Y a-t-il une « révolution copernicienne » ou « anticopernicienne » en phénoménologie (en partant du débat entre Husserl et Kant) ?


Is there a « Copernican » or an « anti-Copernican » Revolution in Phenomenology (starting from the Discussion between Husserl and Kant) ?

This paper raises the question – based on the works of Marc Richir and Dominique Pradelle (in particular) – if and how phenomenology deals with an “anti-Copernican” revolution, considering that the motif (which is initially Kantian) of a “Copernican” revolution seems to have gone through some modifications that reflect a certain deposition of the constitutive role of the subject. Its fundamental thesis is that a certain dimension “beyond” the Copernican revolution does not reestablish a “Ptolemaic” realism but rather opens a dimension “beneath”: beneath the subject and the object where can take place a mutual relationship between an a-subjective constitutive power and a pre-empirical foundational being. This dimension “beneath” means that the alternative does not concern a “pre-Copernican” realism on the one hand and an “idealism” leaving in the shadows the relationship between the transcendental method and an ontological perspective on the other, but rather puts forward a constructive circularity between the transcendental constitution and an ontological foundation. It follows that “normativity” is not achieved on the basis of pre-given objectivity – because it would mean a petition principia – but draws upon the “pre-immanent generativity”.

Keywords: being, constitution, Copernican revolution, foundation, generativity, idealism, normativity, realism, transcendental

[Full Article PDF]