Sens et non-sens de l’hylétique dans la phénoménologie de Husserl


Meaningfulness and Meaninglessness of the Hyletic in Husserl’s Phenomenology

The purpose of this paper is to stress the constancy of the Husserlian conception of sensible contents. I argue that Husserl, despite some significant changes in his philosophical views between 1901 and 1913, always maintained that sensations have a founding role to play in perceptual experience. The proposed interpretation is build against the idea of a scission in Husserl’s work as regards the status of sensations—an idea which became widespread due to the so-called (neo-)Fregean readings of phenomenology. Even if the notion of sense (“Noema”) gains in importance in the Ideas, I argue that this does not discredit the sensuous stuff when it comes to the constitution of perceptual objects.

Keywords: Husserl, Stumpf, Føllesdal, Concept, Intentionality, Sensations, Phenomenology

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