

The Paradox of Freedom in the Context of Construction and Self-organization of Social Reality

Volodymyr Budz
Ivan Franko National University of Lviv

Abstract

In the article, the paradox of freedom is analyzed from the perspective of phenomenological construction, anthropological and axiological self-organizational processes of social reality. It is substantiated that the paradox of freedom lies in that a person is free in a phenomenological aspect, and therefore can construct social reality freely by phenomenological means. At the same time, a person is subordinated to anthropological necessity, which is clearly manifested on the bodily level. Phenomenological phenomena have an associative and emergent nature, therefore, they are instantaneous, stochastic, dynamic, nonlinear, hence pluralistic, i.e. unfold in the dimension of freedom. However, often such pluralism and freedom end where anthropological necessity starts. Herewith, values that a person constructs phenomenologically cannot be chosen absolutely freely, because all values are connected to providing anthropological needs. Therefore, human life is realized simultaneously through phenomenological freedom and axiological necessity. A human is a free creature and can choose their life's way, but the optimal choice forces them to select something that is not harmful on the level of anthropological needs, i.e., the optimal choice is performed under the 'pressure' of necessity.

Keywords: free will, freedom, freedom of action, freedom of choice, determinism, indeterminism, humane values, responsibility, phenomenology of freedom

1. Introduction: the Nature of Paradox of Freedom in the Existential Dimension

Freedom is a universal existential value, which is the most desirable for human self-realization in the context of choice of optimal ways of one's existence and the establishment of social interactions. In such an aspect, social relations tend to

self-organize based on the value of freedom, i.e., all social relations are spontaneously directed at freedom and values that 'support' freedom.

However, a person can have real freedom of choice only in the phenomenological aspect. He/she can construct certain axiological behavior models and possible social worlds on the phenomenological level. But a person does not possess freedom regarding their physical being, in particular physiological and biological needs. The latter create the basis for ontological determinism in human behavior, which is manifested on the level of values, which for the most part are self-organizational in character since they are 'derivative' from anthropological needs.

The essence of the paradox of freedom is that a person allegedly chooses freely anything that they want by phenomenological means. That is, it usually seems that there is absolute freedom of choice and the possibility of construction of some desirable social worlds. However, any choice is not a free construction of social reality because it is determined by life values, which, in their turn, satisfy basic anthropological needs. Hence, the paradoxicality of freedom consists in the fact that a person chooses primarily those values and constructs those relations that are *given beforehand in their anthropological boundaries and do not contradict them*. Otherwise, free choice is dangerous to health, human life, and social surrounding since human is both rational and mortal creature. Therefore, although freedom of choice does exist, mostly it is directed at that value system, which supports human life. Hence, the paradox of freedom is that any freedom of choice is constructed by a human, but at the same time, it is determined by axiological and anthropological factors. Therefore, freedom of choice has a self-organizational nature, which depends on existential values. Consequently, social reality, in general, has self-organizational nature and is unfolded within the boundaries of values that correlate with human nature.

The foundation to the emergence of the paradox of freedom is the correlation between spiritual and bodily beginnings in humans. Human is a *free being* in a spiritual aspect, there are no limitations since a human arbitrarily constructs various conditions of social existence by

phenomenological means. At the same time, he/she is a *captive*, in the corporal aspect in particular, in which objective self-organizational regularities exist concerning the possibilities and needs of the human body. In *the paradox of freedom are expressed the peculiarities of phenomenological construction of social reality, and on the other hand, self-organizational aspects of becoming of social existence based on anthropological needs and correspondent values are manifested*. In such an aspect, social reality depends not only on the values that are freely *constructed* on the phenomenological level but also on the anthropological needs that *self-organizationally* influence the objective regularities in social processes and have the dimension of existential necessity.

In the spiritual aspect, human freedom can be interpreted as its most irreducible value (Holda 2019, 136), as the most important phenomenon of human life (Sosnowska 2019, 244). However, on the corporal level freedom is limited by objective material phenomena and laws, and anthropological needs. If in the spiritual dimension a human can be absolutely free in their thoughts and have absolute freedom of creativity and social construction, then on the corporal level there is no freedom since a human is 'tied' to biological and ecological conditions of existence and depends on them absolutely. From this perspective, a human spirit is directed at absolute freedom, however, human corporeality is determined by natural phenomena, and therefore it brings a human into the sphere of objective self-organizational dependencies.

