

A Heideggerian Account on Sense-certainty through Ent-fernung Based on a Re-entry into Hegel's *Phenomenology*

Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen
University of Southern Denmark

Abstract

This paper presents a Heideggerian account of sense-certainty. As a phenomenon, sense-certainty was originally thematized by Hegel in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a kind of experience that involves what “immediately appears as the richest kind of knowledge” (Hegel 1977, §91, 58). The need for a Heideggerian account of sense-certainty can be motivated as follows: First, Heidegger does not consider sense-certainty in his limited account of perception in *Being and Time*. Second, Hegel's account pushes the onto-theo-ego-logic of the Western philosophical tradition, which Heidegger is critical of. In this paper, I propose that sense-certainty, freed from its onto-theo-ego-logical basis, can be critically reconstrued in relation to Heidegger's notion of de-distancing [Ent-fernung].

Keywords: sense certainty, Heidegger, Hegel, perception, de-distancing

1. Introduction

Heidegger's account on perception in *Being and Time* is limited. Nevertheless, it presents a somewhat clear picture of the role of perception in Heidegger's Dasein-phenomenology. What emerges from the exposition of this work is that Heidegger takes perception to be epistemically inseparable from Dasein's other faculties and attitudes. Perception, he argues, is dependent on Dasein's existential attitudes thus rendering it difficult, if not impossible, to consider it as a stand-alone phenomenon. In particular, Heidegger ascribes understanding epistemic priority over perception:

“Any simple prepredictative seeing of what is at hand is in itself already understanding and interpretive.” (Heidegger 2010a, §32, 144)

In being guided by an antecedent understanding, perception unfolds primarily through our experience of things in their practical significance and in correspondence with their functionality within the context of social practices. Thus, our perception is guided by practical interests and, consequently, by a history of past practical encounters with the world. However, Heidegger also allows for cases of basic perception that, being fundamental, are not directly mediated by practical concerns:

“When we just stare at something, our just-having-it-before-us lies before us *as a failure to understand* it anymore. This grasping which is free of the *as* is a privation of *simple* seeing, which understands; it is not more primordial than the latter, but derived from it. The ontic inexplicitness of the “*as*” must not mislead us into overlooking it as the *a priori* existential constitution of understanding.” (Heidegger 2010a, §32, 145)

The ‘*as*’ mentioned here relates to a point that Heidegger (2010b) also touches upon in his 1925-26 lecture course *Logic: The Question of Truth*, namely, that perceptual acts are somehow enabled by our enactment of so-called ‘*as-structures*’ of experience (e.g., we see things as chairs, people, blackboards). It is through such structures that we come to perceive things in our immediate surroundings (see also Doyon 2016). However, as the quote shows, Heidegger’s point is that even such practically unmediated acts of perception remain conditioned by our understanding-based comportment. They are simply detached from one or more pre-existing ‘*as-structures*’ and, thus, remain epistemically conditioned by our practical understanding. So, even if our understanding plays no active role in our apprehension of the thing, our ability to simply stare at it derives from our initial understanding of the thing in question.

In this paper, I explore a different dimension of a Heideggerian take on perception as I constructively engage with Heidegger’s (1994) 1930-31 lecture course on Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* and, more specifically, how a Heideggerian account on the phenomenon of sense-certainty can be articulated based on such a reading. Sense-certainty,

Hegel stresses, “immediately appears as the *richest* kind of knowledge, indeed a knowledge of infinite wealth for which no bounds can be found” (Hegel 1977, §91, 58). Sense-certainty is the knowledge “which is at the start” (§90, 58) and it is as such epistemically primary to all other kinds of knowledge. Thus, sense-certainty differs, at least in the outset, from the kind of determinate, understanding-driven/-derived perception that Heidegger considers in *Being and Time*.

I.

