

Place and Psychoanalysis

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Abstract

In this article, we highlight the importance of psychoanalysis and the Heideggerian concept of ‘place’ for each respective domain of inquiry. In particular, the writings of Jung and Lacan can unconceal and reveal new dimensions of Jeff Malpas’s work on place. Alternatively, Malpas can extend the work of these psychoanalysts by showing new dimensions of their ideas through an analysis of ‘place’. Ultimately, this article sets up a number of possibilities for future research through this novel interaction and engagement between the philosophy of place and psychoanalysis. One of these possibilities is in genomics and genetic determinism, which we briefly acknowledge throughout.

Keywords: Heidegger, Malpas, Jung, Lacan, place, genetic determinism, psychoanalysis

Introduction

For humans, the influence of ‘place’ is profound. As Marcia Cavell has rightly pointed out, “Philosophy itself begins in the only place it can, *here*, in the midst of things” (Cavell 1996, 41). Many eminent philosophers have considered the concepts of space and place. Aristotle noted that, “the place of a thing is the innermost motionless boundary of what contains it” (Aristotle in Barnes 2014, 361). Sigmund Freud identified place as the second of three forces that are a constant threat to

* Acknowledgements: This work was supported by a grant from the John Templeton Foundation in collaboration with the University of Virginia and QIMR Berghofer Medical Research Institute.

humans (Freud 1930, 77). Einstein focused on the definitional uncertainty of words like space and place (Einstein 1993, xiv). More recently John Agnew has reminded us that when thinking about place we must take definitional care. He argued that place can be a location, or series of locales or as ‘sense of place’ where place is grounded in social-spacial imaginations reflecting visions or fantasies of located connection that are fundamental to understanding knowledge production and dissemination (Agnew 2011). Jeff Malpas connects an understanding of place to Martin Heidegger. Malpas argues, “The idea of place-of *topos*-runs through the thinking of Martin Heidegger almost from the very start” (Malpas 2012, 1). The importance of this is highlighted when he says, “it is impossible to think with Heidegger unless one attunes oneself to Heidegger’s own attunement to place.” (ibid.) Malpas emphatically claims, “Indeed, I would argue that Heidegger’s work provides us with perhaps the most important and sustained inquiry into place to be found in the history of Western thought” (Malpas 2008, 3). Throughout this article, we will demonstrate that a Heideggerian understanding of place can provide a deeper understanding of the ideas of both Jung and Lacan. Additional connections can be made to the work of Nietzsche and Saussure, as well as other aforementioned scholars, which shows the expansive reach that ‘place’, has for a number of influential philosophers. Importantly, this deeper understanding has broad practical relevance to applied ethics and philosophical analysis across a range of areas including in other modes of psychotherapy, generic mental health care, Indigenous health, rural health as well as to genomics and genetic determinism (Crowden 2016).

Psychoanalysis and the goal to enlarge choices by enhancing knowledge of self, of others, the world about us, as well as increasing skills in dealing with persons and things holds a special place in the history of humankind. Attempts to restore or enhance individual psychological well-being and autonomy are important. Psychoanalysis and place are intrinsically connected. Both the aims of Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis can be informed by an understanding or restoration of place. As a result, the foreclosure of ‘place’ is one

way to explain ‘the return of the repressed’ or “the return of the living dead” (Gildersleeve 2018, 175). Essentially what we argue is that the foreclosure of place creates the obstructiveness of a complex and the experience of ‘not-being-at-home-in-the-world’ (Gildersleeve 2017, 2) and the aims of Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis can be understood to change this so the analysand can “‘return’ to place — as a homecoming” (Malpas 2012, 19). Ultimately, this can bring about a “changed conception of both our usual ways of thinking about philosophy, about ourselves, and about our own experience of involvement in the world” (Malpas 2012, 4). Therefore, psychoanalysis allows a broadening of an analysand’s horizon to place because place is “a structure that resists any reductive analysis.” (ibid.) Psychoanalysis can initiate the analysand into thinking about place but “It is an exploration that can never be complete, but always and only proceeds through the following of particular pathways that follow particular directions and move through particular landscapes. Recognizing the topological character of such thinking gives an added significance to Heidegger’s insistence on his own thinking (and genuine thinking as such) as always ‘on the way’.” (ibid.) Furthermore, the analysand’s, or indeed anyone’s, discovery of place as well as it being accepted philosophically requires “a willingness on the part of the reader to participate in that exploration, and in the peregrinations that make it up.” (ibid.)

What is essential to highlight is a recognition that place is “constituted through an essential mutuality of relation at every level, and that is unitary even while it also contains an essential multiplicity.” (ibid.) Therefore, what Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis offer the analysand is an opportunity to “find their unity not in any single preexisting element in that place from which the unity of the whole derives, but rather in the way in which the multiple elements of the place are gathered together in their mutual relatedness to one another” (Malpas 2012, 18). Malpas highlights an example from Heidegger’s writing to elucidate place when he says:

“Thus, in Heidegger’s example in ‘Building Dwelling Thinking,’ the bridge appears as a bridge not through the exercise of its own qualities indetermining an otherwise featureless terrain, but

through a coming to appearance in which bridge, river, and the entirety of the countryside around it are gathered together as one and as many, and are thereby determined, in their being, as bridge, as river, as countryside. It is this essential gathering of elements in a mutual belonging together in which they come to presence that Heidegger also describes as the *Ereignis* — an event that is to be understood not as purely temporal, but as the temporalizing of space and the spatializing of time in the single gatheredness of place.” (ibid.)

