

## **The Pedagogical Dimension of Indoctrination: Criticism of Indoctrination and the Constructivism in Education**

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### **Abstract**

This study proposes a critical analysis of indoctrination in the field of education. We shall first discuss the meaning of this word trying to identify two fundamental dimensions: the pedagogical dimension and the ideological one. After approaching the relationship between indoctrination and authority in education, we classify the types of indoctrination identified by O. Reboul (1977) based on these two dimensions. For the analysis of indoctrination in the teaching process we used a four-dimensional model that includes: the intention, teaching contents, teaching methods and finalities of the didactic process. The study concludes with criticisms of indoctrination in terms of the constructivist paradigm in education. We consider that, far from having achieved the single possible approach, the constructivism is an option for educating the critical spirit and preventing the risks of indoctrination within the teaching process.

**Keywords:** indoctrination, authority, teaching, criticism of indoctrination, constructivist approach.

### **1. The Concept of Indoctrination. The Pedagogical Dimension of Indoctrination**

The initial meaning of indoctrination is of pedagogical nature. In Latin, *Doctrina* means education, science, doctrine, that can many times substitute one for another. The former meaning of *doctrine* was *savoir* or acquired knowledge (Robert 1957, 1564), while that of the verb *to indoctrinate* was: to instruct, to provide someone with knowledge, to teach a science (Robert 1957, 1564). These terms acquired other meanings that allowed a semantic shift to the political ideology without losing

their fundamental pedagogical meaning. According to Robert, the second meaning of *doctrine* is that of “a set of principles stated as true that aim to guide or govern people’s actions (...)” (1534), while the meaning of *indoctrination* is strictly related to that of pursuing: “the attempt to make somebody adhere to a doctrine, an opinion, a point of view” (1564).

The general meaning of this notion mostly envisaged the extreme situations: “training” the young Nazis, brain washing, totalitarian propaganda etc. The indoctrination of children was one of the most efficient methods for strengthening the totalitarian regimes. The children taken from their families at a young age in order to be transformed into some objects owned by the state represents the major stage of an efficient indoctrination. Once uprooted, the child is forced to integrate with a conditioned behavior into a community that represses the developing personality (Cathala 1986).

The English literature (White 1972, Snook 1972) defines the indoctrination in relation to interpersonal relationships, in general, and to moral values, in particular.

The French literature (Reboul 1977, Burdeau 1985, 1989) no longer places the indoctrination at interpersonal level, but at institutional level. The fact that a teacher indoctrinates the students is imputable but less interesting than knowing that the educational system, as a whole, is an institution that uses indoctrination, provided that the school can be considered as an ideological state instrument capable to develop a political and social system and to enlist individuals in it. In this situation, the indoctrination is no longer an ethical issue but also a political one.

To conclude, *indoctrination* has a very complex and circumstantial meaning: its original meaning is pedagogical and positive; by shifting to the political ideology it acquired negative meanings. This term is mostly used with its negative meaning and envisages two fundamental dimensions: the pedagogical dimension and the ideological one.

## 2. The Relationship between Indoctrination and Authority in Education

Indoctrination always involves an authority relationship. In education, he/she who teaches or indoctrinates others exercises a power considered more or less legitimate. Similar to teachers, he/she who indoctrinates others is the representative of an institution of authority; he/she asserts him/herself in the name of God, society, people, culture, truth, humankind etc. (Reboul 1977, 33).

Not all forms of authority are related to indoctrination, particularly because authority is a universal phenomenon. G. Burdeau (1989, 578) emphasizes the universality and polymorphism of authority which is not found only in the human society. All animals live in groups and have a leader that represents the authority. In human communities the authority is a constant element of the social life.

G. Burdeau (1989) identifies three basic forms of authority: the *anonymous authority* generated by the group pressures over the behavior of individuals; the *personal authority* that is spontaneous within social groups as the preeminence of an individual who is capable to influence the attitude of the others and the *functional authority* consisting in the power invested in certain persons due to the position they hold within a specific institutional framework. The difference between the latter two forms occurs in the current language when we distinguish between a person who *has* authority and a person who *is* (an) authority.

In semiotics terms, Bocheński (1974) identifies the forms of authority based on the fields where it occurs. He distinguishes between the *epistemic authority*, namely the authority of he/she who knows (teacher, specialist), and the *deontic authority* of superiors, chiefs, commanders, leaders etc.