Before turning to sense-certainty we must first scrutinize the status of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* in light of Heidegger’s critical interpretation as it unfolds in the lecture course. Only by doing so can we understand how to proceed with our constructive interpretation. At the conclusion of Part One, Heidegger summarizes his interpretation, contending that Hegel’s philosophical project should be viewed as the very “completion of Western philosophy” (Heidegger 1994, 126). Heidegger subsequently stresses that Hegel’s work fundamentally aligns with the Western philosophical tradition by adopting and developing an *onto-theo-ego-logic* approach to the question of Being.¹ In this connection, he summarizes Hegel’s position as follows: “for Hegel the absolute (i.e., the true being, the truth) is *spirit*. Spirit is knowledge, λόγος; spirit is I, ego; spirit is God, θεός; and spirit is actuality, beings purely and simply, the *öν*” (ibid.). The quote is central in that it also elicits Heidegger’s criticism of Hegel’s project and, hence, the attempt at uncovering absolute knowledge by locating it in relation to truth and infinity (including the infinity of the ego). However, a paradox emerges since the lecture course ends in a seemingly inconclusive manner. Heidegger remarks that Hegel’s *Phenomenology* remains an open work. Moreover, he explicitly encourages his students to independently make up their minds about it. In this connection, he re-states the purpose of the lecture course: the purpose is for his students to understand that ‘a confrontation’ with Hegel is required (see also, ibid., 30). Despite this, the lecture course appears inconclusive precisely because Heidegger’s final remarks take us back to the

beginning qua ‘the open nature of the work’; it takes us back to reading the *Phenomenology* once again.

But it does so with a twist. Heidegger also mentions his purpose of awakening his students’ *will* “to do justice to the work in its innermost demands” (ibid., 149). I interpret this as suggesting that while Heidegger challenges Hegel’s onto-theo-logical approach and uses this criticism as a foundation for proposing a shift from Hegel’s focus on infinity to the finiteness of existence (specifically addressing the question of ‘where does Man stand’), Heidegger is not advocating for completely dismissing Hegel. On the contrary, the *Phenomenology* ‘remains open’ and should be re-encountered in light of Heidegger’s critical interpretation. One of Heidegger’s basic critical points is that Hegel’s philosophy lacks the “grounding [of] its [own] possibility” (ibid., 149). Therefore, it logically follows that insights from Heidegger’s critical *interpretation* should form the basis for any critical yet constructive re-entry into the *Phenomenology*.²

With his invitation for a re-encounter Heidegger tacitly motivates the workings of a novel dialectical logic. While the *Phenomenology* unfolds its own dialectical movement on the questionable basis of an onto-theo-ego-logic, Heidegger’s position entails a basic dialectical movement between, on the one hand, what is internal to the *Phenomenology* (i.e., how Hegel’s dialectics unfolds in- and for-itself) and, on the other, Heidegger’s basic criticism of the onto-theo-ego-logical elements in the context of his lecture course. Heidegger’s first step is to present a criticism, and the second step is to explore the opening actualized by this criticism. However, the latter cannot be seen in separation from Hegel’s dialectical philosophy as presented in the *Phenomenology*. At the same time, this step goes beyond the content of Heidegger’s lecture course meaning that we will have to charter into unknown territory as we inquire into those aspects of Hegel’s philosophy that can inform us in answering the finite existential question of ‘where does Man stand?’. This question is directly motivated by Heidegger’s criticism of Hegel’s commitment to truth qua absolute knowledge as infinity. The fact that the end of Hegel’s project is

already prefigured in the beginning (cf. above) means that we must begin before “the beginning of the work”. Heidegger asks:

“Is the leap into the whole of the absolute all that is left? In that case, does the problem not become simply the factual issue of executing or re-executing the leap? [...] [P]erhaps man does not stand at all and is rather a transition? [...] Can and should man as transition try to leap himself in order to leave himself behind as finite? Or is his essence not abandonment itself, in which alone what can be possessed becomes a possession?” (ibid., 149)

So, when inquiring into sense-certainty or, for that matter, any other phenomenon or mental faculty dealt with by Hegel, it seems to follow that our re-entry into the *Phenomenology* must give up on Hegel’s assumption that absolute knowledge exists and, hence, comprise the basis for any experience. Specifically, Heidegger explicitly dismisses the idea that a new leap into the absolute from the pre-beginning is sensible; instead, we must inquire into it in relation to our abandonment, which, indeed, pertains to our very Dasein and the fact that we are always-already ahead of ourselves.³

II.

Considering that our interpretative endeavor must remain faithful to the core of Heidegger’s criticism of Hegel’s project, we find that we need to inquire into the phenomenon of sense-certainty by answering the following question:

How is infinity related to sense-certainty in Hegel’s sense and, further, how do we thematize sense-certainty in the absence of such infiniteness i.e., in relation to (finite) Dasein?