An important theme of this quote is what Heidegger calls ‘gathering’. Our article will demonstrate that ‘gathering’ is essential to both Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis because it reveals the ‘place’ of the analysand through the *Ereignis* (or Jung’s transcendent function). This is a ‘moment’ when the analysand discovers the Self (Jung) or Subject (Lacan) (Gildersleeve 2017, 3; Gildersleeve 2018, 176) by uncovering the meaning of their ‘place’ for being-in-the-world. With this unconcealment of place, *Dasein* (being-there) is also revealed (Gildersleeve 2016a, 22) and “This place is one that is constantly before us, in which we are always situated, and yet from which we often seem estranged” (Malpas 2012, 14). Thus, both Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis can be understood as removing this estrangement to discover the analysand’s authentic place in the world and history. Jung appears to have achieved this in his own life: “At times I feel as if I am spread out over the landscape and inside things, and am myself living in every tree, in the plashing of the waves, in the clouds and the animals that come and go, in the procession of the seasons. There is nothing in the Tower that has not grown into its own form over the decades, nothing with which I am not linked” (Jung 1961, 225).

What will become clear and what we argue, is that place is uncovered when the analysand opens up the space of the desire of the Other (this is where Lacan is important) which is reflected in the words of Malpas when he says “a place is precisely that which opens up to allow room for what belongs within it. The return to place is thus the turning toward that which allows for, that which gives room, but also that which withdraws” (Malpas 2012, 19). Psychoanalysis helps the analysand toward this goal and this is where the barred subject

or Self is discovered through the Other. Put differently, this is when the analysand ‘lets the Other be’ (Gildersleeve 2017, 21) by ‘allowing for, giving room and withdrawing’ from the space of the desire of the Other. This is a negative movement where the analysand discovers the impossibility of their desire and therefore reveals the ‘barred subject’. On the other hand, the impossibility of the analysand’s desire is revealed through the positive ‘thrown’ possibilities the Other has received from their ‘place’ in the world. Succinctly put, what Lacanian psychoanalysis aims to achieve is for the analysand to traverse their fantasies to uncover this authentic situation or ‘place’ between the barred subject and the Other, rather than covering it over by ‘misrecognising’ place. Jung and Lacan are brought together in the same way Malpas talks about Heidegger’s work being brought together through place when he says, “all of Heidegger’s thinking itself turns around the single question of place, and in which, in this place, all of the other elements in his thinking are brought together” (Malpas 2012, 37). Here we detail this notion further in relation to Jung and Lacan.

1. Remembering and Turning

In this section we aim to clarify how the intrinsic foundations of Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis are built implicitly on the phenomenon of ‘place’. Both of these psychoanalytic frameworks aim to promote “remembering that is itself invoked in Heidegger’s characterization of philosophy as marked by forgetting” (Malpas 2012, 20). Both Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis aim at remembering to surpass “a forgetting, not only of finitude and questionability, but of place.” (ibid.) Questionability and discovering finitude (the impossibility of the barred subject) (Gildersleeve 2016a, 16) are both intimately related to the analysand’s success of uncovering and remembering ‘place’. This remembering or “return at issue here is not, however, a return that is predicated on a genuine moving away from – if that were the case there could be no possibility of return at all. Instead, the return is a ‘turning back’ to that in which we already find ourselves (a turning back, in one sense, to our very placedness)” (Malpas 2012, 19). This remembering overcomes misrecognition and is another

way of saying ‘making oneself seen’, shifting from desire to drive (see Gildersleeve 2017) or “truth emerges out of failure, in which failure makes itself an immanent constituent of truth” (Zizek 2014, 89).

Place can remain unconscious or ‘misrecognised’ (Gildersleeve 2016a, 8) if the analysand does not follow the ethics of Lacanian psychoanalysis to act in “conformity with the desire that is in you” (Lacan 1992, 314) to unify their desire with the desire of the Other through Jung’s transcendent function (Gildersleeve 2018, 183). When the analysand achieves this; place is experienced where “It is like the movement in which, having been engrossed in some activity, we look up to see the place that has been around us all the time, and that has also enabled and supported the activity in which we have been engrossed” (Malpas 2012, 19). We argue the ambitions of Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis are to achieve this as “a turning or a coming back to place, or to a place, in a way that also brings that place itself into view. It is an occurrence that is mirrored in Heidegger’s own image of the “clearing” (*Lichtung*) that allows the emergence of things into presence.” (ibid.) Malpas states, this “movement back to place – back to that which otherwise remains unnoticed and unremarked (as place itself often remains in the background of our activities) – can also be understood as a movement of recollection, of remembering again, and Heidegger draws directly on this idea alongside that of return or homecoming.” (ibid.) This homecoming is in contrast to ‘not-being-at-home’, which occurs when an analysand has not removed an obstructive complex from being-in-the-world (Gildersleeve 2016d, 967). What this means is that removing an obstructive complex leads the analysand toward a ‘turning’ or ‘homecoming’ to place. To remove this obstructiveness of a complex is to see that “The historical is thus not opposed to the topological, but encompassed by it. The history of being is itself a history of place” (Malpas 2012, 35). In other words, removing a complex requires the analysand to understand authentically their thrown ‘place’ in history. If the analysand was to not discover their ‘place’ in history this would lead to “the ending of history” which “is to be found in the nihilism of the almost complete

