Konstitution oder Deduktion des Eigenleibes? Paradoxien der Leiblichkeit in der transzendentalen Phänomenologie Husserls

Abstract

Constitution or Deduction of the Lived Body? The Paradox of Embodiment in Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology

The problem of embodiment and that of the constitution of the lived body are central to the Husserlian phenomenology. Husserl’s endeavor to develop a theory of intersubjectivity and his attempt to avoid the solipsistic conundrum depend on his ability to solve the riddle of embodiment. Nevertheless, Husserl struggled until the late thirties to find an adequate account of the constitution of the (lived) body, without much success. In this paper I try to show with the help of Merleau-Ponty, Derrida and Figal that in order to solve the question of embodiment, one has to transcend the boundaries of traditional Husserlian phenomenology and to go beyond the cartesian mind-body dualism, which Husserl more or less adopts.

Keywords: transcendental subject, intersubjectivity, constitution of the body, lived body, embodiment of the ego