The critique of the constitution model of “apprehension - content of apprehension” in Husserl’s On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time

Abstract

The aim of this article is to analyze the problems found by Husserl regarding the application of the constitution scheme of “apprehension-content of apprehension” as a model of understanding the deepest levels (tiefsten Stufe) of time constitution. Such analysis will deal with the first period, in which Husserl investigates in a systematic way time constitution, i.e. in texts from Husserliana X (1893-1917). Firstly, in texts from Husserliana X, Husserl applies the scheme of constitution apprehension-content of apprehension as a way to describe all temporal constitution. Secondly (from 1909 on) Husserl observes that the application of this interpretative scheme to describe the lowest levels (untersten Stufen) of temporal constitution leads to serious problems, such as an inevitable infinite regression and a fall into an understanding founded on “prejudices of the now”. To overcome such obstacles, Husserl tried to deepen his analysis of the lowest level of temporal constitution and found out that the absolute flow (and its own modes of consciousness, viz., primal impression, retention, protention) is the last level of all constitution of temporality.

Keywords: Husserl, apprehension, content, intentionality, constitution, retention, time, absolute flow


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