The didactic authority is defined by its particular way of mixing various forms of authority as pure forms. In terms of norms, values and spiritual traditions of the society, it is an anonymous authority. It is the authority of the “educational society” and school materialized in the transfer of culture to younger generations. The teacher takes part in this anonymous

authority. The teacher embodies the school authority which he/she converts into a functional authority: he/she is entitled with authority by the society and the school. The teacher is the person who *has* authority, by which he/she demands to be listened, an external form of discipline. According to Bocheński, this is a deontic authority; the teacher claims compliance with imperative norms and the acceptance of the authority he/she was given. The real authority of a teacher is, as stated by Bocheński, epistemic: the authority of he/she who knows and provides knowledge. In authoritarian systems, the epistemic authority plays a significantly lesser role if at all. Bocheński defines totalitarianism as “a doctrine according to which all fields should have a deontic authority”, and “expands a deontic authority over everything” (Bocheński 1974). If the epistemic authority is negotiated and gained by equal partners (or who have equal rights) throughout the knowledge assumption process, the deontic authority is “given” and imposed by the most powerful to the weakest ones during the assumption of values, norms, and directives in order to ensure the compliance with the desired social order. While the educational system is dominated by the deontic authority, the knowledge process is subordinated to the one that aims to maintain the social order and to shape conformist attitudes. The epistemic authority of teachers is used to cover the real intentions of the system. A student is more open to follow the advice to comply with, and to adhere to a system of values when it comes from a person who is an authority that he/she respects, even if this is a deontic authority. This is why totalitarian regimes paid a special attention to schools and teachers whom they wanted to adhere to their cause in order to further accept to transfer their authority to the system, which is to change the epistemic authority into a deontic one.

The indoctrination has fundamentally changed the cognitive framework. The truth is not excluded but it loses its reference points and criteria being then reinterpreted from the viewpoint of the “valid” doctrine. No action of indoctrination is admitted *de facto* by the one who applies it. The indoctrination is often defined as the “doctrine of the opponent”, meaning that it is sufficient to identify the “real” and “valid” doctrine in order

to consider any speech opposing to it as an indoctrinating speech. The communist speech abounds in criticisms of the capitalist system whose subject is the practice of indoctrination. Under these circumstances, it is recommended to identify criteria that allow the determination of the most relevant cases of indoctrination and to understand the “mechanisms” triggering the transformation of teaching into indoctrination.

### 3. Situations and Types of Indoctrination in Teaching

O. Reboul presents 13 standard situations of teaching-related indoctrination (1977, 14-24):

1. *to teach harmful doctrines.* For example, we indoctrinate children when we teach them that people belonging to a specific race are dull, thieves, evil etc. these being the specific features of their race; by doing so, we are not simply inculcating them with untrue notions, but also with racial or ethnic hatred;

2. *to use the education to support a partisan doctrine.* This form of indoctrination means to advocate for a biased doctrine in a place not intended for such purposes: the school. Teachers use their authority to teach bias doctrines;

3. *to learn without understanding the essence.* In this case, it is not the contents of a doctrine that really matters but how the inculcation takes place. Here, indoctrination means to learn without understanding rationally what is being taught. The major risk is that we might get used to acquire ideas without arguing them, which leads to manipulation;

4. *to make use of “authority” in teaching.* This form of indoctrination is related to the fact that the subjects cannot determine the truth by themselves, and this becomes debatable. Similar to other fields, the authority is a requisite for knowledge. An essential requirement of the progress of science is to have confidence in the scientific competences of specific “authorities”. The issue of indoctrination occurs when the authority is no longer proposed but imposed; it uses both seduction and constraints;

5. *to teach starting from preconceptions.* An education system relying on racial, religious preconceptions or

of any other nature is definitely tendentious. In this case, the indoctrination is more focused on contents rather than form;

6. *to teach starting from a doctrine considered to be unique.* This is no longer about preconceptions because the teacher might be fully aware of the doctrine and the “explanatory model” inspiring it; the *parti pris* is on purpose. The teacher uses the indoctrination when, by adopting an explanatory model, he/she rejects all others *a priori*;

7. *to teach something as scientific when in reality it is not.* This is the case when a doctrine is abusively using the title of *science*. This was the case of *scientific socialism*, and even *scientific racism*. This abusive scientification is in fact the modern form of dogmatism. We indoctrinate others when we teach dogmas, and assign an objective value to personal or collective beliefs;

