

Reflective and *Relucent* Phenomenology: The influence of Husserl in Heidegger's *Frühe* *Vorlesungen*, 1919–1925

Joshua Fahmy-Hooke
Memorial University of Newfoundland

Abstract

My primary goal in this article is to provide a principled account of Martin Heidegger's concept of reflection and a defensible account of its scattered elaboration in the *Frühe Vorlesungen*, 1919–1925. Disagreement regarding the meaning and validity of Heidegger's use of reflection has been sustained by its apparent resistance to assimilation into his phenomenological project, especially one that encompasses the canonical arguments of *Being and Time*. In the received view, Heidegger rejects Edmund Husserl's concept of *Reflexion*, renouncing the tradition of theoretical knowledge whereby self-awareness and the primacy of consciousness are privileged over practical and historically embedded understanding (*Verstehen*). This view is unsatisfactory because it creates a problematic opposition between reflective phenomenology and fundamental ontology. Recent exegetical work following the received view replicates this inadequacy and fails to improve discussions on the complexity of Heidegger's relationship to Husserl and the tradition of phenomenology. While critical of Husserl's fraught concern for certainty and the formation of phenomenology as a theoretical science, I argue that Heidegger appropriates Husserl's concept of *Reflexion* rather than outright rejecting it. In my view, an understanding of Being (*Seinsverständnis*) depends on a reflective mode of access that brings pre-ontological experience into thematic givenness. Through this reflective thematization, the analytic of Dasein becomes available for explicit articulation in terms of its constitutive existentials.

Keywords: *Reflexion*, *Reluzenz*, Heidegger, Husserl, Natorp, formal indication

In Section I, I reconstruct Natorp's critique of Husserl's notion of *Reflexion* and show how it has been taken to motivate Heidegger's turn to the hermeneutics of facticity. In

Section II, I argue that Heidegger frees *Reflexion* from the charge of objectification by reworking it as a phenomenological thematization of pre-theoretical experience. In Section III, I develop this claim by showing Heidegger's methodological continuity with Husserl's phenomenology in response to the limits of *Lebensphilosophie*. In Section IV, I introduce the underexamined concept of *Reluzenz* and argue that it names Heidegger's reconfiguration of *Reflexion* as a non-objectifying retrieval of what remains implicit in disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*). On my reading, *Reluzenz* functions as the corrective counterpart to ruinance (*Ruinanz*; *Verfallen*) and enables the categorial articulation of the understanding of Being (*Seinsverständnis*) across *existentiell* and *existential* registers

1. How to Investigate Subjectivity?

For Husserl, *Reflexion* designates the capacity of consciousness to render lived experience thematic, thereby making it available for phenomenological description and for the analysis of meaning-constitution.¹ In *Ideas I* (1913, hereafter *Hua* III/1), this general capacity goes beyond empirical certainty to assume a specifically transcendental function employed within the *epoché* and phenomenological reduction (*Hua* III/1, §77, 145–46/139–40; *Hua* XXXV, 98). The natural attitude is suspended such that pure consciousness becomes the thematic field of analysis (Bernet, Kern, and Marbach 1993, 61). Pure consciousness is thereby disclosed as absolute and determined apodictically as the indubitable *residuum* of the reduction (*Hua* III/1, §48). The result, Husserl claims, is the correlation between constituting subjectivity and constituted objectivity (Husserl 2012, 336).