To my mind, based on the correlation of corporal and spiritual beginnings in a human, in the dimension of social reality appears the paradox of freedom, which will be the *object* of this study. Accordingly, the *aim* of the study is to generalize different dimensions of the paradox of freedom and establish its specifics in the context of phenomenological construction and anthropological and axiological self-organizational social reality.

2. Moral Dimension of the Paradox of Freedom

Good free will, benevolent choice, and benevolent behavior based on humane values are never limited in any

community, on the contrary, they are desirable and considered universal values. In this aspect, based on humane values, in particular, the value of freedom, self-organizational processes of formation of social reality may happen. The latter may be even left uncontrolled since the freedom of actions, free will, and freedom of choice will have in such case a humane and benevolent character. In this aspect, *humane axiology can have a self-organizational dimension*, which creates the basis for the absolute freedom of actions. A human can be granted absolute freedom, but only on the condition that this freedom will have a humane and benevolent dimension.

Social limitations are applied only to evil free will, criminal actions, and behavior in the case if free human will denies humane values. In this aspect, one can agree with the thought that “freedom is desirable if it has good consequences” (Vaubel 2019, 320). Human freedom and free will are not limited if they have benevolent and humane consequences. In such a sense, to gain absolute freedom it is necessary to act benevolently and based on humane values. Therefore, absolute freedom is humaneness and charity.

But humane and benevolent activity should be voluntary and should not have any coercion to benevolence and humanness. If a human is forced to act in a humane and benevolent way, then the freedom of choice is limited. That is, the coercion itself is inhumane, however, at the same time common sense points to the expediency of such ‘coercion to humanness’. In this aspect, I agree with the idea that

the issue of moral responsibility arises with reference to voluntary actions alone. Human beings are morally responsible for their actions because they are expected to perform actions complying with their rational choice and reasoning. Further, to become morally responsible, it necessarily implies one must be self-conscious about his/her actions. Again, one must have the freedom to choose an action out of many alternatives. (Suresh and Sethy 2020, 150–151)

Paradoxically, but the coercion to good, humanness, and benevolence does not contradict the basic human rights, however, it simultaneously logically contradicts the notion of freedom in its primary definition. The notion of freedom in its ontological dimension presupposes the absence of coercion of any kind. In this aspect “the original meaning of freedom is

freedom from coercion” (Vaubel 2019, 326). However, a human in a community must voluntarily perform an axiological self-coercion since he/she should control the actions that can have a criminal resonance. Besides, a society performs coercion regarding the limitation of criminal actions concerning humane values based on moral and legal norms.

On this basis, a moral dimension of the paradox of freedom becomes clear, the essence of which is that freedom is unlimited and absolute only concerning benevolent actions, however, regarding criminal acts freedom is limited absolutely. Therefore, a human does not possess the absolute freedom of any actions since absolute freedom of any actions can be harmful to social reality in the case if human acts are criminal. In this aspect, a human does not have freedom in the ontological sense – the sense of physical activity but does possess it in the spiritual sense only – in freedom of thoughts and dreams.

If a human possesses absolute freedom of actions in a humane and benevolent aspect, then such benevolent freedom receives a self-organizational dimension, i.e., people will strive to it spontaneously as to a value that can structure social reality. In such an aspect, social reality can have a self-organizational dimension, which may occur on the axiological level, which, in general, has a benevolent and humane character. Therefore, a human can choose and construct absolutely freely only humane values and benevolent behavior. On the other hand, the self-organizational level of social reality is tracked also on the corporal level, where human freedom is limited by natural and genetic determinism. The latter induce humans to act in the dimensions of necessity, limiting their free choice with the system of existentially important values.

3. The Paradox of Freedom in the Context of Innate Human Inclinations

If the values and rights of humans had innate nature, they would be unchanged and identical in all societies, they would not depend on various mental identifications. Therefore, if freedom had an innate origin, (that is given to a person before any experience), it would be given to all once and forever and nobody could limit the freedom of another. If the freedom is

innate in the ontological understanding, then it would have a necessary character, the freedom itself would be social regularity. Hence, for example, the phenomenon of slavery in such a case would be impossible.