8. *to teach only the positive aspects of a doctrine.* This indoctrination is no longer related to learning premises but its effects: this form of education excludes all its opponent facts,

9. *to counterfeit the facts in order to emphasize a certain doctrine.* In this case, the education is not only tendentious but also false. The one who indoctrinates invents the facts, counterfeits the statistics, provides false evidence etc;

10. *to arbitrarily select parts of a curriculum.* A curriculum is always arbitrary because it involves selections, and, implicitly, rejections. The indoctrination starts when the pedagogical selection gains an explicit ideological meaning;

11. *to emphasize a specific value during the educational process while disfavoring others.* This indoctrination is significantly driven by emotions. In its essence, the excitement is not indoctrination; the latter occurs in the Manicheist education that emphasizes the virtues of a system and denigrates the rest of them;

12. *to inculcate hatred through education.* This is the serious form of the aforementioned situation, being characteristic to fanatics;

13. *to impose a belief using violence.* This is an extreme situation because the violence is explicitly visible while the indoctrination involves dissimulation. The direct violence rather generates lack of confidence. It is much easier to repress

a critical reasoning using the indirect violence: censure, blackmail, seduction etc. Such examples can be found in publicity and propaganda

Based on the forms identified by Reboul, we can establish two fundamental categories of indoctrination situations:

- *situations of indoctrination asserted through their prevalent pedagogical meaning*: to learn without understanding the essence, to make use of “authority” in teaching, to teach starting from preconceptions, to teach something as scientific when in reality it is nothing but a simple opinion or unchecked belief, to teach starting from a doctrine considered to be unique, to emphasize a specific value during the educational process while disfavoring others etc.;

- *situations of indoctrination asserted through their prevalent ideological and political meaning*: to use the education to support a partisan doctrine; to teach only the positive aspects of a doctrine, to counterfeit the facts in order to emphasize a certain doctrine; to inculcate, through education, the hatred against everything opposing to a specific doctrine etc.

Reboul also found two additional methods or types of indoctrination (1977, 12): the *sectary indoctrination* acting upon our deepest preconceptions in order to replace them and the *conformist indoctrination* that actually relies on our deepest preconceptions in order to strengthen them. We notice that the first type occurs independently from our previous existential order, being specific to situations like revolutions that aim to radically change the social and political order based on an imposed and deep change of mentality. The sectary indoctrination is related to the establishment of totalitarian regimes. This form of indoctrination is grounded on physical, but most of all, psychological violence. Brainwashing is an extreme but particularly relevant situation. The conformist indoctrination relies on the existing mentality and enhances the incoherence, preconceptions and confusion in order to inculcate with new values and attitudes. Unlike the first type, the conformist indoctrination is almost invisible, non-violent and reaches its targets after a longer time, with almost the

same efficiency. It does not oppose the formal educational system but integrates into and uses it to achieve its purposes. The sectary indoctrination has to face the reluctance of those envisaged, but when it materializes in the change of the political system it starts aiming to ensure the compliance of individuals with the new values of the regime and continues with the conformist indoctrination.

None of the types, forms or situations of indoctrination can be separated from the educational system. A situation taken out of the educational context cannot be accused of indoctrination. For example, the counterfeit of facts may represent a moral or legal situation, but not indoctrination if it does not involve the teaching–learning relationship, where the indoctrinating teacher changes, adjusts and interprets the facts to make the learning student consider them inseparable from the values of a doctrine. The indoctrinating individual will never admit the real intentions, but will use the formal aspect of his/her teaching/training activity: *he/she teaches, trains people, he/she does not indoctrinate them*. Even when the educational system is totally subordinated to a political ideology and states its intention to radically change the didactic process and the training of individuals in order to make them obedient to the new political regime, the indoctrination intention is still hidden: the opponent is always the one who indoctrinates. The acquiring of new values and attitudes is not an (declared) action of indoctrination, but has the role to “prepare” the young individual to “defend” himself and “fight” the enemy who is the enemy of the new political regime. This intention hides behind a necessity built according to the new axiological order.