In *Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode* (1912, hereafter *AP*), Natorp's critique of transcendental subjectivity is historically pertinent because it draws attention to the uncertainty surrounding several phenomenological principles, especially reflection (*Reflexion*) as the essential core of the transcendental-phenomenological method. For Natorp, Husserl shows the extent to which the task of phenomenology and the determination of its thematic field

(i.e., the intentional sphere itself) are fixed in advance as a domain for absolute scientific consideration. In doing so, Natorp claims that Husserl obtains knowledge of subjectivity by treating experience as an object or by having the subject treat itself as an object. *Reflexion* reconfigures the experiential field such that it no longer coincides with the immediate life of consciousness as it is lived. Instead, it is transformed into an object of cognition, and its original character is lost (*AP*, 8, 28–29, 31–32).²

The main thrust of Natorp's critique, however, is not that reflective phenomenology renders a distorted and derivative form of experience. Rather, the apprehension of genuine subjectivity is an unattainable ideal, since the moment consciousness expresses itself, it is withdrawn from the very domain under investigation. Natorp argues that, in general acts of reflection, "the object of the act that we call self-consciousness is no longer the original I, [...] and the 'content' through which it is merely represented [...] is not the original" (*AP*, 31–32). For this reason, we should avoid the temptation to effectuate the purification process of reflection as though it could provide genuine access to experience. A new reflective enterprise would "once again miss that which had our interest" (*AP*, 99). Dan Zahavi concisely recounts Natorp's critique as follows: "reflection is necessarily objectifying; it destroys the living life experience; it petrifies the stream and turns the experiences into isolated objects" (Zahavi 2003, 158). In full, Natorp argues:

If one were oneself to attempt, or if it were at all possible, to grasp the finding of immediate experience somehow apart from all expression, all judging, all opining, purely in itself, would one not nevertheless always be compelled to delimit it in some way, to lift it out of the entire nexus of experiencing, even if only by pointing with a finger or indicating with the eyes, thus interrupting, as it were, the continuous stream of becoming, as which all inner life undoubtedly presents itself, artificially bringing it to a standstill for the sake of observation, isolating the individual finding and, for the purpose of this isolation, fixing it, so to speak, sterilizing it, like the anatomist his specimen? But does one not thereby already detach it from what is experienced, from the

subjective, and thus make it into an object? It seems, then, that one never grasps the subjective itself as such, but rather, in order to grasp it in a properly scientific manner, must first strip it of its entire character of subjectivity. One strikes subjectivity dead in order to dissect it, and supposes that in the result of this dissection the life of the soul is exhibited! (*AP*, 102–103).

Phenomenology claims to describe and analyze subjectivity in its pre-theoretical immediacy, yet reflection, insofar as it adopts a theoretical attitude, arrests the flowing continuity of lived experience, converts it into an object of observation, and thereby forfeits access to experience as such. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that phenomenological description necessarily relies on language and conceptual universality, both of which mediate what is given individually and pre-theoretically. As a result, the very effort to articulate subjectivity introduces an objectifying distance from the domain it seeks to attain. Although scientific analysis begins with lived experience, it does so only by dividing that experience into discrete aspects that stand in for “the original, undivided whole of experience” (*AP*, 192).

In a 1919 lecture course titled *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie* (hereafter *ZBP*), Heidegger acknowledges Natorp’s critique, conceding that reflection operates within a theoretical orientation in which every act of observation or demonstration entails an objectifying modification. Reflection accordingly introduces what Heidegger calls a moment of “de-living.” What is given is no longer lived through, but merely looked at, thereby effecting a rupture between experience and what is experienced (*ZBP*, 101, 111–112/78, 85; Zahavi 2003, 3).³ Additionally, Heidegger draws on Natorp’s analysis to emphasize the depersonalization present in Husserl’s conception of pure consciousness. Heidegger argues that “the I that firmly fixes [. . .] is only a rudiment of the vital experience [and] is no longer the I-myself” (*ZBP*, 73/59). Heidegger names this process de-vivification (*Ent-leben*), which strips experience of its world-laden character, and the remote “I” is “lifted out of actual experience” (*ZBP*, 74/59). Husserl’s firmly fixed “I” is decontextualized and de-

historicized, leaving existence, or Being (*Sein*), directed toward an equally indifferent “aggregate of things” (*ZBP*, 77/60). By following Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, “we stand at an abyss: either into nothingness, that is, absolute reification, pure thingness, or we somehow leap into another world, more precisely, [we attempt to] make the leap into the world as such” (*ZBP*, 63/51; O’Rourke 2018, 111). Put simply, for Heidegger, experience is not a mute and absolute principle (*ZBP*, 65/52).⁴ Thus, interpreting experience (*Erlebnis*, *Erleben*) apodictically denies the factual and historical conditions of human existence (*ZBP*, 65–66/52–53).

