

## **The critique of the constitution model of “apprehension - content of apprehension” in Husserl’s *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time***

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### **Abstract**

The aim of this article is to analyze the problems found by Husserl regarding the application of the constitution scheme of “apprehension-content of apprehension” as a model of understanding the deepest levels (tiefsten Stufe) of time constitution. Such analysis will deal with the first period, in which Husserl investigates in a systematic way time constitution, i.e. in texts from *Husserliana X* (1893-1917). Firstly, in texts from *Husserliana X*, Husserl applies the scheme of constitution apprehension-content of apprehension as a way to describe all temporal constitution. Secondly (from 1909 on) Husserl observes that the application of this interpretative scheme to describe the lowest levels (untersten Stufen) of temporal constitution leads to serious problems, such as an inevitable infinite regression and a fall into an understanding founded on “prejudices of the now”. To overcome such obstacles, Husserl tried to deepen his analysis of the lowest level of temporal constitution and found out that the absolute flow (and its own modes of consciousness, viz., primal impression, retention, protention) is the last level of all constitution of temporality.

**Keywords:** Husserl, apprehension, content, intentionality, constitution, retention, time, absolute flow.

### **Introduction**

Husserl formulated the model of constitution apprehension-content of apprehension for the first time in the

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*Logical Investigations* (1900-1901). This model was primarily used to describe perceptive constitution, and then generalized as a model to all objective constitution. In every constitution of objects there is an intentional act, which directs itself to the data of sensations and apprehends such sensible contents through synthesis and interpretation, as the unit of multiple modes of profiles (its multiple sensible determinations, for instance, its color, its spatial shape, its smell, etc.)

This interpretative model, when applied to the act of perception, works very well, but a difficulty arises when one tries to apply this model to the categorical constitution, for in such cases the contents that serve as a basis to the act of apprehension are not actual sensible contents. The case of the categorical intentions shows the necessity of enlarging the model of constitution apprehension-content of apprehension. Dieter Lohmar characterizes this enlargement as “the conception of non-sensible representatives.” (Lohmar 2009, 4)

As a matter of fact, in the *Logical Investigations* (Sixth Investigation), categorical intuition also follows the general model of apprehension-content of apprehension, but in this case the apprehended content, i.e., interpreted, is not sensible, but the presentation (*Darstellung*) of a state of affairs (*Sachverhalten*). Such contents consist of representative contents (*Repräsentanten*) of a categorical object that is constituted through syntheses of coincidence (*Deckungssynthesen*) realized between categorical intentional acts and acts of perception.

Nevertheless, Husserl observes that the utilization of the scheme of apprehension-content of apprehension to describe the lowest levels of time constitution and of temporal objects leads one to admit serious problems. They are: 1) the understanding that the apprehended contents are bound to the “now moment”, which implies admitting that we don’t have an access to the past and to the future; 2) the inevitable infinite regress which one needs to accept when one understands that the deepest level of temporal constitution is characterized by acts of apprehension. Thus, to realize a phenomenological description of the deepest level of temporal constitution it is necessary not only to enlarge the scheme of apprehension-content of

apprehension, but also to completely abandon it<sup>1</sup>. It is precisely in *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* (1893-1917)<sup>2</sup> that Husserl for the first time deals with the problems related to the constitution of temporality.

In this paper, I will firstly analyze what the model consists of constitution “apprehension-content of apprehension”. In a first period of his investigations concerning temporal constitution (up to 1909), Husserl uses this model to describe the constitutional operations of time. Secondly, I will analyze the necessity, diagnosed by Husserl, of overcoming this scheme to understand the deepest level of the constitution of all temporality. Then, I will discuss the solution presented by Husserl to overcome the problems arisen from his yet immature analysis of the constitution of time. This solution consists of the discovery of a new sphere of the temporal constitution, viz., the sphere of absolute flow (*absoluter Fluss*), understood as the deepest level of the constitution of time and of temporal objects.

### **1. The model of intentional constitution “apprehension-content apprehension” in the *Logical Investigations*.**

In the *Logical Investigations* (1900-1901), Husserl formulates his own concept of intentionality, recovered from the concept formulated by Brentano. According to Brentano, intentionality consists “of the reference to a content”: “every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the mediaeval schoolmen called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and by what we, not without ambiguity, call the relation to a content, the direction to an object (by which a reality is not to be understood) or an immanent objectivity” (Brentano 1874, 115; Husserl 2001 b, 212).