#### **4. Teaching as Indoctrination. Indoctrination Criteria in Education**

*When does teaching become indoctrination?*

By summarizing the analysis and criteria justifying the approaches in this field, we propose a four-dimensional explanatory model. The analysis of the indoctrination through



teaching must consider four fundamental elements: intention, teaching contents, teaching method(s) and finalities of the didactic process. Further on, we propose a brief analysis of the meaning, functions and practice of indoctrination starting from each dimension.

### **Indoctrination as intention**

According to White (1972) and Snook (1972), the key element is the intention. Their arguments use the following ideas:

- There is no indoctrination in the absence of an indoctrinating person, and what makes human actions unique is the intention itself.

- The existence of authoritarian methods is not a sign of indoctrination if they do not intend to prevent the child from thinking by himself and are not used for this purpose. In fact, what really matters is the purpose they are intended for and not their simple use.

- The result of indoctrination cannot represent a criterion because the indoctrination is not always successful, as the teaching process is not always successful. Indeed, we cannot identify the indoctrination based only on its results, particularly when one of these results is the reduction, until disappearance, of the ability to perceive the process in its essence. On the other hand, the indoctrination with no results is not genuine, as no teaching process is successful if nothing is being learned. The indoctrination itself remains an intention in this situation and does not become reality, at least not a dangerous one.

If only the intention matters, then no teacher can be accused of indoctrination if he/she manages to make students adhere to a doctrine by using an attractive style and persuasion and no hidden intentions. Similarly, a teacher who teaches a dangerous or false doctrine in which he/she really believes cannot be considered as indoctrinating. It is obvious that such situations are debatable and draw attention to the fact that the identification and qualification of intentions is not always possible. Therefore, although the intention is essential for

understanding a situation of indoctrination, this cannot constitute the single functional criterion.

### **Indoctrination through contents**

Teaching turns into indoctrination when it encourages the transfer of contents subordinated to a political, religious ideology or of any other nature. The most relevant examples of indoctrination in this regard are those asserted by their ideological meaning: to use the education to support a partisan doctrine; to teach only the positive aspects of a doctrine, to counterfeit the facts in order to emphasize a certain doctrine, to inculcate, through education, the hatred against everything that opposes to the imposed doctrine etc. A criterion used for separating the indoctrinating from the non-indoctrinating contents is the difference between science (the explicit meaning of the word) and belief. We deal with teaching when the teacher convinces the students of what he/she *knows* and with indoctrination when he/she convinces or attempts to convince the students of what he/she *believes*. A sincere intention counts less; the contents of teaching: knowledge or belief is what really counts most (Reboul 1977, 55). On the other hand, any form of knowledge, including the scientific one, relies on several options that are not specifically scientific, but rather constitute the expression of the mentality of an era or society. Whether they provide or not ethics or religion classes, all educational systems are influenced by the beliefs and preconceptions of those entitled to make decisions and selections on behalf of the direct beneficiaries of the system. Good education does not hide the ideology, but places it in the field of knowledge, thus depriving it of its greatest power, namely dissimulation (Reboul 1977, 63). If we accept this idea, we must also admit that it is not the doctrine that leads to indoctrination, but the way we relate to the doctrine, and not the contents taught but the teaching method that generates a situation of indoctrination.

### **Indoctrination as a method**

Teaching may become an indoctrination act when it uses authoritarian methods, regardless of the contents type and the intentions of the teacher. Defining indoctrination depending on

the method used allows us to talk about indoctrination without considering any doctrine. This is not about a selection of vulnerable content or predisposed to indoctrination. Teaching mathematics may provide a clear example of indoctrination, if this is made in a coercive and authoritarian way. Rejecting the authoritarian education was one of the common points of all the “new education” trend options. This idea is present in the work of J.-J. Rousseau, the setter of this trend, to whom the right education is natural, non-coercive and respectful towards the child’s liberty. Rousseau considers that the bookish type of education slows down the child’s thinking. Therefore, to educate means to provide the child with the liberty to live his/her own life experiences. Hence a serious psychological argument in favor of the thesis on the indoctrination as a method: the coercive education is against the child’s nature. Non-directivism represented the most severe answer to the authority of school and educators. Beyond all exaggerations, this orientation expressed the importance of the real changes needed in the concept of education, and also specified the direction of the changes to be made. Its value lies in the fact that it brought to the fore the issue of the teacher-student relation and the need to transform it into real communication, the frequent conflicts between the teacher’s authority and the student’s need for freedom, the need to educate independent human beings in schools, with the conscience of liberty and responsibility. The authoritarianism of the didactic relation and the use of methodological strategies based on constraint are constantly associated with the denial of the freedom of expression and conscience, which is the very essence of the indoctrination by education. Dewey considered that the authoritarian education is equal to indoctrination, arguing that the authority is contrary to the democratic ideal. Defining the indoctrination as a method results in the ample extension of the meaning of this term, although it keeps us in the area of negative semantics. The indoctrination act is no longer necessarily connected to a specific content. The science teacher may indoctrinate, from a formal viewpoint at least, to the extent that the arts teacher can do. Moreover, indoctrination does not take into account the presence of intention; a teacher may accidentally indoctrinate

