The Nature of Intersubjectivity in Buber, Husserl and Waldenfels: An Encounter, an Intentional Constitution, or a Happening?

Abstract

This text involves the concept of intersubjectivity in Buber, Husserl, and Waldenfels. For these authors, the other has an important place in the constitution of ourselves. Buber presents an innateness of the You, whereby it fosters in us a longing for relation, bringing the directness of love, which implies acts of responsibility toward the other. Husserl affirms that the transcendental subjectivity is a transcendental intersubjectivity implicit in the intentional constitution of the Ego. Waldenfels precludes an idea of the innateness and of the implication in order to explore the event of what happens between us in its integrity. Therefore, Waldenfels conceives the opening of the personality as a latent process. The event of what happens can divert the course of our determination, bringing new possibilities to the personality itself. Now, the meaning is shared, and not endowed by the transcendental Ego (Husserl) as the only thing responsible for meaning. We share meaning because we originally have the experience of the other, of the world, and of ourselves. In Waldenfels, we respond to the others’ and the world’s demands, which occur as original events, instead of responding to them as innate demands, coming from us.

Keywords: event, response, personality, other, experience