Following Natorp, Heidegger turns away from the mute indifference of unstructured solidity standing over and against an equally indifferent, no matter who, theoretical I. Theoretical depersonalization undercuts our practical attitudes and engagement with objects, a point later developed through *Zuhandenheit* in *Being and Time* (1927, hereafter *SZ*). Heidegger’s solidarity with Natorp can thus be understood, in part, as an attempt to return to the ordinary world of practical involvement and personal experience (*Er-fahrung*). Practical self-absorption in a meaningful environment is thus presented as an alternative to the twofold indifference generated by objectification, namely, the indifference of subject and object. Heidegger argues:

Attending strictly to the experience, I do not see anything psychical. [An] event of appropriation is not to be taken as if I appropriate the lived experience to myself from outside or from anywhere else; ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ have as little meaning here as ‘physical’ and ‘psychical.’ The experiences are events of appropriation in so far as they live out of one’s ‘own-ness,’ and life lives only in this way (*ZBP*, 75/60).⁵

In theoretical comportment, I am directed toward something but do not live, as a historical and factual “I,” toward this or that worldly element (*ZBP*, 74/62). Conversely, through the contextualized lived experience of both selfhood and objects, human beings develop an understanding of each, which in turn serves as the basis for constructing philosophical concepts and linguistic articulation. Heidegger

therefore does not trace experience back to an absolute ego, *pace* Husserl, but to the sense-making structure of concrete human existence, which is ineluctably engaged with meaning (*In-der-Welt-sein*) (Sheehan 2011, 42–43). The formally indicative “I” or “Dasein” is “experiencing” and acquaints itself with itself while appropriating the contextual meaning of the environmental *milieu*. Put simply, selfhood accompanies my experience in its worldly environment without pre-emptive theoretical enumeration and, in its concrete articulations and tendencies, constitutes the source of meaning by fixing itself to “*environing* experience” (*ZBP*, 73/58).⁶ The goal of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, on the received view, is therefore to disclose the non-objectifying self-understanding of lived experience (*GP I*, 206/155–156). From this decisive shift, Heidegger hopes to uncover that lived subjectivity is comprehensible and that experience is a preliminary form of spontaneous understanding (*GP I*, 68/55).

In the wake of Natorp’s critique, Heidegger, in *Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität)* (1923, hereafter *O*) and *Platon: Sophist* (1923–1924, hereafter *PS*), recasts philosophical investigation by focusing on the original and unthematic way in which experience is understood (*O*, 17–18/14; *PS*, 270–271/186–187).⁷ On the basis of his reading of Aristotle’s *De Anima* and *Metaphysics*, Heidegger argues that the inquiry into the soul, understood as life, remains proximally bound to ontology. The accessibility and expressibility of life already involve an orientation toward οὐσία (Being), rather than merely toward substance in a univocal sense (*PS*, 269/186; Kisiel 1995, 231). Preserving this insight, Heidegger maintains that the connection between subjective experience and οὐσία must remain intact within any formal account of phenomenological knowledge (Kisiel 1995, 231). Accordingly, the direct experience of life is the site in which I first “have” things, and thus the site in which Being first becomes available for me to speak about (λέγειν; to gather; to bring into relation) (*EpF*, 82f). The Greeks, Heidegger argues, lived in discourse (λόγος) in the sense that Aristotle’s philosophical orientation emerges from the comparative and articulative character of ordinary language.