Husserl does not use the concept of “psychic phenomena” to designate intentional acts (given that Husserl considers such concept to be contaminated by certain psychological assumptions), and also disagrees with Brentano who considers that the object towards which intentionality is directed to is an immanent object, that is, it is an object which pertains to consciousness. However, Husserl agrees with Brentano when considering that every intentional experience is built as a

reference to a content, as direction towards an object, be this object existent or not. Husserl thus understands *apprehension* within this context as a “character of intentional act”, it consists of a “character of act” which constitutes the object. Once consciousness directs itself in an *apprehensive mode* towards an object, in this process of directing, the consciousness does not only aim at the object, but also constitutes the aimed at object, which thus is an apprehended object.

In *Logical Investigations*, the description of the essential structure of the intentional apprehension (of the objective constitution) is introduced through the example of perceptive apprehension. Perception is here a good example to be explored, given that it is an act that originary constitutes its objects. It is an act in which the object “in person” is originary constitutes as something that is actually present in consciousness. Thus, the model of constitution of perception is seen initially as a fundamental model of the constitution of objects, that is, represents the proper mode of constituting which characterizes intentionality of act (*Aktintentionalität*).

Perceptual apprehension constitutes the object from the apprehension of sensory matter – in itself presenting no meaning as it is a pre-given material (*vorgegeben*), pre-constituted – through the conversion of these presenting contents (*darstellend*) (called by Husserl also as representatives) of the object. These contents are the multiple profiles (*Abschattungen*) apprehended. As examples of the multiple profiles of the presentation of the object, there are the red that is felt (*empfunden*) and the spatial shape of the *sphere*, which serves as a basis to the constitution of the object “red ball”. The object is thus constituted as a unit of these multiple modes of manifestation (*Erscheinungen*). The perceptual apprehension works actively in this process of constitution through interpretation and synthesis, giving meaning to sensory matter. The “objectifying apprehension” “inspirit” sensory data in such a way that the *felt contents* appear in a unity, namely the unity of the object.

Unlike Brentano, to whom the sensory contents were transcendent and only the object was really present in consciousness – Husserl thinks that sensory data is really

(*reell*) present in consciousness, that is, both the acts of apprehension and the apprehended contents are *experienced* (*erlebten*), are immanent<sup>3</sup>. However, the perceived object is not *experienced*: “this object, though perceived, is not itself experienced nor conscious (...)” (Husserl 2001 b, 203). The object is not experienced because it is the very thing that is intentionally present in the *manifestation* (in the experience). The appearing of the thing (the experience) is not the thing which appears (that seems to stand before us *in propria persona*). As belonging in a conscious connection, the appearing of things is experienced by us, as belonging in the phenomenal world, things appear before us.” (Husserl 2001 b, 203)

## 2. The constitution of time and temporal objects (*Zeitobjekt*) according to the model “apprehension-content of apprehension”

The difficulties that are presented to the reader in *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, mainly related to the long period (1893-1917) encompassed by the investigations exposed in this work, do not make this work less important to the understanding of time constitution in Husserlian phenomenology. Even when one considers that the analyses in the *Bernau Manuscripts* (1917-1918) (Husserliana XXXIII) and in the *C-Manuscripts* (1929-1934) (Husserliana - Materialien VIII) show considerable advancements regarding the investigations of time constitution, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* is a work that must be analyzed in depth, given that it contains a general and structural presentation of the concepts, and also of the questions regarding the constitution of temporality, concepts and questions that will be once more analyzed and deepened in the *Bernau Manuscripts* and in the *C-Manuscripts*.

When one analyses *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, one sees that, in the texts up to 1908, the constitution of time and of temporal objects is understood based on the scheme “apprehension-content of apprehension”. *Time apprehension* and the *contents of temporal apprehension* are presented as phenomenological data that

constitutes time through the previous realization of suspension (*Ausschaltung*) of objective time. This suspension is the first step in the analysis carried out by Husserl in *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* and consists of suspending – putting between parenthesis – all objective validity of time, real (*real*) and mundane, that is, what must be reduced is real time (*real*) operated by the sciences, time which is measurable with a chronometer.

