

## **The Ground of Experience: Implications in the Constitution of Judgments in Husserl's Phenomenology**

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### **Abstract**

This research will attain mainly in the work of Husserl called *Experience and Judgment*. This book traces the possibility of a common ground for judgments in the way that it can raise new perspectives, facing its limits and variations. Husserl fosters an implication between the Ego and the world through the living experience in the process of constitution itself. Therefore, every abstraction, imagination, subjectivity, objectivity and even hallucinations take a stand on the same ground and follow some same identic logical structures. It does not mean a deterministic point of view, but a latent process of constitution of meaning that goes forever on a march; the march of our living experience.

**Keywords:** experience, judgments, ego, world, implication

### **1. The unification of consciousness through the effective power on the Ego**

In the chapter I of his book: *Experience and Judgment*, Husserl claims that there is *pregiveness* in perception, feeling, and in the active performance of the *Ego*. What excites the perception is *pregiven* in the environing world and it is affected on the basis of this world (Husserl 1939, §15, 74). Such *pregiveness* is given in passiveness; it is already there for us on the basis of previous experiences (Husserl 1939, §16, 75); before the activity of the *Ego*, but not without a field of determinative structure. In order to comprehend it, there is a *pregiveness*, and, subsequently, the activity of the *Ego* upon it, and after the judgment is performed, but not without an operation of

predicative judgment (Sallis 1967, 129). We are involved in a field of sensuous data whereby prominences (*Abgehobenheiten*) come to us. Such prominences already represent a unity that can be thematized. What appears to us in the form of an object is a synthesis performed by the operations of the time-consciousness (*Zeitbewusstsein*). The result of temporal constitution is only a universal form of order of succession and a form of coexistence of all immanent data. However, according to Husserl, a form is nothing without content (Husserl 1939, §16, 76). That means that a form does not come as a thing from nothing, it has content, a unity in time-consciousness, representing a higher level of constitutive activity.

Every field of sense bring the consciousness of a multiplicity of similar things raised to prominence. Such similarity contrast with things in the way it appears in the field of sense. Thus, in every contrast there also remains something on the order of familiarity and fusion (*Verwandtschaft und Verschmelzung*). For Husserl, this unity among a multiplicity is possible immanently in our consciousness in conformity with familiarity (homogeneity) and strangeness (heterogeneity) (Husserl 1939, §17, 77). The unity is possible due to immanence whereby our consciousness associates various objects fostering a unity. Homogeneity and heterogeneity, therefore, are the result of two different and fundamental modes of associative unification (Husserl 1939, §17, 79). In this way, similar is evoked by the similar, and it contrast with the not similar. These syntheses of coincidence (*Deckungssynthesen*) have their affective force; it is not simply passive occurrences in consciousness, but exercise an effective power on the *Ego*, which makes it turn toward with weaker or starker intensity.

Husserl alerts us about discontinuities on the sensuous sphere that come as an obtrusion (Husserl 1939, §17, 80), and that has an affective power on the *Ego* as well. Such effectiveness is also weaker or starker, depending on turning-toward (*Zuwendung*) (Husserl 1939, §17, 83) of the *Ego*. In the example from Husserl, one need not pay attention to a powerful stimulus (like the whistle of a locomotive which passes in front of us) if one is engaged in conversation with an important person.

In the domain of objectivating lived experiences, of doxic lived experiences, in which existents (*Seiendes*) (Husserl 1939, §18, 84) are present to consciousness, we find a belief of existence. However, when we are completely abandoned to the beauty of a picture, we live in the pleasure taken in it and not in the belief in existence. That means that the *Ego* is not tied exclusively to a deterministic objectivation; every nondoxic turning-toward and continuing occupation with something leaves the possibility open for a change of attitude into a doxic one. The tendency of *Ego* to objectification can be directed into new objectifications. Thus, in the course of the continuity we can find a process of modified modes of fulfillment. Such a tendency is done by an attention in relation to the object that appears as prominence to the *Ego*.

