Truth, Representation and Interpretation: The Popper Case
Abstract
Abstract
The aim of this study is to determine several points of reference regarding the way in which Karl Popper built up his philosophical discourse. I locate two specific ways in which Popper interpreted and used ideas belonging to other philosophers. Thus I distinguish in Popper between a projective hermeneutics (where the author uses a thesis that forms a part of his own philosophy in order to reconstruct and understand the ideas of another philosopher) and an ideological hermeneutics (where he uses a statement expressing an interest of the community whereof he is a member in order to interpret and reconstruct the text of another philosopher). In so doing I also highlight the considerable asymmetry between a representationalist hermeneutics, and a projective and, respectively, an ideological one. Whereas in the first case the interpreter wishes to unveil a truth about the philosophical text, in the other two he is rather expressing a desire to talk about himself, his own beliefs and convic¬tions, or about the beliefs of his community of reference.
Keywords: Popper, truth, interpretation, representationalist hermeneutics, projective hermeneutics, ideological hermeneutics, beliefs
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