Let us suppose that a human has indeed ‘innate freedom’. If this assumption is true and accurate in the nature of things at this moment, then the *paradox regarding the correlation of freedom and responsibility* arises. If freedom is given on the ontological level innately as a regularity, then why do people act irresponsibly? The phenomenology of freedom with the necessity presupposes the existence of responsibility, therefore if the freedom is innate, then the beliefs, values, and feelings related to it should also be innate, in particular responsibility. It would be logically controversial for the absolute innate freedom on the ontological level to exist without the innate ideas of *free will* and *moral responsibility*. In this case, if freedom were innate on the ontological level, we would have an ‘absolute moral subject’, who would be absolutely free and simultaneously morally responsible. On the other hand, if only freedom were innate, but not the responsibility, we would have an ‘absolutely selfish subject’ since their absolute freedom without responsibility as a factor of its containment would transform into absolute arbitrariness.

In the *ontological* dimension, a human being has sooner not freedom, but rather *physical autonomy*. That is a person can be relatively autonomous in the physical space and time concerning natural phenomena. Nature and the conditions of existence (including the human genome) cannot be the basis of *innate freedom as the intersubjective social value* and *free will as a moral category*.

The value of freedom and a human right to freedom is not given innately to humans, they occur in social space-time. They become possible based on their phenomenological construction – the theoretical substantiation or on a social agreement that presupposes which rights and values should be considered universal. A human being ‘receives’ their rights and freedoms not from existence and its objective factors, but from *society, which, in general, functions as a system of phenomenological phenomena*. Society itself ‘guarantees’ a

human their rights and values, which are possible based on the collective recognition and defense.

Rights and values are not given to humans by objective factors that have a predominantly mechanistic nature based on natural forces and interactions. They are recognized on the level of consensus, are *logically* substantiated, interpreted by subjects, this testifies about their *social* and at the same time *phenomenological* constructive nature. That is, a society in some period of time recognizes or denies some set of rights and values. Hence, freedom and free will are not innate, but rather constructed and self-organized in society on the phenomenological level based on the axiological and moral phenomena. Hence, innate freedom is impossible, since it has a phenomenological foundation, which in various cultures constructs differently the relation to the value of freedom.

4. The Paradox of Freedom and Free Will from the Perspective of Ontological Determinism

The substantiation of the absence of freedom and free will is characteristic of various types of determinism. In particular, “[...] incompatibilists believe that free will is incompatible with determinism and determinism is a fact, so they are stuck with a world in which there is no such thing as free will” (Pockett 2007, 282). But if there is no freedom at all, that is the absolute necessity rules, then any actions of humans are neither free nor moral since there is no free choice. In such a case, a human cannot be responsible for his/her actions since any action happens due to its necessity. Hence, for example, criminal behavior and aggression are self-organized and therefore justified from the point of view of ontological determinism, because the nature of things is arranged in this way. In this aspect “the traditional philosophical debates about free will take it that the most natural and important potential challenge to people’s belief in freedom and responsibility is determinism” (Nahmias, Coates, and Kvaran 2007, 216).

From determinism logically emerges the *idea of the impossibility of freedom and free will*. It lies in the following: if there is no freedom and free will because there is a rigid determinism, (which is inherent to all phenomena of existence

and the genetic nature of humans), then subsequently the level of moral responsibility of humans should be extremely low since they would not be able to change something in their lives. Hence, there is no sense to be responsible for one's actions since all is subordinated to necessity. In this aspect, truly, "[...] if the physicists then tell us that our universe is ultimately deterministic, we will not then need to convince people that we are free and responsible agents" (Nahmias, Coates, and Kvaran 2007, 237). However, "[...] doubting one's free will may undermine the sense of self as agent" (Vohs and Schooler 2008, 54), which can be the reason for the spreading of asociality and social chaos.

Considering the paradox of freedom and free will in the context of determinism, one should bear in mind that determinism reflects the ontological dimension of existence in the first place, and responsibility and freedom are categories of social and moral human life. Therefore, to my mind, *from rigid ontological determinism and fatalism there are two exceptions – a human being and society*. A human being by their will and consciousness cannot change the natural phenomena and their laws, their own genome, instincts, and physiological needs. However, human beings are absolutely capable of changing and constructing the social being through their will and mind, interpersonal relations in the being, and change on the moral level voluntarily and deliberately. Therefore, even if rigid determinism is a fact, i.e., it's presently active, then a human being does have free will and can construct society.

Humans in the moral sense are not subordinated to natural or genetic determinism since they rationally and based on will transform the influence of natural factors and genetic information. They are even capable of resisting the natural needs and instincts based on worldview and will, e.g., lead and ascetic way of life, sacrifice their own life for the sake of ideals, that is they can overcome the instinct of self-preservation. Humans in their moral behavior are led not by natural needs, but by values. That is why they through the axiological and phenomenological aspect of their nature can overcome natural determinism and be free.