The answering of this twofold question connects directly with our attempt to disentangle (or simply, free) sense-certainty from the onto-theo-ego-logical aspects of Hegel’s work. Thus, we hereby assume that sense-certainty is something other than, though not entirely different from, how it was conceived by Hegel. To be more specific: we recognize that there is a perception-driven attitude that grants us seemingly true experiences of things in our surroundings, while simultaneously undergoing changes over time that effectively overthrow our initial sense of certainty regarding the perceived. Indeed, our

initial certainty is challenged by the fact that ‘something’ undergoes a change—either in us, in our relation to the perceived object, or in the circumstances that condition our perception.

When we re-read the *Phenomenology* in light of Heidegger’s criticism it immediately becomes clear that infinity plays a key role to Hegel’s account on sense-certainty. Considering Heidegger’s summary of Hegel’s commitment to the onto-theo-ego-logic this is not surprising at all. Sense-certainty, Hegel writes, is a wholly receptive phenomenon whereby we perceive a thing in an immediate, non-mediated manner. To begin with, we approach the thing through mere receptivity; “we must alter nothing in the object as it presents itself. In apprehending it, we must refrain from trying to comprehend it” (Hegel 1977, §90, 58). The thing is what appears to us in a particular moment.⁴ Sense-certainty is “the richest kind of knowledge, indeed a knowledge of infinite wealth” (§91, 58). This relates to the pre-condition of sense-certainty in the first place, namely the perceiver’s I which is the condition for constituting the truth of the thing in its moment of appearing (cf. §91, p. 59). Given that infinity (qua I) is at the very base of sense-certainty, it makes sense to ask if sense-certainty is perhaps indeed a falsely construed phenomenon given its groundlessness? Yes and no. Yes, if we consider how Hegel explains it. No, if we consider the fact that Hegel’s depiction of sense-certainty somehow resonates with our everyday experiences: things change, perish, etc., and we can have a sense of the fact that the seeming stability of our perception is constantly being challenged as things unfold in the course of the world and in relation to our finite existence. In this connection, we find that Hegel deals with at least two overall ways in which sense-certainty can manifest itself:

Sense-certainty as dialectically constituted. With the purpose of reconstructing sense-certainty in the absence of infinity (qua truth) which is brought about by the equally infinite I, it makes sense to consider Hegel’s brief mentioning of so-called *natural consciousness*. This kind of consciousness is characteristic of the initial phase of sense-certainty where it involves pure receptivity and no mediate comprehension. Here,

the perceiver comes to learn from “experience what is true in [the perceived thing]; but equally it is always forgetting it and starting the movement all over again” (§109, 64). Interestingly, this attitude is not found in animals and, hence, is limited to human Dasein. Hegel points out that the experience of merely staring at objects is not something that animals can have “for they do not just stand idly in front of sensuous things as if these possessed intrinsic being, but, despairing of their reality, and completely assured of their nothingness, they fall to without ceremony and eat them up” (§109, 65). In other words, the depicted receptivity in natural consciousness is tied to human beings. et, what makes sense-certainty possible is the fact that we humans have the possibility to experientially oscillate from so-called natural consciousness, which is initially receptive, to the active, linguistically-mediated comprehension of the thing. Thus, had we only existed as so-called natural consciousness, such an oscillation would be closed off from us, and there would be no sense-certainty. This is because sense-certainty is constituted in a particular constellation involving pure receptivity (immediacy) and its subsequent mediation. It is a dialectical phenomenon. Thus, Hegel writes: “I have this certainty through something else, viz. the thing; and it, similarly is in sense-certainty through something else, viz. through the ‘I’” (§92, 59). And the mediation is brought about by the ‘I’ which evokes *universals* (in the form of concepts) to grasp the thing.