Attention is a tending of the *Ego* toward an intentional object, toward a unity which appears continually in the change of the modes of its givenness and which belongs to the essential structure of a specific act of the *Ego*; it is a tending-toward in realization. Theses realization which is brought into being with the turning-toward is the beginning (Husserl 1939, §18, 85) of a continuing realizing directedness of the object. Thus, the beginning indicates the direction of a further synthetically unified process of realization. In this way, the beginning has an intentional horizon that points beyond itself in an empty mode, which will be filled in subsequent realization.

In this progress of realization, the *Ego* has a tendency of interest in the process of fulfillment. It is a striving toward a new consciousness (Husserl 1939, §19, 87) in the form of an interest in the enrichment of the *self* of the object. In such way, the object is considered by both sides (the seen and the unseen side) whereby a *kinesthesia* (Husserl 1939, §19, 89) approach will be necessary in order to actualized the object in the flow itself. In the process of realization, the *Ego* can stop or let it continue to flow. Husserl speaks of an "I can".

Husserl says that this interest does not mean that it belongs to an act of will (Husserl 1939, §20, 91), but stays in the effectiveness of the object over the *Ego*, in its awoken and motivation over the *Ego*. It can be an act of the will in the highest level, but not necessarily. Such interest can become a

theme like a scientific research. I can be engaged thematically with something, take a break a drink a cup of coffee, look through the window and see the landscape, to be distracted with the beauty out there, and come back to my research. In spite of this discontinuity, the theme continuous to be my theme, it just sinks into the background for this moment. According to Husserl, this reveals something new about the interest. It is every act turning-toward the *Ego*, whatever transitory or continuous, every act of the *Ego's* being-with (*Dabeiseins*) (Husserl 1939, §20, 93).

When the perception goes normal in an unobstructed way, it brings the expectation of the fulfillment, giving the satisfaction of the interest. Nevertheless, the processes of perception can be obstructed. The interest can be unsatisfied, or have a disappointment in relation to its fulfillment. Husserl speaks of the satisfaction of the interest (*Befriedigung des Interesses*) (Husserl 1939, §21, 93), whenever the interest is fulfilled in a progressive striving way from one phase of perception to the next, from one mode of givenness of the object to the next, constituting the fulfillment of the intentions of anticipation. In case of obstructiveness of the process of perception, the interest can be maintained or not. It will depend on the very process of the interest itself.

The dissatisfaction of the interest fosters the emergence of the disappointment of conscience of otherness (Husserl 1939, §21, 94). That means that in the very process of fulfillment the interest can persist, because a uniform framework (Husserl 1939, §21, 95) of sense runs together with the interest, acquiring the character - not so, but otherwise. The modalization of negation, in its own way, brings an abrupt change on the believe about the certainty of an object; it appeared to be red, but in fact it is green.

Another kind of modalization is doubt (Husserl 1939, §21, 91), which comes as an enduring state, whereby interpenetrating possibilities about the object can arise. For example, one sees out there what seems to be a man, but he is not sure about it, because it could also be a mannequin. Before certainty, it endures a double possibility of perception that interpenetrates each other. Both perceptions are possible. In

the conflict between the inclinations of belief, correlatively of presumptions of being (*Seinsanmutunen*) (Husserl 1939, §21, 104), emerges the concept of possibility. For Husserl, being-possible, possibility is thus a phenomenon that already appears in the prepredicative sphere and is most originally at home there. Thus, the intention through the objective sense, becomes a questioning intention, involving what Husserl would say - a presumptive possibility. The probability that raises from the presumptions creates a unity of the opposite, so that both are equal possible.

Husserl distinguishes between problematic possibilities that comes as interpenetrating perceptions as above, and open possibility that has the character of an indeterminate general intention (*unbestimmt allgemeine Intention*) (Husserl 1939, §21, 98). The open possibility tends to certainty because all the general particularities drive to it. For example, it is presupposed to see the same color on the backside of a ball when I turn to it. Nevertheless, despite presupposed certainty, still there is indeterminateness.

## **2. The penetration of the object through the Ego**

The *Ego* oriented toward the acquisition of knowledge, tends to penetrate the object, considering it not only from all sides, but also in all of its particular aspects, explicating (Husserl 1939, §22, 113) it. On this way, it is possible to consider the following levels of the considerations perception of an object (Husserl 1939, §22, 114-115):

1. The considered intuition, which precedes all explication, the intuition, which is directed toward the object – taken as a whole. This apprehension and consideration is the lowest level of common, objectifying activity, the lowest level of the unobstructed exercise of perceptual interest.