Even if a person lives in unbearable social conditions, e.g., slavery, totalitarianism, under the rule of radical movements, these antihuman social conditions were created by other people who demonstrate their will and actions in an antihuman sense. Consequently, in no society, there never was, never is, and never will be a rigid causal determinism concerning free will and freedom of choice. All reasons for social existence are connected with the rational and emotionally volitional nature of humans, which can be changed and constructed if desired or by upbringing. Human is not ‘thrown’ in existence due to objective circumstances. He/she is not ‘lost’ in cruel and indifferent existence, because existence does not have moral or axiological characteristics. Existence does not have consciousness and is not a subject that is capable of being responsible for its actions. A human should be perceived as the one who lives not just in being (in nature, in the universe), but as one who resides in social being. The latter requires the phenomenology of freedom from humans, that is the realization of freedom of choice and moral responsibility. That is, each person creates their own existence, and members of the community by aggregate rational and emotionally volitional efforts construct different dimensions of social existence.

The universe at the level of its fundamental interactions is absolutely determined. But *moral and axiological human behavior is the only exception to such absolute determinism of the universe*. The determinism of natural phenomena (physical, chemical, biochemical, genetic) should not be equated with moral behavior. Ontological and moral phenomena do not have commensurate volumes of concepts and a common logical basis of division, i.e., they have different essential features.

Determinism affects only a human as a living and bodily creature, however, it is not commensurate with social and moral human life, with the freedom of choice and free will. Therefore, the position of compatibilism, which is “[...] seen as rendering the existence of free will compatible with the existence of determinism” (Pockett 2007, 282) is debatable. *Determinism is possible only concerning natural phenomena, but not social or moral*. That is social and moral phenomena should not be interpreted in the physical sense. There is no

absolute determinism and no necessary causation in social phenomena. The social future is devoid of determinism and is always uncertain simply because human acts are based on moral and axiological choices and freedom of will. In this aspect, I agree with the following: “determinism, an aspect of causal theory, is not a thing capable of sabotaging our choices” (Douglass 2020, 9).

People at all times and in all nations have had, have, and will have a completely different personal consciousness and morality, have lived, live, and will live in different types of cultures and civilizations. However, for example, animals have always led, lead, and will lead the same way of life, because their biological processes are completely determined. Animals, unlike humans, do not lead a social life based on morality, law, and the alternative values they offer. Animals cannot act morally because they lack rationality, which is the ontological precondition of the construction of freedom as value. In this sense, it is the mind and abstract thinking that are the means of ‘liberating’ humans from the conditions of absolute natural determinism.

A human is always morally responsible for one’s actions and can make free choices no matter what external natural or social circumstances surround them. Of course, in conditions of, for example, military conflicts, morality and law degrade, human rights are violated. But, for example, even in very stable and modern liberal-democratic societies of Europe, immorality, and crime do not disappear completely. Therefore, no matter what the social circumstances are and no matter how complex the socio-political relations are, what ontological factors are at work, a human is necessarily morally responsible for their actions. No matter what temptations and desires a person has, he/she is always responsible for one’s actions. But freedom should not be understood as freedom of action, because freedom is the unity of action and choice. However, for example, V. Wagner (2017, 2805) talks about the freedom of action as the universal type of freedom and believes that “an agent is free in her action only if no description of this action that the agent considers in her decision for doing so is in painful conflict with one of her strong desires” (Wagner 2017, 2809). However, the

essence of freedom is precisely to overcome one's excessive selfish desires for the common good. *Freedom is not an ontological but a moral category*, and therefore it should not be considered as freedom of action, but as freedom of one's choice and other people's choice, which they consciously construct.¹

Freedom and free will in most cases are based on common sense and pragmatism. A person chooses mainly those alternative scenarios and makes those decisions that do not contradict their material and spiritual capabilities, i.e., their anthropological bases. That is, these decisions do not significantly deny their existential needs and material and spiritual values. In this aspect indeed "free will is the ability of an agent to select an option (behavior, object, etc.) from a set of alternatives" (Mick 2008, 17). However, any human choice is directed not just to an alternative, but the *most optimal version* of possible actions and worlds, because the measure of choice is anthropological factors – human life, health, and other existential values. Therefore, human choice in most cases is *pragmatic*, this indicates the self-organizational character of social reality, which depends on anthropological needs. A person rationally chooses not just an alternative but considers the most optimal and effective choice, which would existentially suit not only them but also the social environment. In this context *responsibility*, to my mind is not just a worldview belief that is important in the organization of social interactions, it is not just an 'invention' of the mind, but rather a *self-organizational existential need*.² Worldview is the basis of choice of alternatives, but it is not the worldview that makes a person responsible for a choice, but their existence, the actual need to preserve life, and the values on which it is based. Therefore, the condition for the emergence of a sense of responsibility and at the same time the idea of free will is not social conditions and norms, but anthropological reasons – human mortality, the 'fragility' of existence, the need for health, freedom, property. Hence human is more responsible in the situation on which their existential needs depend. Therefore, often the phenomenological activity of the human mind is caused not by clear reason, but by anthropological needs. Hence, although a human chooses freely, but chooses not