Initially, Hegel argues, we go beyond our receptive experience by adopting an assertive attitude towards the thing by not only asserting that “This is a tree” or “Now is night” but also by putting the truth content of such statements to a test⁵:

“To the question: ‘What is Now?’, let us answer, e.g. ‘Now is Night.’ In order to test the truth of this sense-certainty a simple experiment will suffice. We write down this truth; a truth cannot lose anything by being written down.... If *now, this* noon, we look again at the written truth we shall have to say that it has become stale” (§95, 60)

As Hegel makes clear, we intend the sensed object through our assertions and the concepts we employ. Yet, given the general nature of concepts and, hence, the fact that the sensuous given which we intend through the use of concepts

remains fundamentally unreachable (cf. §110, p. 66). This means that there will necessarily always be unanticipated alternations in the thing or in the mode or context of its presentation that do not correspond to the concept or concepts used in our asserting. Indeed, changes in sense-certainty fundamentally relate to changes in I-thing relation and, more specifically, on the side of both the I and the thing as the former seeks to actively comprehend what is passively experienced in natural consciousness.

Sense-certainty as 'a whole'. Hegel also allows for sense-certainty to happen in an abolished dialectical I-thing relation. There is moment in the progression of sense-certainty where it comprises "a whole which stands firm within itself as immediacy and by so doing excludes from itself all the opposition which has hitherto obtained" (§103, 62). What this entails is that the subject abstains from comparing individual appearances of the perceived thing (i.e., its 'Here's' and 'Now's'). Indeed, the mediacy through active assertion (e.g., 'Now is night') is no longer there, meaning that our experience merely flows with the changing object. Consequently, "this pure immediacy, therefore, no longer has any concern with the otherness of the 'Here', as a tree which passes over into a 'Here' that is not a tree..." (§104, 62). This is enabled by the essence of sense-certainty of being whole. For whereas sense-certainty began as a dialectical movement from a thing to the I (Moment 1); and from I to the thing (Moment 2), it has come to rests through the merging of its two moments expressed in the I and the thing.

So, how do we possibly unify these two aspects of sense-certainty by means of a Heideggerian vocabulary?

III.

Crucially, sense-certainty is not purely receptive. It starts out being so (in the initial part of its *dialectical constitution*) and eventually it gets locked into an experiential immediacy on the basis hereof (in its *being whole*); an immediacy which Hegelian 'consciousness' eventually evolves out of by perceiving the thing in relation to the many Here's

and Now's which the thing is ultimately taken to consist of (cf. §110, 66). Thus, what pertains to the 'essence' of sense-certainty as a dialectical phenomenon is an experiential discrepancy between, on the one hand, what is receptively perceived in immediacy and subsequently comprehended by means of concepts (e.g., "Now is night") and, on the other, a subsequent act of reaffirmation of the truth that "Now is night" that ends up being disconfirmed due to the fact that the I-thing relation, or Dasein, has changed in the meantime. Sense-certainty is an attitude which remains dependent on the subject's intentions; something which Heidegger (1994) also observes.

As to how sense-certainty is initially brought about we can conceive of it in relation to Heidegger's (2010a) underdeveloped notion of *de-distancing* [Ent-fernung]. De-distancing is an indispensable aspect pertaining to Dasein in the sense that bringing something near is fundamentally characteristic of Dasein's basic attitude of care (Heidegger 2010a, §23,104). According to Heidegger, de-distancing pertains 'essentially' to Dasein's being-in-the-world (cf. §23, 105). Nearness should not be understood in the sense of bringing a thing physically near, but instead of bringing one or more things near for circumspection. An act of de-distancing is itself imbued with practical values and a history of past engagements since it de-distances what is at hand "in the surrounding world in a region previously discovered circumspectly" (§23., 105). Yet, as Heidegger also argues, space can indeed also be discovered either unthematically or devoid of circumspection as we simply look at it (§ 24, 109). So, in the case of the first moment of the original dialectical constitution of sense-certainty, Dasein can be said to bring near a particular sensuous given (e.g., 'the night', 'the tree'). This act of de-distancing is enabled by Dasein's understanding-driven comportment towards the thing.⁶ Indeed, Heidegger states that "Every bringing near has always taken a direction in a region beforehand..." and that de-distancing is "guided by the circumspection of heedfulness" (Heidegger 2010a, §23, 105). In other words, Dasein must have a tacit, pre-thematic understanding of the fact that night involves darkness and that

a tree typically consists of a trunk and some branches with leaves and, further, master the use of the relevant concepts (as universals). The certainty itself is what Hegel tacitly treats as the ‘connector’ between the experiencing subject, or I, and the thing (p. 59). In Heideggerian terms, the certainty becomes constitutive of Dasein’s caring in that particular moment and, as having been brought the thing near, Dasein lingers in its mediative relation with the object. Indeed, Hegel (1977) states: “The vanishing of the single Now and Here that we mean is prevented by the fact that I hold them fast” (§101, 61).⁷ And it concerns the fact that the subject is certain of the existence of the passively given thing which has been subsequently comprehended by means of universals (ibid., 58). In fact, as Hegel concludes his account on sense-certainty, the richness of our sensuous experiences escapes words and concepts in the sense that what we mean, or intend, in sense-certainty “cannot be reached by language” (§110, 66).