2. The higher level of exercise of this interest is the true explicative consideration of the object. That means that the interest follows the direction of the expectation, which has been awakened. Explication is penetration of the internal horizon of the object by the direction of perceptual interest, following its internal determinations.

Another level of perceptual operations happens when relative determinations arise which display what the object is in its relation to other objects. In the example of Husserl: the pencil is beside the inkwell, it is longer than the penholder, and so on. The objects will be drawn by their relations to the object, depending on the cogitances of other objects in the external horizon of the perception.

Husserl starts to analyze each one of these levels. In the simple apprehension, Husserl sees the possibility of an immanent-temporal unity done passively in the activity of apprehension. The *Ego* just hold the continuum fluxes in the appearance of the object, like a sound that rings in a constant tonality. The *Ego* apprehends the sound in his activity of apprehension, as a continuum. In the immanent-temporal flux it remains the same sound, as a thematization, which is preconstitutive. It is a passivity that belongs to the act; a kind of passivity in activity (Husserl 1939, §23, 119). The act has its source in the *Ego*, but through the regularity of the phenomenon, as a still-in-grasp (*Noch-im-Griff*) (Husserl 1939, §23, 118). The act is done passively. Each now is different, where the phenomenon happens, but through the activity of apprehension it receives its unity as the same.

A still-retaining-in-grasp can also take place without the appearance of the regularity of the object. For example: if the sound ceases to ring out or a visual object is removed from the visual field it does not mean that it will not be retained in grasp; it does not merely sink retentionally. The retaining-in-grasp can thus be impressional, a retaining-in-grasp during the continuous givenness of the object, or it can be nonimpressional (Husserl 1939, §23, 121), persisting after the original givenness of the object has come to an end. According to Husserl, thus, every act of the *Ego* appears in the temporal field as a temporally self-constituting datum. Therefore, not only to the retentional extension of the past, but also to the protentional, although completely empty, extension of the future belongs to such field.

Every object has its peculiarities, its internal determinations. It can rise up out of the obscure background of consciousness, affecting and determining the apprehension of the *Ego*. Through such internal orientation bringing-to-

givenness (*Zur-Gegebenheit-bringen*) (Husserl 1939, §24, 125) emerges a horizon of familiarity, a general essence through which the process of explication is distinguished from a pure and simple act of consideration. If we pass from synthetically, from one color to another, there is already a synthesis of coincidence; the moments which overlap one another coincide according to likeness or similarity. Such process that goes continuously offers the base for explication, which involves property and determinations of the object.

For Husserl, every object is not a thing isolated in itself but is always already an object in its horizon of typical familiarity and precognition. For this reason, the process taking place in an original intuition is always already saturated with anticipation; there is always more cointended apperceptively than actually is given by intuition. The object in its horizon is constantly in motion; with every new step of intuitive apprehension, new delineations of the object result, more precise determinations and corrections of what was anticipated. It can be characterized as a lived experience of the apprehension of a substrate and an explicate. This lived experience itself, and the objective moment constituted in it, may become forgotten; but for all this, stay a trace; it merely become latent. With regard to what has been constituted in it, it is a possession in the form of a habitus (Husserl 1939, §25, 137), ready at any time to be awakened anew by an active association.

From now on, Husserl ascend to the more complicated forms of explications, namely, ramified explication (*verzweigenden Explikationen*) (Husserl 1939, §28, 147), and it happens in the following way:

1. The Ego abandons its original substrate instead of continuing to hold it in grasp, while it retains in active apprehension what has just been characterized in explicate. In the example of Husserl, a flower bed attracts our attention and becomes the object of consideration, it may happen that one of the flowers apprehended in the explication attracts our interest so strongly that we make it out exclusive theme, while we abandon all interest in the flower bed. Now, the single flower instead becomes the proper substrate for a continuing act of cognition.