Various levels of understanding first manifest themselves in natural Dasein and are only subsequently raised to philosophical conceptuality. Knowledge of our existence through the investigation of Being is therefore not invented through theoretical objectification; it already lies within the horizon in which the disclosure (ἀληθεύειν) of natural Dasein moves, namely, the world (*O*, 17–18/14). The origin (προέλευσις, ἀρχή) of ontology, then, is natural Dasein itself, and philosophical knowledge draws upon the self-referentiality operative within the stream of life. Heidegger's point is that the theoretical articulation of knowledge becomes misguided when it divides inquiry into two separate regions, subject and world, as though they stood alongside one another (*PS*, 66/46).⁸ Human beings, insofar as they see, uncover, and speak about what is uncovered, already possess an original and natural ontology grounded in pre-scientific experience (*PS*, 270/187). Even the “principle of phenomenology” is therefore called into question by this pre-scientific sense of “having,” since what is had—whether an object, a world, or life itself—is already conditioned by a lived mode of access (Kisiel 1995, 231).

On the basis of Aristotle's originary lived account of experience, the ontological meaning of being “in” the *Weltlichkeit* of the world, and thus the being of the “I” of Dasein, is determined (*O*, 86/66). The result, Theodore Kisiel claims, is an “understanding [of the] access that life has to itself,” which opens the possibility of a “non-objectifying, non-theoretical conception” of life that retrieves and “foreruns the stream” without disruption, and thus “without lapsing into old-fashioned objectifying concepts [*pace* Husserl]” (Kisiel 1995, 55).⁹ In order to comprehend the dynamism inherent in the primal essence of lived experience, or, in Heidegger's gloss, the “vital impetus in the direction of . . . a determinate world,” a new methodology is required, one that serves as an “originary [*sic*] science of life” (*ZBP*, 115/97; *O*, 43/35). Heidegger does not proceed from the theoretical prejudices of the life sciences but indicates the need to inquire into the experiential field that precedes these derivative senses. From Aristotle, Heidegger's fundamental ontology follows “life

experience” to recover the primordial immediacy of experience that remains unattainable within Husserl’s phenomenology.¹⁰

Heidegger’s inquiry into the “life-world,” understood through the inseparable unity of Dasein and its world, anticipates the analyses of §32, “Understanding and Interpretation” (*Verstehen und Auslegung*), and §33, “Assertion as a Derivative Mode of Interpretation,” in *Being and Time* (*SZ*, 148/188; 154ff/195ff). The structure of *logos apophantikos*, now called the “apophantic as,” is “founded upon interpretation (*Auslegung*), and its structure, upon understanding (*Verstehen*),” which Heidegger calls the hermeneutical-as (*SZ*, 225/266). Λόγος, with its closely related determinations of speech, discourse, predication, declarative expression, and communication (διάλογος, ῥῆμα, φωνή, ἀγόρευσις, ἐκφώνησις, δῆλωσις), is not merely a “stored up heap of propositions” through which we approach and address the world from a free-floating and neutral position (*SZ*, 157–158/199; *GP II*, 295/208). Rather, λόγος is “afforded” to us through the practical, dynamic, enactive, and pre-reflective aspects of human life (*SZ*, 80/111). In other words, the apophantic “as,” or what is conventionally called assertion (e.g., S is P, Fx, or x as F), is derivative of a more basic hermeneutical understanding (the “hermeneutical as,” e.g., taking, handling, seeing, or signaling x as F) (*L*, 170–191/143–161; *GM*, 416–507/287–349; Dahlstrom 2023, 34).