After the reduction of objective time, what remains as phenomenological residue is the *apprehension of time* (*Zeitauffassungen*) and the specific contents of this apprehension. Hence, Husserl initially characterized the temporal constitution of object (*Zeitobjekt*), i.e., temporal “objectification”, in the same way he characterized “objectivation” in the *Logical Investigations*: “the experienced content is ‘objectified’, and at that point the object is constituted in the mode of apprehension from the material of the experienced contents.” (Husserl 1991, 8)

In the case of temporal constitution, one can also say that, at least in the first part (of the work) (up to 1908), the sensory contents are ‘nothing’ considered in themselves regarding being and meaning (once they are pre-constituted), they serve only as a basis to objectification, thus being indispensable to the constitution of the object. As John Brough states, “the immanent sensory contents are taken to be neutral with respect to temporal determinations. A tone-content, considered in itself, is neither now, nor past, nor future. It becomes the bearer of temporal characteristics only through special time-constituting apprehensions.” (Brough 1991, XLIV)

During this period Husserl, in his analyses of temporality, understands temporal constitutions as happening through “apprehensions of the now”, “apprehensions of the past” and “apprehensions of the future”. These apprehensions animate the immanent content according to a proper temporal mode. However, these apprehensions are developments of a continuous act (*Aktkontinuum*) (Husserl 1991, 25) which is characterized as being the perception, i.e., an act that constantly permeates in three directions: present, past and future. In 1905 Husserl understood the question regarding the

“origin of time”, which was a *leit motiv* for the investigations in *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, as a question regarding “the perception of a temporal object”. As Luis Niel suggests, one can rephrase it as a question: “how can one perceive a temporal object through acts?” (Niel 2011, 11)<sup>4</sup> Perception is a privileged locus in the analysis of temporal constitution. Husserl understands this act as the very act that donates time originary, given that it consists of apprehensions of the now (*Jetzt*).

If one uses this interpretative model to understand the perception of a temporal sequence as the sequence of sounds do, re in a melody, and one considers that the do-sound is actually perceived as a do-sound *now* actually present in consciousness, then this means that this do-sound is only actually conscious while its content of sensation is animated by a “perceptive apprehension of the actual now”. However, when a new sound sounds the do sound recently perceived does not simply disappear, it is still conscious as a *past do sound* through an “apprehension of the past” operated by a primary memory (also denominated as a fresh memory; Husserl will later characterize this originary consciousness as *retention*). If, in the perception, the actual now is originally donated – in the perception the now is donated in flesh – primary memory is originary donation of the past, it is immediate consciousness of the “already been”. Only through primary memory in the past accessible: “only in primary memory do we see what is past, only in it does the past become constituted – and constituted presentatively, not representatively.” (Husserl 1991, 43)

The intentionality that aims at what is going to be given in the future, in the *now becoming* (for instance, a mi sound that follows in the melody), is immediately connected with the intentionality of perception that aims at what is given in the actual now and also connected with the intentionality that aims at what is given in the past. This direction that aims at the future as an always open possibility, empty intention, to be fulfilled in the actual perception, is characterized by Husserl as primary expectation. This threefold dimension of temporal constitution of an object is a “triple intentionality belonging to each perceptual phase” (Brough 1991, XLIV). This triple

intentionality constitute the phases present, past and future within which a temporal object is always perceived. Each individual phase of an object must encompass a continuum of contents and a continuum of constitutive apprehensions. Hence, perception is a “continuum of these continua.” (Husserl 1991, 239)

A new and decisive element arises from this analysis of the temporality: the notion of *temporal object* (*Zeitobjekt*). Husserl uses this notion to explain how the object apprehended temporally is not only a “unit in time”, but “contains in itself temporal extension.” (Husserl 1991, 24) Hence, if one takes the sound of a melody as an example, a temporal object is the apprehended sound as one and identical in its multiple modes of temporal appearance (actual present, past and future). What is new here is that the temporal object can be transcendent or immanent. The object considered regarding its real determinations is still understood as a transcendent temporal object, but the object considered in its “way of appears” is an immanent temporal object. It is easy to notice a great modification regarding the conception of object expressed in the *Logical Investigations*. There, the object was exiled in the transcendence sphere, here the objects itself is located in the interior of consciousness, in the immanence. Nonetheless, it is not every single object which is immanent to consciousness, but only the *object in its how way* (*das Objekt im Wie*) of temporal appearance.