2. In the second case, the original substrate still remains the object of principal interest, and all particular explication, penetrating further into the emerging determination, indirectly serves only its own enrichment. In this sense, the flower bed is still the interest of my grasp, but the way I go further in explicates, I enrich it ever more.

In both cases, the ramified explication comes from a substrate. This substrate produces several explicates, generating news connections, whereby a new substrate can emerge. In the first case, the new substrate lives the old one into passivity and becomes thematically autonomous. In the second case, the new substrate just enriches even more the original one.

Substrates can function as determinations, can take over the functions of parts of wholes. Every substrate has determinations which are not absolute substrates (Husserl 1939, §29, 152). Thus, in the example of Husserl: the shape and color serves as determination of the body of the object, of a spatiotemporal thing which is its substrate. A finite substrate can be experienced simply for itself and thus has its being-for-itself, but it can be a determination, considering a more embracing substrate. For example: The world has a plurality of substrates which can count as determinations, taking the world as a theme, or as an absolute substrate. This implies that everything in the world is ultimately dependent; only the world is independent. That means that absolute substrates are independent and absolute determinations are dependent (Husserl 1939, §29, 156). Husserl alerts that the world of our experience is not only the totality of nature. In the world there are also others, our fellow men (Husserl 1939, §29, 158), and this world is a world for all (Husserl 1976 258). In this way, things do not sustain only natural determinations, but they are determined as cultural objects, shaped by man, attesting a personal determination.

The cultural object reveals that there are others that are implicated in the constitutions of meaning. In everyday life, we find ourselves constantly before an infinite number of objects which are presented with a cultural meaning (Carroccio 2013, 323), developed in the context of our experience in the *life-world* with other. In this sense, every object is presented with its

burden of traditional meaning by the community as the meaning of that object. The object affects us traditionally before any meaning endowment.

For Husserl, every whole has determinations (parts) that are either independent or dependent. In the case of independent determinations, they are capable of being dismembered into pieces (independent parts) and, by contrast, the dependent parts will be called dependent moments. Husserl brings the example of the a copper ashtray (Husserl 1939, §31, 164) which has a red color characterized as a dependent moment, because the substrate which is explicated as red, and retained in grasp as such, affects us as being at the same time rough or smooth a so on, in a not independent way. The basis of the ashtray is a piece because it is connected in the whole with other parts in contrast with dependent moments that does not have something that completed it.

Husserl brings the illustration of the edge of a material thing or the total surface which defines it as a spatial figure. For Husserl, we cannot consider the edge or the surface as pieces, because they cannot be dismembered into parts. Although, they are dependent moments, they cannot be considered qualities of the thing. Instead, qualities of a thing are its color, roughness, smoothness, and the like. They can even be divided into pieces; like that piece is blue and the other is white. Thus, if we dismember the thing, then the color, etc., of an individual piece is its quality, and only mediately the quality of the whole. The thing is first of all extended, and its extension has a limit of this or that form as its immediate quality, which is them only a mediate quality of the total thing. Dependent concrete moments which do not belong to the thing as immediate qualities thus are mediate qualities. Therefore, qualities are dependent moments of an object which do not belong to its pieces as their moments or to any sum of pieces as their connection.

### **3. The external explication: the possibility of otherwise**

Husserl now will turn his attention to the relational consideration which goes beyond the object *per se*. In this way,

Husserl will enter into the external horizon of the object, whereby we had in view its objectively copresent surroundings, representing a plural unity of the affecting, constituted according to the laws which govern the field of passivity. Thus, instead of investigating the object for itself on the basis of these relations, we can also thematize these relations themselves (Husserl 1939, §33, 172). It works on the level of free imagination whereby it is possible to build up several ways of relations. A fixed order is not prescribed here, as it was in the case of internal explication.

As Husserl points it, we can have changed our place of residence, have come to another country or the neighborhood may have so change that it has simply become another; but, despite all this, all these different remembered enviroing worlds are pieces of one and the same objective world (Husserl 1939, §38, 189). The same with time, despite all conflict that occurs in sensibility itself, prior to all activity, to all perceived, all perceptible, individuals have the common form of time. Temporality as duration, as coexistence, as sequence, is the necessary form of all objects of intuition as unities and in this respect is the form of their intuition.