forgetting of being that is also a forgetting of place”¹ (ibid.). As will become clear as this article progresses “Place cannot be other than what is given in the multiplicity of places – to suppose otherwise would be to envisage the possibility of place, *topos*, as itself *atopic*” (Malpas 2012, 49). If the analysand does not recognise the importance of the multiplicity of places for the turning to homecoming, an atopic understanding of place will lead to the analysand experiencing obstructive being-in-the-world as an estrangement and alienation from place.

Looking into this further reveals that the transcendent function (Jung) or traversing the fantasy to uncover the barred subject (Lacan) (Gildersleeve 2017, 11) “is a turning back to place, [and] it is also more immediately understood in the Heideggerian context as a turning back (in the sense of a returning or reorienting) to being” (Malpas 2012, 36). In other words, these actions of psychoanalysis lead the analysand to reveal a truth of Being through a discovery of their place in the world and history. Both Jungian and Lacan psychoanalysis allow the analysand to achieve “a turning back into the place in which we already find ourselves” (Malpas 2012, 37). The analysand achieves this by discovering their relation to the Other/s which is “a structure that is constituted through the mutual interplay of multiple elements, a structure that encompasses the entities and elements that appear within it rather than underlying them, a structure to which belongs a unity that is given only in and through the mutual relatedness of the elements that make it up” (Malpas 2012, 40). These elements are the analysand’s multiple relationships with Others, more specifically, the analysand’s desire in relation to the desire of the Other/s. Essentially we argue this is a major focus of both Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis; to reveal the structure of the analysand’s place within the world and history by developing their understanding of the relationship of their desire to the desire of the Other or Others. What is important to understand is that the structure of the analysand’s place “is a certain definite region, *bounded* and yet also thereby *gathered*, in which we and the things around us are given *together*” (Malpas 2012, 45). Furthermore, this discovery of place does not only occur once because “The

gathering of place that is the happening of presence and of world is a constant and multiple occurrence rather than a single founding or positing” (Malpas 2012, 38). This is consistent with a Lacanian understanding of hysteria with Nietzsche’s Will to Power (Gildersleeve 2016b). As a result, both Nietzsche’s Will to Power and Lacanian hysteria can be understood further by connecting them to place.

2. Nihilism and Homelessness

Malpas highlights that “We may become estranged from place, we may forget or cover over our essential placedness, but these are all forms of concealing, disguising, or denying a relatedness to place that nevertheless perdures” (Malpas 2012, 63). Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis combined with Malpas and Heidegger can be understood as aiming to reveal or unconceal this place that perdures to remove the analysand’s estrangement from place. Malpas indicates, “under the reign of technological modernity, our relatedness to place is not obliterated, but is rather covered over, ignored, made invisible.” (ibid.) Importantly, in reaction to this covering, Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis as well as Heidegger’s philosophy can mount a “critique of the placelessness of modernity – such a critique depends on the contradiction, within modernity itself, between its refusal of place (a refusal that refuses to recognize itself as a refusal) and its own inescapable placidness.” (ibid.) Here modernity itself can be compared to an analysand who is estranged from and has covered their place in the world and history.

The forgetting of place is “The nihilism of modernity” (Malpas 2012, 98). In other words, nihilism results from “a denial of the very *topos* in which thinking itself comes to pass” (Malpas 2012, 97) and therefore nihilism with affect (through the obstructiveness of existence) the analysand who denies or covers their place in the world and history. To surpass this nihilism “it is only in the direction of the thinking of *topos*, itself an essential form of questioning – of holding open a free-play of possibility (a ‘play-space’) – that any proper response to the overpowering movement of nihilism can be found” (Malpas 2012, 111). This questioning is depicted in Jung’s interpretation

of the 10 woodcuts of the *Rosarium Philosophorum* as well as in Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (Gildersleeve 2016c). Malpas also recognises a connection between Nietzsche and place when he claims "Nietzsche's preoccupation with the need to find a location attuned not only to his physical but also to his mental and spiritual needs. Here is a thinker who is far from being detached from his surroundings but whose very capacity for thought depends on them. Scattered throughout his writings, one finds comments concerning the relation between his work, his state of mind, and the places in which he resides, as well as descriptions, positive and negative, of those places" (Malpas 2015b, 195).

Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis assists an analysand in "the form of a returning to place, a refinding of oneself, a reorientation (even, perhaps, a repositioning) – as Heidegger himself refers to it, a form of *homecoming*, although a coming-home to that from which we never really departed" (Malpas 2012, 111). When the analysand does not reveal their place they experience an obstructive complex (Gildersleeve 2016c, 90) indicative of "Homelessness... consists in the abandonment of beings by being. Homelessness is the symptom of oblivion of being" (Gildersleeve 2016c, 154). Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis assists the analysand "back to that place in which we always already are, but from which we are so often turned away, and which modernity threatens to hide almost completely" (Malpas 2014a, 21). Malpas explains "The need for the recovery of place, for a return home, arises, then, only because of the way in which our very being 'out of place' is itself a failure to grasp our being already 'in place'" (Malpas 2008, 309) which occurs when the analysand has not discovered the Self or barred subject. Both Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis implicitly understand that "We dwell, and yet we do not dwell; we belong to being, and yet are separated from being; we are in place, and yet we find ourselves displaced; we are at home, and yet nevertheless remain homeless." (ibid.) As a result, both theoretical orientations aim toward a "homecoming' of which Heidegger speaks is a return to the *nearness* of being" (ibid.), the barred subject or Self. Malpas also shows that Heidegger identified an error of the philosophical

“tradition as having largely overlooked such ‘situatedness’” (Malpas 2008, 39) of place. Correcting this error is important to prevent the analysand’s ‘homelessness’ and “On this basis the central questions of philosophy, questions of being and existence, as well as of ethics and virtue, must themselves take their determination and their starting point from this same place.” (ibid.)

3. Boundaries and Multiplicity

What we aim to show in this section is that for Jung and Lacan and “Fundamental to the idea of place, and so to the idea of philosophical topography, is the notion of bound or limit” (Malpas 2014c, 14). The notion of bound or limit is essential to both Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis as well as place. Boundary and limit are essential to Jung’s transcendent function as well as discovering the barred subject in Lacanian psychoanalysis (Gildersleeve 2017, 3). This combination of discovering the barred subject through the transcendent function is how an analysand surpasses an obstructive complex and this highlights that “The idea of bound or limit that appears here is one that takes bound or limit to be essentially productive, rather than merely restrictive. As Heidegger famously puts it ‘a boundary is not that at which something stops but... that from which something begins its presencing’” (Malpas 2014c, 14). This boundary, loss, impossibility or limit discloses the place of the barred subject of the analysand and allows them to traverse their fantasy to remove the obstructiveness of their complex from being in the world with Jung’s transcendent function (Gildersleeve 2017, 3). The transcendent function takes place when the analysand unifies their desire (conscious) with the desire of the Other (unconscious) through the drive (Gildersleeve 2017, 9). When this occurs, this reveals the boundary, impossibility or limit of the barred subject through the possibilities or boundaries of the desire of the Other/s. This is how the analysand goes beyond their imaginary fantasies to find their place in the world by discovering ‘the impossible’ (the possibility of the impossibility of their desire) (Gildersleeve 2017, 23) which equates to Lacan’s formula “the real as the impossible” (Lacan 1998, 167). Since

the analysand has removed their imaginary fantasies by discovering the impossibility of their desire, their complex no longer obstructs their world because they have found a more authentic or *Real* 'place' in the world. When this occurs through the drive/transcendent function, the analysand reaches the 'place' of *Gelassenheit*, which is an "experience of letting go, being let, and letting be" (Gildersleeve 2017, 20). This is when the limit or boundary of the barred subject/Self is revealed to the analysand; this is elucidated by Heidegger when he says, "the boundary, in the Greek sense, does not block off but, rather, as itself something brought forth, first brings what is present to radiance" (Malpas 2012, 101). This radiance of the boundary of the barred subject/Jungian Self is 'the event' or '*Augenblick*', which we will discuss in a later section of this paper.

Another important aspect to detail is the "*complexity of place*. This complexity is evident in the 'folded' character of place" (Malpas 2012, 49). In Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, the analysand needs to come to an understanding that "any place encompasses other places within it while also being encompassed by other places in its turn." (ibid.) For the analysand to discover the place of the Self or barred subject they must appreciate that place is always "a manifold of places [that are] reciprocally related by belonging together, which we call a settlement or a district [*Ortschaft*]. That 'place' in which the essence of Being comes to presence in an eminent sense" (Malpas 2012, 154). In other words, when the analysand discovers the manifold of places reciprocally related together they are able to turn toward their homecoming to remove the obstructiveness of their complexes and imaginary fantasies. This understanding of place is important because "Rather than presenting human beings as deterministically constrained, such a conception opens up a view of the human as enmeshed in an essentially reciprocal relation with the world in which it is also situated. The human thus cannot be assumed in advance, nor can it be taken to arise out of only one set of structures or elements alone" (Malpas 2012, 156). As a result, the analysand needs to understand their "reciprocal relation with the world" to achieve their homecoming rather than understanding themselves as isolated from others. This also

highlights the idea that place and the foundations of Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis are important instruments to understand the ethics of genomic futures and in particular criticize the philosophy of ‘genetic determinism’ (e.g. see Dar-Nimrod & Heine 2011, Kirby 2000, Gilbert 2002, Crowden 2016).