anything there is, but only those variants that are the most optimal ways of satisfaction their anthropological needs. In such a sense *human choice simultaneously: 1) has an element of free constructing of possible social worlds and 2) has an element of anthropological self-organization of society.*

In such a case there is no absolute determinism regarding free will and freedom, there is only a *logical mistake* of comparison of ontological and moral causes of human behavior. In my opinion, ontological reasons (including physical, chemical, biochemical, genetic processes) are in no way able to influence the moral freedom of choice. They only self-organizationally stipulate the physical and productional human actions, self-organizationally determine the specifics of human labor and life, but do not determine their moral choice or the moral progress of a society.³

5. The Paradox of Freedom and Free Will in the Context of Genetic Determinism

One of the variants of determinism – genetic determinism presupposes that human behavior and their sociality depend on the human genome. If we suppose that genetic determinism at this time is a truly credible fact, then most likely the behavior of all people and the ways of their sociality should be identical. The human genome is generally unchanged, therefore all people should have had the same innate predispositions to, for example, selfishness or altruism, or to criminal or benevolent behavior without any alternatives. However, the experience of social life indicates that human behavior and the ways of their sociality are not identical but have alternative manifestations.

Of course, a human acts and works in order to survive and satisfy physiological needs, because without their satisfaction a person will die. But the choice of how to meet these needs is already social and moral, i.e., it does not depend on genetic information. The human genome and physiological needs, in general, affect only its production activities, work, lifestyle, nutrition, life, but not moral choices. That is, free choice, freedom of choice, benevolent or criminal behavior do

not depend on the genome, which is manifested in instincts and physiological needs.

Human as a living being at the level of his/her genetics and physiology, at the level of biological phenomena, is determined by genetic processes, which indicate to some aspect of naturalistic self-organization of social reality. But human is not only a living, material, corporeal being, but also a social being. Therefore, a person is and can be morally free and morally responsible because moral responsibility is the result not of material, biological, genetic, but social existence.

The human genome, genetic processes, physiological phenomena can be interpreted to some extent as mechanistic phenomena. In the genetic sense, the human body can also be considered a self-organizational mechanism that develops based on causal relationships, regardless of the will and consciousness of a human. But consciousness and will are purely phenomenological processes that are not subject to mechanical and linear causal relationships, but, on the contrary, are stochastic, dynamic, and nonlinear. That is, will and consciousness are not mechanical, but self-organizational by character, which is based not on genetic information, but *on the creative nature of consciousness*. At the same time, morality as a phenomenon of consciousness cannot have a mechanistic and linear causal dimension because it proposes alternative choices to humans. In this aspect morality has self-organizational dimensions, it is a dynamic system, for 'the point of bifurcation' within morality is the situation of moral choice, which is a critical one since the whole subsequent course of social events depends on it. Herewith, the situation of moral choice is always characterized by dynamism, uncertainty, and unpredictability, and a person when choosing is constantly in a state of uncertainty, doubt, phobias, which express the negative phenomenology of freedom.

Human consciousness and will are not directly determined by biochemical processes. The latter directly determine only the activity of the brain and nervous system. But the results of the activity of the brain and nervous system (thoughts, ideas, emotions, feelings, will, meanings, values, values), which are realized through thinking, memory,