According to Husserl, the unity of an *Ego* extends, and can extend, only as far as we have a unity of internal consciousness; and all intentional objects of the perceptions, which appear in this consciousness, must to the same extent, constitute a temporal connection that coincides which that of the immanent time of the acts (Husserl 1939, §38, 193). Therefore, all perceptions and experiences of an *Ego* are in connection with regard to their intentional objects; they are related to a single time. Similarly, all perceptions and experiences of all *ego-subjects* which are in mutual understanding are in connection with regard to their intentional object.

In the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl says that volitions, acceptances, believe and so on, develop a particularization of the *Ego* itself, which Husserl calls personal character (Husserl 1973, §32, 101). Nevertheless, the attitude of openness, to the possibilities brought by the *epoché*, lived by our immanent consciousness of time, forming its ideal types

(noematic) together with its implicit flux, develop also our personal character. Thus, our personal character is constituted by our very attitude toward the process itself; may be an attitude of openness, or a natural attitude. So, every *Ego* has his own particular constitution (Husserl 1973, §41, 117), forming a concrete *Ego*. The *concrete Ego* includes also the whole of actual and potential conscious life; it includes all constitutional problems without exception.

Husserl has shown the implication represented by a transcendental subjectivity in relation to the stream of conscience (*the immanent conscious of time*), the genesis process between passive and active constitutions (*passive synthesis*), the constituted and the constituting dynamism of consciousness (*noetic/noematic*), and the horizontality of the world itself with its constancy and claims (*the original world*). Such implications are involved in a transcendental subjectivity by its intentionality. In this way, the intentionality embraces the intentionality of the world (objects) and the intentionality of consciousness in which a unity is performed constantly.

It seems that we have a common constitutive unity structure, an immanent conscious of time, but our judgement goes to different perspectives, forming a variation of personal characters, but all are formed by the same constitutive original structure. Even in our fantasies we can find a representation of time, but it is a time without actual, strict localization of position; Husserl called it a *quasi-time* (Husserl 1939, §39, 196). In the actual world, nothing remains open; it is what it is. The world of fantasy is by grace of the imagination which has imagined it. Nevertheless, we can find a unity of a complex of imaginings; it is the unity of a possible world which is constituted with an encompassing form of the time of imagination pertaining to it. The unity of the intuition of time is the condition of the possibility of all unity of the intuition of a plurality of objects connected in any way, for all are temporal objects (Husserl 1939, §42, 214).

The interest in perception, which guides receptive experience, is only a part of the interest in cognition in the proper sense. In addition, we have a will to cognition (Husserl 1939, §47, 232) whereby the *Ego* wishes to know the object. The

goal of the will is the apprehension of the object in the identity of its determinations. For this reason, Husserl says that the confirmation of what exists, how and what it is, is the sense of all cognitive activity. The achievement of knowledge is an activity attached to pre-given objects, but attached in a completely different way than the merely receptive activity of apprehension, explication, and relational consideration. Its outcome is the possession of knowledge. Thus, the work of cognition, this higher stage of activity, in contrast to receptivity, is characterized as a creative spontaneity, itself already productive of objects; it is the real of predicates. Such cognition search for logical connections, forming categorial objectivities (Husserl 1939, §47, 233) through which an abiding possession is made which can be intuited as identical by others.

The predicative forming and cognizing is in fact inseparably entwined in the concretion of one consciousness. Thus, each step of the predication presupposes a step of receptive experience and explication. On this way, Husserl asserts that something can be originally predicated only if it has been originally given in an intuition, apprehended and explicated. Therefore, in order for the substrate of the explication to become a subject and for the explicates to become predicates, it is necessary that the regard turns back to the unity which is passively preconstituted within the receptive activity of the process in a changed attitude, making an active synthesis from a passive one. Even the progress of judgment, which goes to various logical combinations, providing an open horizon (Husserl 1939, §51, 258), has its constitution in the unity of intuition.