or without being aware of this, if he/she uses passive and authoritarian methods and does not accept but his/her own ideas as valid. Thus indoctrination becomes a matter of “style” rather than a certain doctrine. The main limitation of this approach is related to a very simple truth: the use of a coercive strategy determines rejection rather than adhesion to an idea, just as the use of a democratic strategy does not involve the dissimulation of intention and manipulation. Therefore, indoctrination does not always depend on the authoritarian style and cannot be dissociated by values and attitudes, and thus by the contents that confer a sense for the didactic act.

There are several critical differences between finality and intention:

- intention can be attributed to an individual, finality is expressed at the system level;
- intention is part of an explanatory mechanism of a singular act, while finality determines the evolution of a process, by integrating acts into a coherent system;
- intention mostly acts in the beginning phase of an action, while the finality accompanies an action throughout its trajectory, right to the end (from this viewpoint, the term itself is suggestive), allowing the correlation between the results and the expectations.

Gaston Mialaret (1991, 53) identifies two basic concepts of educational finality:

- *a vision on man*: as an individual, as social being and in his relations with nature and environment;
- *a vision on education's functions*:
  - Is education only for the benefit of the individuals?
  - Is it in the service of a group, either political or religious, etc. or of the society, in general? What determines this subordination of education?
  - Is it in the service of society? But what kind of society: the present one, the future one? What will be the future society like: an extension of the present one; a completely new society?

Mialaret expresses the nature of the finality in an interrogative way, using a set of questions whose answer depends on the sense of the educational act. Such an approach

allows us to know the values that ground an educational system. The finality of education provides the most important criterion for the selection and organization of the educational content and for the design of teaching and learning strategies. The finality is the expression of the educational project of a society. These define the desirable personality profile of a society, in a given historical time. The “new man” ideal forms the grounds of the educational project of the communist society, producing radical changes at the level of content and teaching strategies. The communist ideology confers upon the school a critical role in transforming the society, by transforming the education into a political indoctrination process.

### **5. Criticism of Indoctrination and the Constructivist Approach in Education**

*Can indoctrination be prevented?*

*Where is the limit between normality and deviance and how can we be more cautious towards them?*

The change of perspective on knowledge and on the teacher-student relation in the teaching context may lead to the prevention of the abusive effects of the education induced indoctrination. The constructivist paradigm provides a critical perspective on the indoctrination through the conception on knowledge and its achievement during the didactic process. We further present several ideas that draft a critical approach of indoctrination, from the constructivist model perspective.

1. *Knowledge is both a process and the product of this process.* Knowledge does not totally pre-exist, but it is built by the active and critical involvement of some subjects, having expectations and motivations that implicitly influence the cognitive interpretation of the world. The involvement of the student exceeds the area of assuming some previously produced knowledge.

2. *The conflict of ideas enhances the knowledge build-up.* The concept of *cognitive conflict* was proposed by B. Inhelder, a collaborator of Piaget, to emphasize that the progress in knowledge is not a linear and cumulative process,

but it involves the child in cognitive unbalanced situations, and puts him/her in front of experiences that determine internal conflicts, that make the child aware of his/her own acquisitions. Knowledge is built during the process of conflictive confrontation between the individual and the environment. Confrontation generates adaptive unbalances that challenge the individual to use all his/her adaptation resources in order to reach a more stable balance. The situation of a cognitive unbalance in relation to a new problem that cannot be solved by using the previously acquired procedures and knowledge becomes a potential factor of cognitive progress.

