Ideation und Idealisierung: Die mathematische Exaktheit der Idealbegriffe und ihre Rolle im Konstitutionsprozess bei Husserl


Ideation and idealization: The mathematical exactness of the ideal concepts and their role in the constitution process in Husserl

In this article I trace the origins of the process of idealization and compare it to the process of ideation at Husserl. I argue that Husserl’s statements do not keep – as originally intended – a clear distinction between both. On the contrary, ideation and idealization build up a continuing process whose telos is the exact determination of the experienced object. Hence, the idea of the Kantian thing-in-itself as the particular actuality of a thing embracing an open infinity of possible adumbrations – a transfinite infinity – becomes an ideal of exact determination comprising a closed infinity of the infinite ways of givenness – an actual infinity. This leads to an aporia insofar as the infinite perfection of the idea has to be presupposed in order to conceive of the infinite imperfection of the actuality of the thing. The aporia may be resolved by considering the historical contingency of ideas and the open essence of a thing, which in conjunction lead to a conception of an idea allowing both for openness and indeterminacy. Nevertheless, although the telos of adequate knowledge is not the exact, but the optimal givenness, the exact idea still constitutes a telos insofar as it guarantees the pursue of the maximal possible fullness of perception.

Keywords: Husserl, ideation, idealization, Kantian thing-in-itself, infinity, openness

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