To reiterate, Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis enable “a return to our own experience of being, and one might say, our own experience of ourselves. It is also, it should be said, a remembering of place” (Malpas 2012, 173). In other words, psychoanalysis assists the analysand to “that open realm in which self, other selves, and things first come to presence” (ibid., 197). This occurs when a “multiplicity of elements is gathered” (ibid., 202) by the analysand by going beyond an imaginary relationship to themselves and the Other (Gildersleeve 2018). This happens through Jung’s transcendent function, which unifies the analysand’s desire with the desire of the Other to disclose each other’s ‘place’ in the world. Jung’s transcendent function discloses the possibilities of the analysand and the Other but also their impossibilities (Gildersleeve 2017, 13) which is “a certain boundedness, but it is a boundedness that opens up rather than closes off” (Malpas 2012, 202). This boundedness is the structure of the Self or barred subject and this is what allows the analysand to remove the obstructiveness of their complex to find their place, freedom (Gildersleeve 2017, 7-8) and homecoming in the world. To summarize, the ‘place’ of the barred subject or Self is disclosed by Lacanian and Jungian psychoanalysis through “a unitary structure that is constituted in terms of a multiplicity of irreducible elements; a structure that is bounded and yet open” (ibid., 203).

4. Mapping Out, Topography and Poetry

As we have been claiming throughout this article, Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis shift an analysand from error (misrecognition) to a truth (Gildersleeve 2017, 16) in an “attempt to illuminate a place in which we already find ourselves and in which other things are also disclosed to us” (Malpas 2008, 34). This can be detailed further by noting that the processes developed by these psychoanalysts “bears

comparison with the idea of the writing or ‘inscribing’ of place that is undertaken by the traditional topographer. The topographer who is concerned to map out a particular region.” (ibid.) The analysand needs to map out their place in the world in connection to the Other to discover the Self or barred subject to remove an obstructive complex or fantasy from being in the world. The analysand like a topographer “has the task of mapping out that region while located within it. Such a task can only be accomplished by looking to the interconnections among the features of that region and through a process of repeated triangulation and traverse-and a good deal of walking-on the basis of which such interconnections are established.” (ibid.) In other words, the analysand discovers their place in the world by understanding their interconnection to others through the transcendent function like that depicted in the 10 woodcuts of the *Rosarium Philosophorum* and Nietzsche’s *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (Gildersleeve 2016c). The analysand achieves this by acting in conformity with their desire (through introversion) until they discover their boundary or limit through the desire of the Other (extroversion) (Gildersleeve 2018, 176). The analysand discovers their interconnections with others through this process of acting in conformity with their desire until they experience the obstructiveness of their complex through the desire of the Other. When this happens, the analysand can come to a deeper understanding of their place by discovering the impossibility of their desire through the desire of the Other, which reveals the barred subject or Self to the analysand. Once this has been achieved the analysand can traverse their fantasy by understanding the impossibility of their desire which allows the obstructiveness of a complex to be surpassed (Gildersleeve 2016a, 14-16). When this happens, the analysand has a deeper understanding of their authentic ‘place’ in the world (Gildersleeve 2018, 199) by understanding their interconnectedness to Others through “the crisscrossing pathways that represent the topographer’s travels through the landscape” (Malpas 2008, 34). This analogy is very important because it “suggests that it is a mistake to look for simple, reductive accounts-whether we are exploring a concept, or problem, or the meaning of a term, the point is always to look to

a larger field of relations in which the matter at issue can be placed” (ibid., 35). This again highlights the errors of genetic determinism and psychotherapies that do not conceptualise the human being as having a ‘place’ in the world and history through their interconnections with Others.

Similar to the topographer, the analysand must unify introversion with extroversion (Gildersleeve 2018, 167) to map out and come “to understand a place, and so to grasp the more particular localities and places situated within it, through walking around and getting used to the various pathways and sites that make it up” (Malpas 2012, 203). In other words, this is the analysand’s journey to ‘act in conformity with their desire’ (Lacan 1992 314) through introversion to discover if that desire is possible or impossible by discovering the desire of the Other through extroversion (Gildersleeve 2018). This is how the analysand maps out their place in the world and history “through repeated triangulation and traverse across the face of that terrain” (Malpas 2012, 203) which is guided by the obstructions of their complexes they experience along the way.

In contrast to those who argue for genetic determinism (Dar-Nimrod & Heine 2011, 22; Gilbert 2002, 123), the analysand’s unobstructed freedom and place in the world is not “a matter of finding just one point from which everything else falls into view. The elements within the landscape provide the focus through which the unity of the landscape is grasped” (Malpas 2012, 203). Malpas ardently states that place is discovered through “a multiplicity of elements that are focused and gathered together” and place “is to be located within a unitary but differentiated ‘region,’ each element of which is interconnected and mutually defining” (Malpas 1999a, 133). This differentiation comes from the differences between the analysand and the Other. The analysand and Other are interconnected and their place is mutually defined by the ‘thrown’ possibilities and impossibilities of their desires. As a result, the analysand’s discovery of place “is to encounter oneself only inasmuch as one also encounters others, and inasmuch as one also encounters things.” (ibid.) The analysand’s discovery of place “is always a ‘there’ belonging to the many rather than the one – a ‘there’ that must be always

multiple and never single in any simple fashion – and so also as the place in which being, that is, the nearness of the presence of things, also comes to light” (Malpas 2007, 495). This is why introversion combined with extroversion is necessary to discover place (see Gildersleeve 2018).