One cannot forget in order to have an understanding of the whole of temporal constitution, that there are also secondary memories and expectations. Primary memory is possible only due to its specific intentionality, which after that forms a basis of content for the secondary memory. Hence, secondary memory is an act of *presenting* (*Vergegenwärtigung*) – while perception is always a presentation (*Gegenwärtigung*) – because it reenacts something from the past. Husserl says that memory is always reproductive, it re-presents something that is past “as” (*gleichsam*) present. Hence, secondary memory is not an act of originary temporal donation, i.e., in secondary memory there is no originary donation neither of the now present, nor of

the past. In secondary memory there is only representation of the past as the now.

Secondary expectation is also *reproductive* consciousness of the now. Nevertheless, this anticipative consciousness certainly does not simply reproduce the past, it represents a future process in images. In so doing, intentions founded on this kind of intentionality are characterized as “open”, in other words, according to Husserl, “the intuition belonging to expectation is memorial intuition turned upside down, for in memory’s case the intentions aimed at the now do not ‘precede’ the event but follow after it. As empty intentions directed towards the surroundings, they lie ‘in the opposite direction.’” (Husserl 1991, 57-58)

Husserl also states that not only temporal objects have in themselves temporal extension, i.e., duration in time, but also the constitutive acts (apprehensions) of time have in themselves temporality. This consideration of the temporality of acts is due to the fact that Husserl understands that, if the acts are immanent structures, they must also necessarily happen in the interior of the consciousness, given that they have in themselves temporal duration. Because of the fact that the acts last in a temporal course, one can go back to the acts through *reflections* which are properly speaking acts that turn themselves to other acts of consciousness. This process of turning back to the consciousness aims at capturing the unity of the aimed at acts. Hence, reflection is always consciousness of consciousness.

In a first part of the investigations pertaining to *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, Husserl is uniquely concerned with an analysis of the constitution of temporal objects based on the scheme “apprehension-content of apprehension”. In the later studies, in the texts between 1909 and 1917, Husserl finds problems when applying this scheme to understanding the deepest level of the constitution of temporality, and thus abandons this scheme, incapable of phenomenologically describing the lowest level of time constitution. In what follows, we will see what these problems are and how Husserl managed to solve them.

### 3. The abandon of the scheme “apprehension-content of constitution” to describe the deepest level of time constitution

In several of the texts in the *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* posterior to 1908 Husserl presents a critique of the use of the model apprehension-content of apprehension to the deepest levels of time constitution. Generally speaking, this critique refers to two aspects: 1) the understanding of time constitution founded on the “prejudice of the now” (in the words of Brough 1989, 275); 2) the inevitable infinite regression one falls in when one understands the deepest level of the constitution of temporality through acts, apprehensions of time.

The first aspect of the Husserlian self-critique regarding the application of the model apprehension-content of apprehension is developed in the section IV of Part B in *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*. In these passages, Husserl criticizes his still immature analysis of the temporal constitution (up to 1909), pointing out to the same types of prejudices which he found years before in Brentano’s theory of the origin of time.<sup>5</sup>

In 1905, Husserl observes that in Brentano’s theory of originary association, the “moment of time” was given by phantasy as an addition to sensory content. Because of his theory, according to Husserl, Brentano has to deny the perception in the succession and alteration: “we believe that we hear a melody and therefore that we still hear what is just past, but this is only an illusion proceeding from the vivacity of the original association.” (Husserl 1991, 14)

Nonetheless, was Brentano led to deny the perception of succession and alteration? According to Husserl, the problem resides in the very fact that Brentano understands that we become aware of the phases of past and future of an object through an alteration in sensory contents. However, sensory contents are themselves present, are now and, being so, are “incapable of presenting, or appearing as, past or future contents. They are simply ‘now’, and nothing could overcome that fact.” (Brough 1991, XLVII) Brentano indeed understands

the moments of past and future as unreal given, that real is only the now moment. In 1905, Husserl observes that, because Brentano founded his theory on the prejudice of the now, and because of this static understanding of time constitution, he was not able to answer in a definitive way to the question regarding the origin of time.