A spontaneous synthesis of identification can take place only where receptive apprehension and explication have already gone before. The *S* which endures as identical is invested with ever new logical sense. In the example of Husserl:

if *S* is determined intuitively as *p* and again as *q*, etc., if in determinative identification the transitions from *S* to *p*, *q*, ..., are actively carried out, the *S* which is determined as *p* passively coincides with *S* determined as *q* with certain obviousness. *S* is before us in intuition as the identical, and our thematic interest is directed exclusively toward its ever richer determination (Husserl 1939, §57, 280).

For Husserl, in each step of judgment not only does a determination of the substrate, originally pre-given and already receptively apprehended, take place, not only is this substrate predicatively intended in an ever new way and invested with logical sense, but, at the same time, a new kind of objectivity is preconstituted: the state of affairs (Husserl 1939, §59, 285). Every situation involves several states of affairs. For example: the quantitative situation  $a - b$  involves the two states of affairs  $a > b$ , and  $b < a$ . Another form of an objectivity of understanding, in its productive spontaneity, is the set whereby is possible a retaining-in-grasp between objects on their specific sets (Husserl 1939, §61, p 292-293). Thus we have a unity of apprehension in the form of  $([A,B], C)$ : likewise  $([A,B], [C,D])$ , etc.

Husserl considers that every lived experience, every consciousness, is subject to the original law of flow (Husserl 1939, §64, 304). Every concrete lived experience is a unity of becoming and is constituted as an object in internal consciousness in the form of temporality. In the case of proposition, it has no binding temporal position, which belong to it. The proposition is not like a real object, individuated in an objective point of time; rather, it is an irreal (Husserl 1939, §64, 311) object which, so to speak, is everywhere and nowhere. The irreal of the proposition as the idea of a synthetic unity of becoming; it is referred to all times, to whatever time it may be referred, it is always absolutely the same; it sustains no temporal differentiation.

The world is the universe of realities, among which we count all objects individualized in spatiotemporality, as the form of the world, by their spatiotemporal localization. Irreal objectivities make their spatiotemporal appearance in the world, but they can appear simultaneously in many spatiotemporal positions and yet be numerically identical. It belongs essentially to their appearance that they are subjective formations, therefore localized in worldliness by the localization of the subject. That is, a supertemporal unity pervades the temporal multiplicity within which it is situated: the supertemporality implies omnitemporality (Husserl 1939, §64, 313). We call real a specific sense all that which, in real things

in the broader sense is, according to its sense, essentially individualized by its spatiotemporal position; but we call unreal every determination which, indeed, is founded with regard to its spatiotemporal appearance in a specifically real thing but which can appear in different realities as identical – not merely as similar. In the examples of Husserl: books, states, theories have a mundane reality, but such cultural objectivities have a determination of significance. To understand it better, Husserl makes an important difference between free idealities and bound idealities (Husserl 1939, §65, 321). Both idealities are built through the world, but free ideality, despite being mundane, is omnispatial and omnitemporal. Bound realities, in their being-sense carry reality with them and hence belong to the real world.

#### 4. The simple categorical judgment: *S is p*

In order to analyze the act of judgment in the full concrete sense, Husserl starts do consider the phenomena of modalization. The modalities of predicative judgment must be understood as mode of decision (Husserl 1939, §66, 327). Our original experiences; the ground composed of all judgments already passed and all the categorial objectivities already constituted in them, objectivities which depend on the law of sedimentation with possibility of reactivation, taking effect within the new and original reaccomplishment of the act of judgment; doubts that brake the chains of certainty; negation that cancels one's habitual possession, - all these, springs the striving for decision (*streben nach Entscheidung*) (Husserl 1939, §68, 340) and the necessity of a criticism of the judgments already passed, of the categorial objectivities already spontaneously produced; this criticism as regard the supposition of their truth bears on the question of whether they can be brought to a synthesis of fulfillment coincident with the original givens of experience. Husserl notes that the effort to attain a decision and a guarantee of the position-taking of belief does not aim at a mere decision, but to a striving toward cognition, being directed toward truth.

