Subjectivity as the Foundation for Objectivity in Kant and Husserl: On Two Types of Transcendental Idealism

Abstract

The idea that subjectivity makes up the foundation or source of all objectivity applies to all transcendental idealists. Nevertheless, Husserl conceives of this relationship between subjectivity and objectivity in a radically different fashion than Kant. Husserl’s conception leads to a primacy of the noetic dimension of sense (Sinn) at the expense of the noematic dimension. In order to render this explicit, not only a closer look at Kant’s transcendental deduction is illuminating but also taking into account neo-Kantianism. In contrast to Husserl, Kant and the neo-Kantians grant primacy to the objective or noematic within the correlation between subject and object or noesis and noema.

Keywords: Husserl, Kant, neo-Kantianism, Rickert, transcendental idealism, subjectivity, noema, noesis