attention, perception, imagination have logical and creative nature, although they also have biochemical origins. That is why the *results of thinking possess self-organizational characteristics*, actually dynamic, stochastic, and nonlinear. In this aspect, I disagree with the position of libertarians and a concept of free will, according to which “[...] one must necessarily be a full-blown dualist with regard to the nature of consciousness – that is to say, one must regard consciousness as being a non-physical phenomenon” (Pockett 2007, 282). As S. Pockett thinks “[...] libertarians essentially have to be dualists in respect of the nature of consciousness, and dualists face the perennial problem of how a non-physical consciousness could interact with a physical brain” (Pockett 2007, 282-283). Consciousness has biological grounds, its foundation is genetic information, nervous system, and brain. In this aspect, for example, M. Butnariu and I. Sarac trace the close relationship of psychic and biological factors and assume that “almost all hormones are involved in emotions [...]. Emotional self-regulation cannot be achieved without hormones” (Butnariu and Sarac 2019, 2), while “the brain is a place where there are innumerable chemical reactions that change our emotions, behavior, and even the way we think” (Butnariu and Sarac 2019, 2). In a similar aspect, a group of other researchers claims that “emotions are complex chemical reactions in nervous system characterized by neurophysiologic changes associated with thoughts and behavioral responses” (Varsha et al. 2020, 26), that is “[...] emotion is defined as the complex collection of chemical and neural responses initiated by brain which have physical and mental components [...]” (Varsha et al. 2020, 26). Therefore, if biochemical processes can still be interpreted in the context of determinism, then the phenomena of consciousness are already a consequence of these phenomena. It is not purely material, but also mental, besides, the phenomena of consciousness are already phenomenological processes that have only indirect biochemical origins. Consciousness in its origins is subordinated to genetic determinism. However, its phenomenological content is not subject to any determinism and is a means of construction of

social reality. In such an aspect genetic determinism does not deny the possibility of freedom and free moral human choice.

6. The Paradox of Freedom and Free Will in the Context of Psychological Determinism

The main idea of different types of psychological determinism is based on the fact that the activity of human consciousness, including moral choice, is determined by the biological basis of consciousness (brain), subconsciousness, or the already existing prior psychic experience. However, the phenomenological phenomena that are included in the structure of consciousness (thoughts, ideas, emotions, feelings, will, senses, meanings, values) by their nature, to my mind, are rather *indeterministic*, i.e., have stochastic, dynamic, nonlinear characteristics, which are embodied in different worldviews, different values systems, various identifications, various mentality.

Such dynamism, stochasticity, and nonlinearity of the phenomenological phenomena are possible even though the nature of biochemical and nervous processes and the specifics of laws of human thinking on the abstract level are the same for all people. In their thoughts, emotions, feelings, the system of values a human has absolute freedom. At least in creativity, this independence of human consciousness from psychological determinism is absolute because one cannot predict the end result of the creative process.⁴

In thoughts, emotions, feelings, and value system of humans there exists absolute freedom. A human is capable to control his/her phenomenological processes and intentionally produce them, can make choices, that is, to have only controlled and deliberate freedom of choice and responsibility. In this aspect, as C. Douglass points out “the concept of freedom must be developed on the level of and in relation to agency, and to do that one must see the agent as a controller, exercising control and making choices” (Douglass 2020, 10). Control and choice are phenomenological processes that the subject performs consciously and responsibly. In a similar aspect, a group of researchers thinks that “[...] conceptualization of free will as consisting of self-control, following rules, and making

enlightened decisions is more plausible (as compared to free will as random behavior) from an evolutionary perspective [...]” (Baumeister et al. 2008, 6), that is, in general, “...understanding of free will entails rational choice, self-control, and following rules” (Baumeister et al. 2008, 12). Free will as an element of the phenomenology of freedom is based on rational self-control, conscious decision making, i.e., the basis of free will is the mind in this case. In this aspect, it should be taken into account that “[...] the Enlightenment itself, in its view of reason as the instrument by which freedom is achieved, takes reason itself as offering a certain “technology” of freedom. Reason is the means to freedom [...]” (Malpas 2018, 96). However, the weight of reason for the realization of freedom is not only a paradigm of Enlightenment, but also an existential need of arrangement of social relations, which should have been rationally controlled by people, and not by some irrational or external factors. At the same time, it should be noted that “[...] the “choice” lacking freedom is, in fact, irrational” (Bondor 2019, 267), that is, not only the mind is the reason of freedom, but freedom of choice is the reason of rational behavior.

The lack of freedom of choice is characteristic of psychological determinism, which presupposes that human thinking is absolutely determined by mechanical means, i.e., by biochemical and physical processes at the level of the nervous system and brain. The beginnings of thinking really have physical and biochemical grounds. But the *results of thinking* (the actual phenomenological results) – thoughts, ideas, emotions, feelings, will, meanings, values are the phenomena of consciousness, the content and meaning of which cannot be linearly determined by any even the most significant objective factor (genetic in particular) since *they* function based on the semantic connections. In such a sense the ideas of *psychological determinism* in regards toward freedom and free will are paradoxical because the beginnings of thinking although are subordinated to determinism, the *results of thinking in their nature are indeterministic*, i.e., function as a free (associative) combination of senses. A free (associative) combination of senses in consciousness is the prerequisite to the freedom of choice and free will.