For Husserl, all verification leads back to the substrates of judgment, it returns to the self-giving experience of these

substrates. Thus, the origination of modalized judgments is always connected with the act of empty judgment which goes beyond what is self-giving and with the criticism of these anticipations. In this specific sense, the act of judgment is therefore the *Ego-act* of position (Husserl 1939, §71, 348). The field in which the *Ego* now operates is not only the horizon of free expectation and the intentionality now established in unanimity, but also the *Ego* actively appropriates through its striving an acquisition, therefore an enduring cognition, and this in full consciousness. Husserl says that striving for consistency of judgment and for certainty in thus a characteristic which is part of the general striving of the *Ego* for self-preservation (Husserl 1939, §71, 351). The *Ego* preserves itself when it can abide by its acts of position-taking, its validations and reacts of everything which disturbs this self-preservation, like unmodalized certainties.

There is only one basic form which is the simple categorical judgment:  $S$  is  $p$  (Husserl 1939, §72, 353). Accordingly, the favored concept of judgment is that which knows only one quality: the confirmation of what is valid. Thus, in the act of judgment the two terms ( $S$  and  $p$ ) are put into relation in a peculiar way which yields judgments of a particular kind.

Husserl distinguish the position-taking of doubt from that of supposition (*Vermutung*) (Husserl 1939, §76, p 365-368), which will arise when one of the attracting possibilities obtains the greater weight, when it has more speaking in its favor, when it has a kind of preferential recognition. Thus, position-taking of supposition must be distinguished from passive, affective attractions, because we take one side, admitting the other, although with reduced weight. Another kind of position-taking is conviction (Husserl 1939, §77, p 368-369); while we are so completely certain, many things can speak against the being-thus, that another being presents itself to us as an attracting possibility. Such attractions can have a different weight, they can exert a stronger or a weaker pull, but they do not determine us. Only the one possibility determines us to believe, namely, that for which we have already decided. Husserl presents other kind of certainty, is the mode of

empirical, presumptive certainty (Husserl 1939, §77, 370-371). The certainty of external experience is always presumptive, although this certainty is repeatedly confirmed in the progress of experience. Presumptive because it refers to the realm of open possibilities, whereby they are all equally possible. The mode opposite to presumptive certainty is that of absolute, apodictic certainty.

Husserl also highlights the role of question and answer in judgments (Husserl 1939, §78, p 371-375). For Husserl, questioning is a practical mode of behavior relative to judgments. If we ask a question and fail to reach a decision, we find ourselves in an unpleasant frustration, which perhaps also frustrate us in other decisions of our practical life. According to Husserl, questioning is not merely a state of wishing; rather, it is a striving directed toward a judicative decision, which as such belongs to the sphere of will and becomes a decisive willing and acting only when we see practical ways to actually bring about the judicative decision. The true sense of questioning is revealed by answers, for it comes the fulfillment of the aspiration which relaxes tension and attains satisfaction. Questions involving justification is distinct from the simple questions (Husserl 1939, §79, p 375-380). The question of justification is thus not directed toward mere judicative certainty but toward a grounded certainty. Hence, it is necessary to distinguish, on the one hand, between being certain, being-decide, being-convinced in a subjective way, and, on the other, being-certain objectively, in other words, being-decide from intuitive grounds. The subjective curtains can serve as inducement for the raising of questions of justifications.

For Husserl, empirical generalities are acquired at first on the basis of the repetition of like, having a horizon which presumptively exhibits a broader experience of particulars which can be acquired in free arbitrariness by opening up this presumptive horizon of being (Husserl 1939, §86, 409). The extension is then an infinitely open one, and still the unity of the empirically acquired is a contingent one. The concept opposed to this contingency is that of *a priori* necessity, whereby pure concepts are formed, before all experience (Husserl 1939, §86, 410).