As a working definition, the hermeneutic “as-structure” refers to the pre-propositional or pre-predicative understanding of objects that shapes and contextualizes our interpretation (*Auslegung*) of the world. When we encounter an object, we already understand it *as something* based on its context, use, or practicality (*SZ*, 33/57; *L*, 172–173/144). Heidegger states that when we “‘know our way around’ [*Umgang*] the world, every act of having something before our eyes is, in and of itself, a matter of ‘having’ *something as something*” [...] “it has the as-structure” (*L*, 143–144, 172–173/121–122, 144).¹¹ The beings addressed by assertions are first apprehended *a priori*, that is, prior to thematization and theoretical assertion. This is how we encounter entities before explicitly describing them as such. Everything experienced in

factual life, including its content, bears the character of significance (*PRL*, 13–14/10). Immediate significance indicates that the worldly character of life is structured by a primordial anticipation and mobility that precludes the static determination of objects in terms of universality or absoluteness. Even unfamiliar entities are encountered within this same horizon of significance, disclosed through their instrumental strangeness (*ZBP*, 73/58; O'Rourke 2018, 111). In short, being-in-the-world is always already structured by the pre-predicative, hermeneutical “as.” Accordingly, subjectivity is not constituted through reflection or judgment but emerges from Dasein’s interpretive engagement with its world known as the *hermeneutics of facticity*.

2. Heidegger’s Rejection of Natorp’s Critique of *Reflexion*

From the preceding analysis, it is hardly surprising that many commentators regard Natorp’s critique as an insurmountable problem that catalyzes Heidegger’s renewed philosophical aim of grounding the origins of meaning in lived experience.¹² On the received view, Heidegger’s response to Natorp’s problematization of transcendental subjectivity, and thereby of Husserl’s phenomenology, is not simply an attempt to revise its founding principles, but to radicalize its approach by rejecting the methodological primacy of *Reflexion*. As Robert C. Scharff puts it, “this interpretive direction of movement – what the young Heidegger sometimes calls ‘sinking back down into environmental life’ – is something very different from becoming a revisionist Husserlian [...] Heidegger was never any kind of Husserlian revisionist” (Scharff 2019, xiv, xxi).¹³ After Natorp, experience can no longer be straightforwardly translated into theoretical concepts, since the expressibility of phenomenology’s immediate matter, namely, the givenness of experience as such and the transcendental ego, is called into question.

There are clear methodological affinities between Natorp’s critique of transcendental subjectivity and Heidegger’s skepticism toward the objectification (*Objektivierung*) and de-vivification (*Entlebung*) characteristic

of theoretical philosophy (Dahlstrom 2015, 248). However, Heidegger rejects both Natorp's reconstructive psychology, developed as an alternative to transcendental philosophy, and the view that reflection is exclusively bound to a theoretical act of ego and world constitution. For Natorp, we become acquainted with subjectivity indirectly, by "catching a glimpse of it in the mirror only in an inauthentic way" (AP, 32). He qualifies this seemingly pejorative claim by noting that "all the ways by which one tries, in any case, to describe consciousness are borrowed from the content" (AP, 31). Although the contents of consciousness are given, consciousness itself is not; it must therefore be reconstructed through its relation to those contents, a process he calls *Subjektivierung* (AP, 59–83).

Heidegger challenges Natorp's position by questioning whether his reconstructive method achieves what it intends:

Does and can the method of reconstruction achieve what it is supposed to? No, for first of all it too is objectification [...] Natorp in no way shows that his method is different from that of objectification. Natorp's method of subjectivization [*Subjektivierung*] is only an extension of the method of objectivization" (ZBP, 107/82).

Natorp denies that the immediacy of experience can be given prior to analysis (ZBP, 107/82; Dahlstrom 2015, 243; AP, 192). Instead, subjectivity must be treated thematically (*Gegenstand*) and can therefore be approached only through its derivative and representational content, which approximates, but never attains, the concrete life of consciousness (AP, 192). At the same time, however, Natorp argues for a methodological regression whereby the subject, *a posteriori*, reassembles the unity of experience that objectification has divided, thereby reuniting the meaningful elements that originally belonged together (Cazzanelli 2020, 13).¹⁴ The result, Natorp claims, is a reconstruction of the original living continuity of experience itself, namely *Subjektivität als Subjektivierung* (AP, 59–83).