The second moment of sense-certainty is then Dasein’s attempt at re-evoking or re-affirming what was originally brought near and, hence, which would confirm the truth of the propositions that “Now is night”, “This is a tree” etc. The violation of the certainty comes about once Dasein discovers that the original act of de-distancing cannot be repeated given that that the sensuous given has undergone changes or has ceased to appear/exist. Consequently, Dasein ends up affirming its opposite: “Now is Day, not Night”. What allows for this disconfirmation of the original experience is that something of the original act is kept fast (to paraphrase Hegel) or, simply: it is re-enacted at later point. Indeed, Heidegger writes:

“It is true that Dasein can take the remoteness of something at hand from Dasein to be distance if that remoteness is determined in relation to a thing which is though as being objectively present at a place which Dasein has already occupied. Dasein can subsequently traverse the ‘between’ of this distance, but only in such a way that the distance itself becomes de-distanced” (Heidegger 2010a, §23, 105)

On my reading, the *traversing of distance* (or the de-distancing of a foregoing act of de-distancing) is precisely what Hegel takes the violated sense-certainty to express. It is a subsequent disconfirmation of something which has originally

been affirmed through our apprehension of what was given to us in passive receptivity.

As to the case of the being whole of sense-certainty we find that Dasein does not experientially withdraw from the perceived for a period of time but rather remains experientially engulfed in what it has just brought near. This entails that Dasein supersedes or ignores the mediative relation to the thing which was constitutive of having brought the thing near in the first place. Hegel (1977) explains why:

“This pure immediacy [...] no longer has any concern with the otherness of the ‘Here’, as a tree which passes into a ‘Here’ that is not a tree.... Its truth preserves itself as a relation that remains self-identical, and which makes no distinction of what is essential and what is unessential” (§104, 62)

So, the mediacy involved in the understanding-driven comportment is put aside as the thing comes to be experienced in an unmediated fashion through an immediate experiential flow. Indeed, as Hegel writes in this connection, “were we to examine this truth afterwards, or stand at a distance from it, it would lose its significance entirely” (§105, 63). In Heideggerian terms, it becomes a temporally prolonged staring which, in expressing a distance, or nearness, can always itself be distanced and, hence, come to lose its significance as we come to realize that our relation with the thing has changed.

NOTES

¹ In a critical essay, Gabriel has recently claimed that Heidegger’s overfocusing on this particular aspect of Hegel’s philosophy made him blind of the fact that Hegel actually proposes a particular methodology. Instead, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger claims that Hegel is tied to a vulgar conception of time and, hence, that Hegel merely “looks at historical reality from a fundamentally Christian perspective for which all of historical reality moves toward an endpoint of revelation which is achieved in the Hegelian system” (Gabriel 2021, 355). Hegel basically questions the idea that the mind-independent world can be separated from its mind-dependent counterpart. Consequently, as Gabriel puts it, “Each of the shapes of consciousness discussed in the *Phenomenology* is an attempt to solve this problem by specifying a ratio of mind-dependence and mind-independence for a given paradigm case of intentionality.” (ibid., 354)

² Heidegger's attempt at a re-entry into the *Phenomenology* falls into the second of three overall attitudes adopted by Heidegger towards Hegel in his writings, namely the attempt at assimilating aspects of Hegel's thinking into Heidegger's own project (cf. Souche-Dagues 1992). As such, this attitude comes after Heidegger's dismissal of Hegel's conception of time as it was delivered in the Marburg lectures of 1914/15 and Heidegger's more constructive engagement with Hegel's *Science of Logic* in his 1957-lecture 'The Onto-theological Constitution of Metaphysics'.