Finally, Malpas brings attention the relationship between place and the poetry of T.S. Eliot. He suggests, “Perhaps *Four Quartets* can be seen as an example of what Heidegger would call ‘the poetry that thinks,’ and so perhaps Eliot can be seen, in a certain way, as moving in the direction of his own topology of being” (Malpas 2012, 267). He adds, “In his juxtaposition of end and beginning, Eliot also gives added emphasis to the image of turning and return that is so central to the thinking of *topos*.” (ibid.) Malpas quotes Eliot’s *Four Quartets*: “What we call the beginning is often the end/And to make an end is to make a beginning” as well as “We shall not cease from exploration/And the end of all our exploring/Will be to arrive where we started/And know the place for the first time.” (ibid.) This connection between beginning, end and place is also found in Sartre as a change in a ‘fundamental project’ (see Gildersleeve 2017, 12).

5. Gathering and the Other

The task for the analysand for both Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis “is never a matter simply of the coming to presence of a single being-as if presence was something that could attach to a single self-sufficient entity. The presencing or disclosedness of a being is always a matter of its coming to presence in relation to other beings” (Malpas 2008, 14). Jung’s transcendent function and Lacan’s traversing the fantasy is only possible when the barred subject or Self of the analysand comes “to presence in relation to other beings” (the Other/s). This occurs because the analysand comes to understand a “gathering of otherwise multiple elements in a single unity” (ibid., 16). This gathering of place is structured through the analysand’s desire (introversion) in relation to the desire of the Other/s (extroversion). This also emphasizes the importance of the analysand’s balance between introversion and extroversion and this is how the analysand appropriates

their place in the world and history in ‘the moment’ (Gildersleeve 2016c, 102) “in which we find ourselves along with other persons and things” (Malpas 2008, 221). The analysand reveals their place in this moment through the barred subject or their boundaries by discovering the possibilities and impossibilities of their desire. Place involves a gathering of the “interrelations between the originary and mutually dependent (‘equiprimordial’) elements” (ibid., 306). As a result, the analysand’s task of understanding their place in the world is never complete and understanding their relationship to others can always be developed through more gathering (this will be detailed in the penultimate section of this article)². This elucidates Malpas when he states, “idea of boundedness and that of focus or gathering are themselves closely tied to a conception of place as constituted through a gathering of elements that are themselves mutually defined only through the way in which they are gathered together within the place they also constitute” (ibid., 29). This is important because it highlights that the analysand will only be ‘at home in the world’ if they are able to discover their place, which is mutually, defined in relation to the desire of the Other/s. Again, this shows the errors of genetic determinism that excludes an analysand’s relationship to others by focusing solely on the genetic makeup of the individual as “separate and autonomous entities” (Malpas 2011, 49). Supporters of genetic determinism do not recognise “that we cannot understand ourselves independently of the places in which our lives unfold even though those places may be complex and multiple” (Malpas 2014a, 22). Haslam eloquently describes the problematic consequences of genetic determinism when he notes this “thinking has an insidious tendency to deepen divisions among human groups, creating a view of the social world as collection of fixed and segregated categories” (Haslam 2011, 822). What we aim to show is that both place and psychoanalysis provide a way out of this nihilism.

The analysand’s place is arranged in “both a being gathered into as well as a differentiating from” (Malpas 2014a, 22) the desire of the Other/s. This is how the analysand ‘gathers’ an understanding of their place by unifying their

desire with the desire of the Other/s to establish their “identity through differentiation” (Malpas 2016, 7). When supporters of genetic determinism isolate the individual from their relationship with others both place and “identity through differentiation” is lost and misrecognised which can contribute to an ideology that is similar to one that condones an analysand’s imaginary fantasies and obstructive complexes. In other words, “while one can take the thing at issue at a certain ‘instant’ and then analyze or dissect it into its apparently separate elements, treating each as if it had an identity of its own, any such analysis is always somewhat artificial” (Malpas 2008, 59).

6. Reciprocal Determination and Language

The analysand’s unobstructed place in the world and history stands “within a dense web of relations – through those relations it gives shape and focus to other things, but in doing so it also gives shape and focus to itself” (Malpas 2016, 8). The analysand discloses their place “through the interrelating of the elements that already belong to the situation” (Malpas 2008, 59) of their desire. The possibility or impossibility of the analysand’s desire is determined by the possibility or impossibility of the desire of the Other resulting in “the reciprocal determination of elements.” (ibid.) The analysand’s identity and place in the world “is given only in and through the ongoing and reciprocal determination of the elements of which it is constituted” (ibid., 60). Because the “identity and unity is thus not to be found at any statically conceived ‘instant’ in that constitution” (ibid.), the analysand needs to always be open to more ‘gathering’ to be unobstructed by complexes and to find their authentic place in the world (for more, see footnote on previous page).

The analysand’s understanding of place is similar to the hermeneutic circle where “the elements that make up a text can only be understood in relation to the unity of the text as a whole, while the unity of the text is only to be understood in terms of the elements that contribute to that unity.” (ibid.) This again highlights the importance of non-reductionism and extroversion so the analysand can discover their place through

the desire of the Other/s. This is also supported by “Heidegger’s account of being-there as always social of being-there as always ‘being-with’ [which] indicates the way in which Heidegger takes issue with the predominantly solipsistic underpinning of many traditional ways of thinking of human being-especially those ways of understanding that are taken to have their origins in the internally centered thinking exemplified in Descartes’s *Meditations*” (ibid., 89). This reductive solipsism is still prevalent in genetic determinism, which “reduces the self to a molecular entity, equating human beings, in all their social, historical, and moral complexity, with their genes” (Parrott et.al. 2012, 763).