In Heidegger's eyes, Natorp remains guided by the preconception (*Vorbegriff*) of "theoretical seeing" and falls prey to the same objectifying account of subjectivity that he

attributes to Husserl. Reconstruction is “precisely characteristic of objectification, thus theoretical” (*ZBP*, 107/82). Moreover, Heidegger asks how Natorp’s method can reconstruct experience as it is given prior to analysis when it “has no criteria for determining whether it has in fact led to the original lived dimension” (*ZBP*, 107/82). In other words, reconstruction aims to recover that to which it allegedly has no pre-theoretical access, even though only such access could corroborate its claim to success. Even if this reconstructive movement of *Subjektivierung* were successful, it would once again result in objectification (Dahlstrom 2015, 243; *ZBP*, 107/82).¹⁵

The paradox of Natorp’s critique and proposed solution is twofold. First, he rejects the givenness of consciousness on the grounds that it objectifies experience while nevertheless proposing a reconstructive method that yields a more theoretical, and therefore more objectified, conception of subjectivity. Second, *Subjektivität als Subjektivierung* is meant to reassemble the original unity or stream of experience, even though that original unity is itself claimed to be inaccessible before reconstruction takes place. Nevertheless, in my view, Natorp deserves credit for illuminating the problem of consciousness in characteristically unsatisfactory ways. By arguing that subjectivity can be reconstructed, he inadvertently presupposes or concedes some indirect, non-epistemic acquaintance with it, since reflection can distort only that which is already accessible.

Natorp shows Heidegger that theoretical experience is not originary experience and that, in seeking the primordial character of theoretical comportment, he “has not exhausted all [the] possibilities therein” (*ZBP*, 108/83). More precisely, Natorp cannot accommodate the pre-reflective or pre-theoretical ways in which we relate to the world, especially to our environment, nor can he account for the eventful character of such engagement. As Dahlstrom observes, “Natorp lacks an [originary] conception of being-in-the-world” (Dahlstrom 2015, 243). Most importantly, in Heidegger’s words: “Natorp does not see the sphere of experience in its primordial givenness” (*ZBP*, 216/184). The problem for Natorp, then, would appear to

be that his explicit commitment to the traditional sense of theoretical philosophy ironically prevents him from granting philosophical status to his own “taking-notice” of the existential condition he is trying to reconstruct, one characteristic of which, in the living-through of this thereness, is a kind of experiential certainty (*Erfahrungsgewißheit*) (Scharff 2019, 124).¹⁶

Natorp’s reconstructive psychology leaves much to be desired. However, the more pressing concern is his understanding of *Reflexion* as an inherently theoretical act of ego and world constitution. Heidegger contends, to be sure, that a genuine account of subjectivity or being-in-the-world cannot be secured through what Natorp characterizes as purified theoretical reflection. However, in light of this concession, Heidegger rejects the basis for Natorp’s claim that all philosophical conceptualization is theoretically “objectifying,” and therefore, *in virtue of being theoretically conceptualized*, subjectivity and *Reflexion* are methodologically objectifying principles or concepts in themselves.¹⁷ Heidegger insists that “the primacy of the theoretical must be broken, but not in order to proclaim the primacy of the practical, and not in order to introduce something that shows the problems from another side [*pace* Natorp], but because the theoretical itself refers back to something pre-theoretical” (*ZBP*, 59/47).¹⁸ As such, what is often described in the literature as Heidegger’s turn toward the hermeneutics of facticity overlooks that “the theoretical itself [remains] but must refer to something pre-theoretical,” without “falling victim to unphilosophical pragmatism” (*ZBP*, 47/59; *PIA*, 135/100; Crowell 2001, 134). Heidegger’s concern is not to establish a non-theoretical and therefore non-reflective philosophy, but to ensure that the theoretical is founded on the pre-theoretical. Doing so requires moving beyond both the narrow sense of objectifying reflection (i.e., ego reflection), which determines subjectivity as absolute, and the theoretical attitude that reconstructs subjectivity.