³ This relates to Heidegger's general criticism of Hegel's conception of time and, hence, his basic counterclaim in *Being and Time* which Surber summarizes in the following manner "Only because Dasein exists primordially as temporal in its concrete concerns can it become alienated from itself in an objective view of history and time as over against it and determining for it" (Surber 1979, 365). In other words, it is due to our basic, primordial being-in-the-world (qua Dasein) that something like a split between mind-dependent and mind-independent reality is possible in the first place.

⁴ Marder stresses that consciousness is thus assumed to involve the most relative kind of knowledge; "one where the absolute is at the furthest from itself and where it subsists in a negative modality of the 'not-absolute,' while remaining itself." (Marder 2021, 6)

⁵ Indeed, as Trisokkas observes, this relates to Hegel's understanding of Being which Hegel, according to Heidegger, understands as *presence-to-hand* in relation to sense certainty (Trisokkas 2022, 4).

⁶ Sloterdijk remarks that *de-distancing* pertains to Dasein's so-called "primary spatial embeddedness into the world" (Sloterdijk 2012, 36) and that it together with orientation (*Ausrichtung*) comprises the essential traits of Dasein's spatiality. As such, the phenomenon of spatiality was explored by Heidegger with the purpose of overcoming the Cartesian dualism and, hence, the idea that the world can be divided into material and thinking substances where the latter can "withdraw again into his worldless fortress of no extension" (ibid., 38). Indeed, as Sloterdijk observes, Heidegger's counterpoint is that Dasein is always-already world-involving meaning that "even cognition is only a specific mode of dwelling in the spaciousness (*Geräumigkeit*) of the world that is opened through circumspect heedfulness (*Besorgen*)" (ibid., 39).

⁷ As Sinnerbrink notes, Heidegger's criticism of Hegel for having adopted an "extreme formalization of time as a succession of Now moments" is not entirely warranted. Indeed, the fact that Hegel allows for the Now and Here of sense-certainty to eventually become a unity in Place critically demonstrates "the untenability of the abstract punctuality of the Now in the experience of *sense-certainty*." (Sinnerbrink 2007, 135)

REFERENCES

- Doyon, Maxime 2016. "The 'as-structure' of intentional experience in Heidegger and Husserl." In *Phenomenology of Thinking. Investigations into the Character of Cognitive Experience*, edited by Thiemo Breyer & Christopher Gutland, 116-133. Oxon: Routledge
- Gabriel, Markus 2021. „Heidegger on Hegel on Time.” In *The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism and Phenomenology*, edited by Cynthia D. Coe. Palgrave Handbooks in German Idealism. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hegel, G. W. F. 1977. *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Heidegger, Martin. 1994. *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.
- Heidegger, Martin. 2010a. *Being and Time*. Albany: SUNY.
- Heidegger, Martin. 2010b. *Logic: The Question of Truth*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Marder, Michael. 2012. "The Phenomenology of Ontico-Ontological Difference." *Bulletin d'analyse phénoménologique* 8(2): 1-20.
- Sinnerbrink, Robert. 2007. "Sein und geist: Heidegger's confrontation with Hegel's phenomenology." *Cosmos and History* 3(2-3): 132-152.
- Sloterdijk, Peter. 2012. "Nearness and Da-sein: The Spatiality of Being and Time." *Mind, Theory & Culture* 29(4/5): 36-42.
- Souche-Dagues, Denise. 1992. "The Dialogue between Hegel and Heidegger." In *Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments Volume II: History of Philosophy*, edited by Macann, Christopher, 246-276. London: Routledge.
- Surber, Jere P. 1979. "Heidegger's Critique of Hegel's Notion of Time." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 39(3): 358-377.
- Trisokkas, Ioannis. 2022. "Being, Presence, and Implication in Heidegger's Critique of Hegel." *Hegel Bulletin* 44(2): 345-369.

Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen, PhD, Associate Professor. I am researching human socio-practical activity from an interdisciplinary perspective by means of, amongst other things, phenomenological theories (particularly Heidegger). My publications include 'Ensuring Wholeness' (BioSystems – coauthored), 'Concrete Concepts in Basic Cognition' (Philosophia), 'Seeming autonomy, technology and the uncanny valley' (AI and Society), and 'But language too is material!' (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences).

Address:

Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen
Department of Language, Culture, History and Communication
University of Southern Denmark
E-mail: rga@sdu.dk