The inability of *psychological determinism* to positively resolve the issue of freedom and free will is based on the fact that human behavior and choices are ‘instantaneous’ and ‘new’ each time, i.e., they are nonlinear and stochastic. Hence each human choice is made not by the same linear algorithm (scenario), but it is always pluralistic. The pluralism of choice is caused by the *associative and emergent nature of human phenomenology*, which is nonlinear and stochastic. Therefore, whatever the *previous* knowledge and experience, systems of values, and beliefs of humans, they do not significantly affect the *current* choice and *current* human behavior. The latter is carried out each time in a completely new system of ‘phenomenological coordinates’ (thoughts, ideas, emotions, feelings, will, senses, meanings, values),⁵ which are extremely dynamic. Hence the paradoxical conclusion that *freedom is possible only because of the stochasticity, dynamism, and nonlinearity of the phenomenological processes*. Hence, the psychological determinism regarding the understanding of freedom of choice stands on false positions, since phenomenological processes are *stochastic, dynamic, and nonlinear* and simultaneously have associative nature, i.e., they spontaneously encourage humans to act freely and creatively. In such an aspect a human is ‘doomed’ to be free because their thinking’s nature is stochastic and denies the ideas of psychological determinism. Consequently, it is paradoxical, but the freedom of action and choice is rather a self-organizational phenomenon, which is based on the nature of human thinking, and not the nature of constructing of social relations and their values.

7. Conclusions

The paradox of freedom is based on the correlation of spiritual and material factors of human nature. Humans can freely construct any possible social worlds on the spiritual level. However, the choice of the social world and the way of its construction is self-organizational because they are limited by axiological systems. The latter are ‘derivative’ from anthropological needs that express the existential necessity.

The existential dimension of the paradox of freedom is based on the fact that a human is a *free creature in a spiritual dimension*, in which he/she freely constructs the social conditions of his/her existence. However, he/she simultaneously is subordinated to the necessity, which expresses bodily factors of human nature. Hence, the existential dimension of the paradox of freedom combines simultaneously: 1) the freedom of phenomenological construction of social reality and 2) self-organizational aspects of the establishment of social being based on the existential values and anthropological needs that exist with necessity since values and needs correlate with human corporeality.

The moral aspect of the paradox of freedom lies in that the manifestation of goodwill, benevolence, and voluntariness based on the realization of humane values that have the dimension of absolute freedom and can be the ground of self-organization of social reality. The coercion concerning freedom of human actions is applied only regarding evil free will and criminal actions that deny humane values. In such a sense evil free will undergoes social construction based on its limitation.

The innate freedom as a moral category is impossible because it presupposes innate moral responsibility. If innate freedom were possible an absolutely responsible moral subject will be possible also, who would appear self-organizationally. Freedom and free will as moral categories are the consequences of the phenomenological construction of social reality, which presupposes the substantiation of the value of freedom and free will. On the other hand, freedom cannot but be unjustified as a value because freedom is a fundamental and necessary anthropological need.

If ontological determinism denies the existence of freedom at all, including moral one, (because moral actions are also subordinated to absolute necessity), then in such case a human is not a moral creature. The requirement for humans to be responsible in such conditions is absurd because any type of behavior is only a consequence of the nature of things. The idea of rigid determinism denies the possibility of social constructing and social self-organization because in this case a human is not an independent subject.

Genetic determinism is based on the idea of the absolute dependence of freedom and sociality on the human genome. However, the human genome affects with necessity only the self-organization of material foundation of thinking, and the result of this thinking tends to free and associative construction of senses.

To explain the freedom of choice based on the grounds of psychological determinism is impractical since phenomenological phenomena have stochastic, dynamic, nonlinear characteristics, they can appear and disappear instantaneously. Such characteristics of phenomenological phenomena are caused by the associative and synergic nature of human thinking, which functions as a system of senses. Each moral choice is performed not based on a 'stiffened' linear algorithm but has various alternatives that depend on the synergic combination of thoughts, ideas, emotions, feelings, will, meanings, values.