Husserl considers that every abstraction, imagination, subjectivity and objectivity take a stand on the same ground, - in the world and follow some same logical structures. In the example of Husserl (Husserl 1939, §87, 416): the house is an object which, in the realm of the possible, could have other determinations in place of, and incompatible with, whatever determinations happen to belong to it within the unity of a representation. This house, the same, is thinkable as *a* and as *non-a* but, if as *a*, then not at the same time as *non-a*. It cannot be both simultaneously; it cannot be actual while having each of them at the same time; but at any moment it can be *non-a* instead of *a*. For Husserl, in the natural development of universal experience, the unity of which is continually being realized, the experienced world is granted to us as the universal permanent ground of being and as the universal field of all our activities (Husserl 1939, §89, 424). Therefore, what can be varied, one into another, in the arbitrariness of imagination bears in itself a necessary structure, an *eidós*, and therewith necessary laws which determine what must necessarily belong to an object in order that it can be an object of this kind. Husserl says that this necessity holds for everything factual: we can see that everything which belongs inseparable to the pure *eidós* color, the moment of brightness, must likewise belong to every actual color. Hence, these essential truths are called *a priori*, this means, by reason of their validity, preceding all factuality, all determinations arising from experience (Husserl 1939, §90, 427). For Husserl, the whole of mathematics produce its immediate *eidetic laws* as truths, which are *necessary and universal*, admitting of no possible exception (Kant) (Husserl 1939, §89, 425). Kant locates the ground for the *a priori* structural unity of the natural world in pure understanding, but Husserl implicates this eidetic laws to the concrete Ego. Thus, if transcendental *a priori* is grounded in the constituting intentionality of the transcendental subject, the transcendental subject, in turn, is concretized in the factual ego (concrete ego) (Murphy 1974, 76). It is possible to say that, the *a priori* is transcendental since constitutive; the constitutive is transcendental since *a priori* (Murphy 1974, 77).

## 5. The same structural ground: Conclusion

According to Husserl, we can build various news possibilities of variation; we can, for example, imagine the fountain pen changed into a stone, and there is still something common which runs through them: both are spatially extended, material things. We have thus come to the highest genus *thing*, which as the highest genus of *concreta* we call *region* (Husserl 1939, §92, 435). Regional essences have no other higher generalities above them, and they set a fixed, unsurpassable limit to all variation. Thus, for Husserl, we also obtain pure and general ideas of collections, of relations, and of every kind of state of affair. We obtain therewith ideas of the *formal region* (Husserl 1939, §92, 436). Therefore, all eidetic possibility, relatively or actually concrete, likewise offers occasions for abstract limitations and free variations.

The constructions of a priori universal judgment reveals its implication. In general, we obtain general states of affairs brought out in a pure *a priori*, states of affairs which have as their form an implication, an into-one-another, a being-included-in-one-another. Thus, in order to build general judgments or particular ones such inclusion must be taken. The particular and the universal, the whole and the parts, the *a priori* and the empirical are included (implication) into one another.

Against the humean argument, Husserl argues that an empirical assertion is justified if it can be grounded precisely on such a principle, if the principle guarantees the ideal possibility of its verification. For Husserl, if we admit that all convictions of the sciences based on experience are illusions, then psychology cannot provide us the satisfaction of exhibition the source of these illusions or even of marking them as illusions (Husserl 1939, Beilage II, 474). Husserl's emphasis is not on how apprehension can fail to be confirmed, like walking in a fog, one sees a person, but when he comes closer, he realizes that, in reality, it is just a tree stump. Instead, Husserl works on how the illusions can become adjusted so that we can perceive what is truly there (McKenna 1982, p 190-191). As Husserl points it out:

Correction continually takes place, or at any rate is always possible.  
Doubt can be resolved, what is correct underlines what has been

consciously negated and a new harmony is restored, a unity of thoroughly confirmed experience containing a unity of unbroken and continually held belief lives on. Correlatively, the world, as it is experienced after each correction, counts as the true world. This truth is and remains forever on the march (Husserl 1959, 47).

The fact that corrections can be made means that there is a world which is the ultimate standard against which all mere appearance, error, and illusion are to be measured (McKenna 1982, 191). Thus, the idea of a definitively true world is the idea of the world that we perceive, based on such perception, being an illusion or not. We can conclude that the world traces a limit to our abstractions and, through our living experience, our own judgments are susceptible to change as we go on such march.

The *Ego* and the world are implicated through our living experience, which propitiates(?) judgment of several kinds, but with a same ground. Judgments are constitutive of experience as a whole; it is not separated from the flux of the living psychophysical mode of existence (Junglos 2015, 47). The understanding of such relation gives us the possibilities to understand the character of our judgments; if they are formed in natural attitude or live space for new possibilities. This understanding helps not just in the comprehension of the structure of the judgments, but also in its limits and character. .

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