In contrast, Jung’s transcendent function is a “unifying occurrence in which differentiation is also evident” (Malpas 2008, 116) where the analysand removes their obstructive complex by discovering the possibilities and impossibilities of their desire and the desire of the Other. Place and psychoanalysis are developed by noting that they “stand in an important and essential relation to *language*. This is so in at least two respects: first in the character of place and language as ‘gathering,’ and, second, in the character of language and space as both ‘differentiating’ or ‘dif-fering’” (Malpas 2012, 263). It is vital to point out the relation to Saussurean linguistics here. Place, the barred subject and the Self have an essential relation to Saussurean linguistics since they all share the characteristic of being “purely differential and defined not by their positive content but negatively by their relations with the other terms of the system. Their most precise characteristic is in being what the others are not.” (Saussure 1959, 117) Furthermore, place, the barred subject and the Self like “Language is a system of interdependent terms in which the value of each term results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others” (ibid., 114). Lastly, Saussure’s linguistics can critique genetic determinism by recognising that “The idea or phonic substance that a sign contains is of less importance than the other signs that surround it. Proof of this is that the value of a term may be modified without either its meaning or its sound being affected, solely because a neighboring term has been modified.” (ibid., 120) The

analysand's place in the world is discovered through "a gathered unity in which things find themselves brought together with one another while they are also disclosed in their difference-'language' is a key word that names this happening of unifying and differing" (Malpas 2008, 264). Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis helps the analysand "allow the world, and the things that make up the world to come forth in their abundance and multiplicity." (ibid., 271) As a result, in contrast to genetic determinism or reductive psychotherapies that eliminates place, the analysand's "identity is never just a matter of the self-sameness of the thing, but always directs us towards the thing in its relationality" (Malpas 2014a, 19). The analysand discovers their place in the world and history through the desire of the Other/s which is "a difference that itself arises only in and through an essential relatedness. It is this event of gathering - which is also a belonging, a unifying, and a differentiating" (ibid.) and this is what we believe both Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis aim toward.

7. Homecoming, Reorientation and *Ereignis*

We claim the analysand visits the psychoanalyst because of their ontological 'homelessness' in the world. They experience this homelessness because they have 'forgotten' or misrecognised their place in the world and this results in the obstructiveness of a complex. The job of psychoanalysis is to change this through a "reversal of forgetting [which] is also a turning back to our proper place-and it is in just this sense that Heidegger will frequently, in his later writing, call upon the idea of the reversal of forgetfulness as a matter of 'homecoming' (*Heimkunft*)" (Malpas 2008, 149). Thus, psychoanalysis is a form of 'transhumanism' because it promotes a "returning to this dwelling-place, the place in which we already are and yet are not, that we come into the 'being-there' that belongs to our 'future humanness'." (ibid., 180)

When the analysand discovers the barred subject or Self, a turning to their place in the world/history occurs, but "this turning is not a change in standpoint, but rather what might be thought of as a 'reorientation' that enables the proper recognition of the place, the locality, in which thinking already

finds itself.” (ibid., 151) This is possible because the analysand is no longer obstructed by their complex or fantasies because they have gone beyond an imaginary relationship to themselves and the Other/s. The analysand can now see their *Real* place in the world more authentically through this ‘event’ or “*Ereignis*”. Malpas explains this by saying “‘*Ereignis*’ is the idea of ‘coming to sight,’ ‘being disclosed,’ ‘being made evident.’ Etymologically ‘*Ereignis*’ has its roots in the now somewhat archaic term ‘*eräugnen*’ meaning to see or to be evident. Once again this is suggestive of a connection back to *Being and Time*-to the idea of the ‘moment of vision,’ *Augenblick*, in which being-there grasps its existential situation.” (ibid., 215) The *Augenblick* was briefly mentioned earlier as the radiance of the boundary from the barred subject. As a result, this connection can be retrieved here where “‘*Ereignis*’ is the name for the particular sort of unifying and differentiating happening by which things come to presence, by which they come to be” (ibid., 216) as the analysand discovers the place of the barred subject/Self through the impossibility of their desire through the desire of the Other/s. In other words, we believe the aim of both Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis is to achieve this “‘visionary moment,’ the ‘*Augenblick*,’ as that in which being-there grasps its ‘Situation,’ the idea of authenticity, can all be seen as articulations of aspects of this original understanding of situatedness as ‘eventful)’” (ibid., 59). This is “the “other beginning” of the turning back to being that occurs in the disclosive gathering of belonging that is the Event-a turning in which we regain a proper relatedness to the world and ourselves, in which we recognize the proper place, and so the boundaries, of our dwelling.” (ibid., 299)

8. Triangulation and Psychoanalysis

Malpas also sees some important connections between triangulation and place. For example, “in a terrain that is not yet mapped, triangulation, together with movement across the terrain, allows the mapping of the terrain through the successive triangulation of the different locations within it” (Malpas 2014b, 4). This analogy has resonates with Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis. The success of these

psychotherapies depends on the analysand taking the journey of triangulation to map out the terrain of their place in the world (Cf. Gildersleeve 2016c). This involves the analysand ‘acting in conformity with their desire’ until they discover the unconscious through the impossibility of their desire via the desire of the Other. This unconceals the barred subject or Self through the unification of opposites (the transcendent function – conscious/unconscious, desire/desire of the Other, introversion/extroversion).