The ideas of different types of determinism can be applied only in the explanation of a human as a living and corporeal creature. But determinism is not a fact of social and moral human life. There exists no type of determinism regarding free will and freedom since determinism is based on the logical mistake of correlation of ontological and moral factors of human behavior. Freedom is not ontological, but a moral category. Therefore, it should be understood not as freedom of physical activity, but as freedom of axiological and moral constructing and choice between various alternative value systems. However, at the same time freedom has also a self-organizational dimension, which depends on the nature of human thinking, which is stochastic and nonlinear.

NOTES

¹ The freedom of an individual is limited by the arbitrariness of others, which does not depend on determinism, but only on their immoral position. Therefore, any restriction of human freedom has a social dimension.

² If the phenomenon of responsibility can be traced back in the evolutionary sense, then most likely responsibility is not of mental origin, but of existential. That is, responsibility is self-organizationally 'derived' from the biological essence of human – life. In fact, human mortality significantly

affects the formation of responsibility and freedom and the correction of social norms. However, human behavior and choices are influenced not simply by mortality as a *process* of biological termination of life caused by genetic determinism, but rather by: 1) awareness of mortality and 2) fear of death as a result of this awareness. Therefore, the direct source of responsibility is phenomenological phenomena. On the basis of reason, a person is able to overcome the fear of death with the help of religious and philosophical ideas about the immortality of the soul.

³ No society has a significant progress in moral aspect since *the carrier of phenomenology of morality* (as well as *the carrier of phenomenology of freedom*) is each individual mortal subject. The latter, unfortunately, cannot transfer their morality and personal phenomenological experience to future generations by technical means. A person can transmit to others through technical means only information about their phenomenological states, but not the direct experience of emotions, feelings, will, experience of choice and their moral qualities. Similarly, in the measurement of the human genome, only genetic information is transmitted, which contains the ability to think, speak and the appearance of consciousness based on the nervous system and the brain. However, the logic of thinking is social, and the specifics of individual phenomenology are not passed down from generation to generation. Therefore, each subject learns to experience one's feelings anew, re-creates morality and freedom.

⁴ It would be absurd to assume that this article in its final version, together with a fixed number of words, a list of references and a structure was caused by some type of psychological determinism. What exactly will be the sequence of words in sentences, the sequence of paragraphs, the final structure and ideas of the article in the process of writing it is still unknown. Even writing this footnote, I still do not know exactly how they will end. It happens due to *human consciousness being associative and emergent*. Hence, all previous experience in the form of clear knowledge and thoughts becomes 'blurred'. That is, all the acquired knowledge seems to 'dissolve' in the structure of consciousness. There are no clear sentences and fixed knowledge in it, but there is their *semantic integrity* in the form of an *emergent gestalt* (which, by the way, is also not stable, but one that is constantly evolving). Therefore, the term '*emergent gestalt*', which I have just coined, is not very apt for the characterization of consciousness, but its origin is hardly due to any of the types of determinism. Our thoughts do not depend on being and not on the specifics of the biochemical work of the brain, but on those semantic connections of our consciousness that characterize consciousness as an emergent gestalt.

⁵ Imagine a 'phenomenological cocktail' of thoughts, ideas, emotions, feelings, will, meanings, values, which is 'mixed' in the mind every day and supplemented with new components. *Phenomenological phenomena are in synergy* and therefore have an *emergent effect*. Any new phenomenological component (for example, a new idea, emotion, feeling) can significantly change the previous experience and worldview, because emergent interaction affects not only the adjacent elements of the system, but the system as a whole. In this sense, human *consciousness* and *will* are a self-organizational

consequence of *emergence* and *associativity* of human phenomenology. Therefore, it is impossible to predict what *they* will be in the next moment. Hence psychological determinism (including worldview and mental) does not exist, because their phenomenological components are dynamic and stochastic.

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Volodymyr Budz: Ph.D. in philosophy, Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy, Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, Lviv, Ukraine. Primary philosophical interest lies in the areas of social ontology, social phenomenology, philosophical anthropology, axiology, ethics. Published 6 monographs and more than 90 scientific articles. The latest publication: "Anthropological and Axiological Dimensions of Social Expectations and their

Influence on Society's Self-Organization". *Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research* 18: 76-86. <https://doi.org/10.15802/ampr.v0i18.221379>.

Address:

Volodymyr Budz
1 Universytetska Street,
Room No.: 316
Department of Philosophy,
Ivan Franko National University of Lviv
Lviv, 79007, Ukraine
E-mail: volodymyr.budz@lnu.edu.ua