In 1909, however, Husserl addresses the very same critique from 1905 regarding Brentano's theory of originary association to his own understanding of time constitution based on the scheme apprehension-content of apprehension. Husserl notices that, when considering that the constitution of temporal objects happened through a process in which the contents were animated through apprehension of present, past and future, as a matter of fact, these contents, while actually apprehended, were themselves present in the actual momentary phases of consciousness (be it in the phases of perception, memory or expectations). In other words, these contents, even when apprehended through memories or expectations, were always present, always tied in the now. If on the one hand, Husserl demanded that the contents in themselves were "neutral" in relation to their temporal determination, given that temporal constitution should happen through temporal apprehensions, on the other hand, the other hand his considerations led to the conclusion that the contents that formed the basis to the apprehensions were always present in the actual phases of consciousness, and thus were not at all neutral, but either present or now. According to Brough, the situation is thus given: "the contents in the actual phase of consciousness are not temporally neutral but present or 'now', and that no 'past-apprehension' could make them appear otherwise." (Brough 1989, 275)

The second aspect of Husserl's self-critique refers to the inevitable infinite regression, which is brought about when one considers that the last level of the temporal constitution consists of *objectifying acts of apprehension*. An infinite regression is inevitable because the acts have in themselves temporality, that is, once the actual moment of the realization of the act is past, the act remains still in the consciousness as an experienced past. Hence, the act becomes itself a temporal

object of consciousness. But, if it becomes an object, its temporal determination of past must be constituted of another constitutive act of time. This second act, by its turn, also becomes an object of consciousness and demands a third act that constitutes it as a temporal object, and so *ad infinitum*. Husserl's conclusion is that there must be a last term that does not demand beyond itself any structure that could constitute it, that is, a last term which is not *constitute* but that is only the source of *constitution*. Husserl finds this last term and designates it as *absolute flow constitutive of time*.

#### **4. The discovery of the absolute flow as the deepest level in temporal constitution**

The absolute flow is discovered in 1909 as being the last level of the constitution of all temporality. In the paragraph 34 of part "A" of *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, Husserl describes three levels of the temporal constitution as follows: the first one is the level of the objective constitution of the empirical thing (transcendent) in objective time (time that must be reduced in the phenomenological reduction). The second one is the level which refers to the phenomena that occurs in immanent time, the immanent units such as acts, temporal objects and sensation (sensory contents). The third and last one is the level of the absolute flow of the constitutive consciousness of time.

The absolute flow which must hinder the infinite regression is understood by Husserl as being timeless (*zeitlos*) because if it were a unit *in* time, there should be another consciousness that would constitute it thus leading to an infinite regression as described above. The absolute flow is not a process *in* time, it does not possess in itself any sort of duration, nor alteration, that is, it is not and cannot become an object in time. Hence, the absolute flow can only be the *atemporal form (unzeitlich)* of the flow of consciousness. The last constitutive instance of time can only be named in a *metaphorical way* as "flow" (*Fluss*), as Husserl says: "This flow is something we speak of in conformity with what is constituted, but it is not 'something in objective time'" (Husserl

1991, 79). He sees the necessity of lending a name of something that is *constituted* to name the *constitutive* because when one tries to name and describe the sphere that is the pure origin of time “we lack names” (Husserl 1991, 79). Flow is to be understood now as absolute constitutive consciousness of time, i.e., understood according to its absolute properties of being “something to be designated metaphorically as ‘flow’; of something that originates in a point of actuality, in primal source-point, ‘the now’.” (Husserl 1991, 79) The predicate “absolute” does not bear any metaphysical trait, it is a grounding structure, the last level of constitution.

When Husserl takes up the investigation of time constitution and of *temporal objects* after discovering the absolute flow, the analysis of a melody, for instance, will happen as follows: when one directs oneself to the *sound* of the melody, one notices that this sound “begins” to be conscious in a determined phase (or mode of consciousness), and this “beginning” will be characterized as source-point (*Quellpunkt*) named as primal impression (*Urimpression*). Given that the constitutive process of time is a flow of constant production of modifications of modifications, and that a modification constantly produces a new modification, the originating impression is the beginning of the process of modifications, it is “the primal impression, the absolute beginning of this production, the primal source, that from which everything else is continuously produced. But it itself is not produced; it does not arise as something produced but through *genesis spontanea*; it is primal generation.” (Husserl 1991, 106)

Husserl identifies the primal impression as an *originary sensation* (not to be understood as a simple sensation, constituted sensation, but as “originary mode of consciousness of the now”), it is something “new”, received spontaneously by the consciousness. In other words, there is no active productive operation of consciousness involved in the birth of this “new” element. Hence, this constitution can only be understood as a passive operation, once it “brings what has been primarily generated to growth, to development.” (Husserl 1991, 106) The now is a source-point that sets in motion the continuum of modifications of past and future; the primal impressions are

intimately linked to retentions and protentions, and it is in the passage of the impressional “mode of consciousness” to the retentive (originary consciousness of past) and to the protentive (originary consciousness of the future) that the temporal constitution takes place.