The analysand discovers their place in the world “through the interconnectedness of the places” (Malpas 2014b, 4). In other words, their interconnectedness with the desire of the Other/s and place is revealed in more depth and detail “through repeated sightings and movements across it” (ibid.) (see next section for more on this). The meaning of the analysand’s place in the world is “an interconnection that can never be given all at once, nor in any final or exhaustive fashion (no mapping is ever complete)” (Malpas 2014b, 6; Gildersleeve 2016b, 6). As a result, the analysand needs to continue “repeated tracing out of those connections” (Malpas 2014b, 6; Gildersleeve 2016b, 21) to become more authentic and at home in an unobstructed world. The analysand’s place is “not given independently of other places-for there to be one place is for there to be many places, and so places appear always as part of a larger topographic or topological field” (Malpas 2014b, 8). Finally “Given the dynamic character of triangulation, and so of the formation of place and region, the relationality of place and region is itself always in process” (ibid.) which is the focus of the penultimate section of this article.

9. Hysteria, Will to Power and Place

We contend that an analysand’s task is to discover their “place that is essentially unitary, dynamic, and constantly unfolding” (Malpas 2008, 65). The analysand displays authenticity by understanding “the structure that appears here-whether understood through the *Ereignis*, the happening of place that is the happening of the Fourfold, the ‘event’ of disclosedness that is the event of truth (the ‘clearing’ – *Lichtung*) – never achieves completion even though there is a

sense in which it is always moving towards completion” (Malpas 2014b, 12). As the analysand discovers their place in the world through the relation of their desire to the desire of the Other/s they are “unifying but not unified.” (ibid.) As a result, to be authentic to their place in the world the analysand requires an understanding “that rejects the idea of a finished system” (ibid.)³. The analysand’s “Returning to place is a returning to nearness to things, but such nearness is a matter of allowing things to be what they are, in their closeness as well as their distance, in their unity and differentiation” (Malpas 2008, 310). The analysand achieves this through introversion to act in conformity with their desire until they discover the boundaries of their place by traveling to the desire of the Other/s through extroversion and this is “why returning to place, as Hölderlin makes clear, stands in an essential relation to ‘journeying’” (ibid.)⁴. The analysand metaphorically undertakes the ‘journey’ of triangulation by acting in conformity with their desire until they discover the desire of the Other/s and this is how the analysand can remove their obstructive complexes and find their place at home in the world. To achieve this, the analysand needs to understand that “triangulation has the character of an always unfinished process” and “triangulation is a potentially continuous process that is brought to an end only temporarily and on the basis of more or less arbitrary convention or decision” (Malpas 2014b, 7). As a result, the analysand’s “Authenticity would thus be tied, not to adherence to some determinate inner ‘truth’, but rather to an openness to what Heidegger calls the ‘event’ of appropriation—an openness to the happening of place” (Malpas 2014a, 22)⁵. Finally, this means being authentic takes “the form of a returning to place that has always to be repeated—a returning that is never simply accomplished and completed, a returning that never brings us, once and for all, into a fully and enduringly-present ‘there’, a returning that never results in our finally and forever finding ourselves simply and unequivocally ‘at home’” (Malpas 2015a, 4).

Conclusion

In conclusion only through the analysand's "active involvement with the landscape" (Malpas 1999b, 40) (i.e. involvement with Other/s) and "repeated triangulation and traverse, can a picture of" (ibid.) their authentic place in the world/history be built. Our article highlights that in contrast to supporters of genetic determinism, in psychoanalysis, the analysand "must be understood through their interconnection rather than their reduction, through their interdependence rather than their simplification." (ibid.) The analysand is "on the way" (Malpas 2012, 4) to their homecoming when they understand that "No single sighting is sufficient to gain a view of the entire region; multiple sightings are required, and every sighting overlaps, to some extent, with some other sighting" (Malpas 1999b, 41). Finally, and to reiterate, the analysand's "delineation of place can only be undertaken by a process that encompasses a variety of sightings from a number of conceptual 'landmarks' and that also undertakes a wide-ranging, criss-crossing set of journeys over the landscape at issue-it is only through such journeying, sighting and resighting that place can be understood." (ibid.) This investigation of place and its relation to psychoanalysis provides important insights which we plan to examine in our future research on genetic determinism. Our forthcoming work explores in more detail how place can reveal the errors of genetic determinism in connection to the media, education, discrimination and debates on genetic modification. The movie GATTACA provides us a vehicle and platform to achieve these aims.

NOTES

¹ Cf. Nihilism in Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (Gildersleeve 2016c, 103).

² See Gildersleeve 2016b, 3 for how this connects with Nietzsche's "art is worth more than truth".

³ Cf. „Hysteria and the Will to Power" in Gildersleeve 2016b.

⁴ This is comparable to the journey of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*; see Gildersleeve 2016b, 20-21.

⁵ This equates authenticity with hysteria and the Will to Power.

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