3. *The teacher enhances the previous acquisitions of the student.* Most of the constructivist didactics are based on the previous conception notion, which was shaped for the first time by Bachelard. He brings into discussion the previous culture of the student as an epistemological obstacle for knowledge. He supports the idea of a total separation and of the ongoing conflict between the common, empirical knowledge and the scientific one and he is vexed by the fact that "...teachers failed to reflect on the fact that the student comes to the classes (...) with already existing empirical knowledge: therefore, the problem is not to acquire an experimental culture, but to change the culture, to remove the barriers already formed in the daily life" (1938, 18). Knowledge building is not a simple and linear process, but it often involves a preliminary "deconstructive" stage, to remove the biases or the false ideas that act as an obstacle to the knowledge process. In other approaches (Giordan and Vecchi 1987; Giordan 1993; Giordan 1998; Larochelle and Desautels 1992), "the preliminary conceptions" play an active or even positive role, and knowledge is conceived both as an extension of the previously acquired data, and as a separation from them.

4. *Errors may play a positive role in learning.* Giving a new value to errors is determined by a different perspective on knowledge, which is not given, as a perfect conceptual system, already made, which has to be assimilated by the student as it is, but a process in which the student is actively involved, by building his/her own cognitive system. Therefore, the resizing of the error condition depends on the

change of our way to report ourselves to knowledge. Favre (1995) talks about the replacement of “the paradigm of dogmatic approach of information”, based on certitudes that can take the shape of dogmatic statements and abusive generalizations with “the paradigm of scientific approach of information”, that works with provisional and approximate assumptions. If “the paradigm of dogmatic approach of information” is valid for closed societies, where individuals must know only what they are transmitted to, in a normative educational process, “the paradigm of scientific approach of information” is specific to the society whose major values are: change, progress and personal assertion (Favre 1995, 212).

5. *The confrontation at the ideas level does not exclude cooperation.* On the contrary, the idea of social construction of knowledge lead to the revalorization of pedagogic relations at the teaching level (student-student and teacher-student). A.-N. Perret-Clermont considers that the change of educational relations not only leads to the improvement of the social and affective climate of the classroom, but it also makes the learning more efficient (2000, 31). The direct pedagogical consequence of this observation is the design of educational strategies based on team work and cooperation. According to M. Perraudeau, the most original element of the constructivist approach and, paradoxically, the less known one, is the design of knowledge environment not only in a physical sense, but mostly as a human environment (2000, 80), and therefore, an increased importance granted to the cooperation-based activities.

6. *The adult’s role is to mediate the interaction of the child with the environment,* but not by reducing or attenuating the problems faced by the child, as a cognitive subject, but, on the contrary, by involving the children in activities that create cognitive conflicts, into an active solution seeking process. One of the most important qualities of the educator is from this perspective that of anticipating the competences the child will be capable of. The way in which this is done may not be the traditional one, by transmitting some content, because these competences cannot be regarded as knowledge “to be taught”,

but under the shape of the individual capacity to build and continuously rebuild his/her own cognitive system.

7. *Knowledge is a democratic process* where each candidate to the cognitive act expresses his/her opinions and confronts them with the others. The student thus understands the importance of ideas diversity and learns how to defend/argument his/her own opinions. In this context, “the previous conception” of the student changes its condition: it turns from a simple statement into an assumption, which will be checked in various ways, depending on the cognitive act specificity: the conformity to the reality, the logical coherence, etc.

Without necessarily being a recipe, constructivism is an option for the cultivation of the critical spirit and in order to prevent the risks of indoctrination by teaching. Dethroning the absolute truth dogma leads to a pluralistic concept of knowledge that is grounded on the moral of mutual acceptance and respect, that positively enhances the tensions resulting from diversities and difference. “Even when new contents of learning should be connectable, they have to differ from the already existing knowledge. Adapting everything to existing cognitive systems means being resistant to learning. Perceiving only confirmations and no differences means stagnation. The acceptance and testing of new distinctions and leading differences present a qualitative ‘jump’ in a learning biography.” (Siebert 2002, 117) The constructivist approach answers to the exigencies of a democratic and multicultural society by the cultivation of ideas, in order to form in schools autonomous persons, aware of their liberty and responsibility.

## NOTES

The text includes excerpts from Mariana Momanu's book entitled *Educație și ideologie. O analiză pedagogică a sistemului totalitar comunist (Education and Ideology. A Pedagogical Analysis of the Totalitarian Communist System)*, Sub-chapter II. 2, “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University Publishing House of Iasi. These were reviewed and adjusted to the current context of this analysis.



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