Despite conceding to Natorp’s “scientifically noteworthy objections against phenomenology” just a year earlier, in *Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks* (1920,

hereafter *PAA*), Heidegger seemingly adopts and develops a distinctively new position. Heidegger now claims that subjectivity accompanies life through self-acquaintance and shows itself because “experiencing,” as the genuine sense of the *a priori*, is itself a preliminary form of understanding (*PAA*, 66, 166/54, 127). Accordingly, there is an intimate connection between experience, expression, and understanding, maintaining subjectivity as a continuation of the *reflexivity* found in life (*GP I*, 211–225/156–169; Zahavi, 161). Reflection, even, Heidegger states, can be recovered as a mode of self-apprehension, provided it is not posited as a function of a theoretical ego (*GP II*, 226/159).¹⁹ Moreover, self-apprehension and the facticity of Dasein—revealing itself to itself—can also be reflected upon as long as it is not understood in the conventional or narrow sense “as an ego bent backward, merely staring at itself” (*GP II*, 226/159). The co-disclosure of the self and world belongs to experience in such a way that there is “not only a self-directing-toward and not only an understanding of the Being of the beings toward which it is directed, but also the associated unveiling of the self which is comporting itself here” (*GP II*, 224/158). Thus, being-in-the-world as “intentional directedness toward” something, or phenomenological research as a “comportment toward something,” does not gain reference to experience by imposing a reflective act onto it (*GP II*, 224/158). On the contrary, reflective experience is constitutive of the co-disclosure of selfhood as experience belonging to being-in-the-world as such (*GP II*, 225/158; Frank 1991, 518). Subsequently, this means that “reflection itself belongs to the sphere of life-experience” and allows “the stream of experience to become describable” (*ZBP*, 100/84).

3. Heidegger’s Formal Indication and The Methodological Role of Husserl’s *Reflexion*

The dominant position in the scholarly literature, following Natorp, problematizes phenomenological reflection *tout court* and replaces its methodological role with hermeneutic understanding (*Verstehen*). Reflection, and theoretical conceptualization more generally, are conceived as

inherently objectifying, while the non-reflective, φρονητικός (*phronetic*) concept of understanding is treated as inherently non-objectifying. In doing so, Heidegger moves from “intuition to understanding,” that is, from acts of consciousness to pre-conscious being-in-the-world, in order to treat *Existenz* as pervaded by a fore-theoretical expressivity without disturbing the “stream of life” (Kisiel 2002, 83). Husserl’s theoretical attitude, it is claimed, with its existential neutrality, fixed determinations, and methodological detachment, cannot access this orientation of existence (McGrath 2010, 193). This reading, however, is sustained in part by the belief that Husserl’s phenomenology shares the same theoretical distortions as Descartes. Kisiel, for example, claims that Husserl and Descartes are “essentially” the same with respect to “their inadequate attention to the question of the being of consciousness” (Kisiel 1995, 280). In *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time* (1995), Kisiel traces Heidegger’s critical narrative of Husserl through the largely unsympathetic lecture course *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung* (1924, hereafter *EpF*). Yet he sets aside, “for reasons of space,” Heidegger’s discussion of the “Fundamental Differences between Descartes and Husserl” (*EpF*, 196ff.; Kisiel 1995, 280). In this decisive chapter, Heidegger develops a positive relation to the concepts of intentionality and *Reflexion*, sharply distinguishing Husserl from Descartes and challenging Natorp’s understanding of phenomenology.²⁰