One can notice that it is in this new moment of Husserl’s analysis of temporal constitution that a terminological replacement occurs. In fact, it is not only a terminological replacement, but rather a decisive conceptual alteration related to the originally constitutive phases of time. If Husserl understood initially that time was constituted through a *continuum apprehension act* (perception) characterized as now-perception, primary memory and primary expectation, now the constitutive phases are characterized as *primal impression, retention and protention*. The novelty is that the primal impression, retention and protention *are not acts* but *modes of consciousness* or *constitutive phases* of the deepest level of time constitution, thus pertaining to the region of the absolute flow, thus being *atemporal (unzeitlich)*. Hence, through the discovery of the absolute flow Husserl is able to abandon the model of constitution apprehension-constitution of apprehension to describe the deepest level of the constitution of temporality.

### **Final considerations**

When one follows Husserl’s itinerary in the first analyses of temporal constitution, from the application of the scheme of apprehension-content of apprehension to the description of the constitutive operations of temporal constitution up to the overcoming of such scheme, one observes that this path is a process of constant reformulations and deepening of the description of the lowest levels of the constitution of temporality. If, on the one hand, the analyses carried out by Husserl from 1909 in *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* show a great advance in what concerns the analysis of time constitution, on the other hand, the texts posterior to *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* that deal with time constitution (namely *the Bernau Manuscripts* and *the C-Manuscripts*) also

seek to reformulate and deepen the understanding of temporal constitution as exposed in *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*.

However, what one must highlight in *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* is that it is a *starting point* to the analyses that follow this set of texts: the deepest levels of time constitution cannot be understood through the application of the scheme apprehension-content of apprehension. The investigations of time constitution posterior to *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* that follow this principle consist of a constant process of stratification of the consciousness. This process can be seen, for instance, in the frequent use of the prefix *Ur-* to characterize the lowest levels of time constitution, given that in the *Bernau Manuscripts* the last level of time constitution is characterized as *Urprozess* and in the *C-Manuscripts*, as the *Urzeitigung* (besides many other terms used by Husserl to describe this last level, as *Urbewusstsein*, *Urhyle*, *Ur-Ich*, etc.).

The analyses in *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* regarding the status of the absolute flow and the critique of the model of apprehension-content apprehension represent a first investigative step that is fundamental to the realization of a complete elucidation of the “last and true absolute” (*letzte und wahrhafte Absolute*) (Husserl 1950, 198) (expression used by Husserl to characterize time consciousness in the *Ideen I*). One must recognize that the texts from *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* are not at all “dead”, but they are rather texts that constantly invite new and fruitful readings of Husserl’s phenomenology of temporality.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The abandon of the model of constitution apprehension-content of apprehension refers exclusively to the analysis of the deepest layers of time constitution. Husserl maintains this model to describe other constitutive acts. For a detailed analysis of this discussion, see Lohmar (2009, 12-19).

<sup>2</sup> Original title: *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins* (1893-1917). The volume X of *Husserliana* is composed of two parts

and was integrally published in 1966 (edited by Rudolf Boehm). It is the fourth part of a course taught by Husserl in the winter semester of 1904-1905 in Göttingen, entitled "Important Points from the Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge". Part "A", *The Lectures on the Consciousness of Internal Time from the Year 1905*, consists of the lessons from 1905 with an addition of texts from 1901 to 1917. The texts from this part were prepared and organized by Edith Stein, Husserl's assistant, and first published in 1928 in the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, Bd. IX, Martin Heidegger being its editor. Part "B", *Supplementary Texts Setting forth Development of the Problem*, is composed of manuscripts from 1893 to 1911, some of which unpublished, some reproduced from part A. See Boehm (1966, XII-XLIII) and Brough (1991, XI-XVIII).

<sup>3</sup> One must pay attention to an important distinction between "reel" and "real". *Reel* means immanent, i.e., the sphere of consciousness as a whole. *Real*, on the other hand, refers to the sphere of transcendence, the mundane determination of things.

<sup>4</sup> "Wie nehmen wir durch Akte ein Zeitobjekt wahr?" (Niel 2011, 11).

<sup>5</sup> For a detailed critique of originary associations in Brentano see Husserl 1991, 11-20.

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