According to Heidegger, the difference between Husserl and Descartes becomes clear in the way each interprets the phenomenal finding of the *cogito me cogitare* (“I think that I think”) (*EpF*, 259/201). For Descartes, the “I think” becomes the basis for the abstraction of a formal-ontological proposition that, by virtue of its certainty, satisfies the *certum* and thereby serves as the point of departure for further propositions of the same validity, regardless of their relation to the being of consciousness (*EpF*, 259/201).²¹ For Husserl, by contrast, intentionality as consciously “relating-oneself-to” becomes the point of departure for a principled conception of reflection. Reflection here is not the *fundamentum* of a formal-

ontological proposition, nor is it concerned with “psychic occurrences” [*pace* Natorp], but rather with how the genuine path of phenomenological inquiry is opened (*EpF*, 259/201). The phenomenological method proceeds through acts of reflection, yet what is attended to is consciousness in its basic intentional character. Heidegger argues that “the term ‘suspension’ is always misunderstood when it is thought that in suspending the thesis of existence and by doing so, phenomenological reflection simply has nothing more to do with the entity” (*P*, 136/99). Heidegger goes so far as to say that reflection is not a pure mental process, but the manner in which consciousness comports itself toward the world. It is therefore a fundamental error, Heidegger claims, to characterize Husserlian phenomenology as “transcendental psychology” or as “act-phenomenology” in the old sense, as Natorp does (*EpF*, 259/201).²² Likewise, it would seem to be an error to characterize phenomenological reflection as concerned exclusively with pure ego-constitution in a domain of its own.

Heidegger states that in Descartes’ case, the orientation toward the surrounding world (*Umwelt*) is governed by the question of whether it can be established as a *certum*. Conversely for Husserl, the task is to return to the world in its original givenness and to describe our comportment toward it (*EpF*, 259/201). In this sense, “the kind of reflection that matters is the exercise of reason and how we intend something,” that is, a reflection on sense or on the “object in terms of how it is determined” for me (Jacobs 2016, 263; *Hua* III/1, 272–273/260–261). The merit Heidegger sees in phenomenological methodology is that it allows for the positive tendency to co-posit *Sein* (Being) and *Seiendes* (beings), thereby reopening the question of *Sein* within a new science. Accordingly, Heidegger claims that transcendental reflection “does not have the sense of leading to an end-situation as in Descartes’ case, in such a way that the search sees itself confronted with nothing and inserted into the void of possibilities of finding” (*EpF*, 259/200). Rather, Husserl opens the “possibility that all possible being can come into view” (*EpF*, 259/200). What is disclosed is the totality of being, albeit under a specific modification, as that which becomes

thematically accessible.²³ Phenomenology, therefore, is directed at the domain of “relating-oneself-to” in such a way that what one relates oneself to is also given. Without this basis, Heidegger claims, “one is in no position to discern any character of being in the direct consideration of entities, nor to pursue ontology as such” (*EpF*, 259/201).

Although this reading may not be entirely faithful to Husserl, Heidegger concludes from this analysis that reflection and intentionality thematize the relational structure of experiential phenomena. Accordingly, lived experience unfolds through acts of reflection and consists in a cognitive comportment toward ontological significance (*PIA*, 62–63/43; *SZ*, 51/38). Heidegger states:

Philosophizing (formally indicated) is a comportment. We will attempt, first of all, by way of a formal indication, to grasp more sharply the sense of relation [*Bezugsinn*] of the comportment: what is the relation to [...] what does it aim at? Philosophizing, according to its sense of relation [*Bezugsinn*], i.e., the comportment to the object in philosophy [i.e., life], is a cognitive comportment. (To call it “clarifying” comportment would be formally more original). Cognition is a grasping of the object “as” object [*Gehaltsinn*], and so is a determining of the object by way of grasping it. The grasping determination “says” that, what, and how the object is. The relation holds on to something as a being, just as a being and as a definite sort of being [...] Philosophy is cognitive comportment [...] specially such that what is decisively at issue in the comportment and for it is the respective Being (sense of Being) of the possessing of the comportment [*Vollzugsinn*]. The cognitive comportment has a quite original and radical relation of principle to beings in their Being (*PIA*, 53, 60/41, 46).

Although Husserl does not employ the formally indicative triad of *Bezugsinn*, *Gehaltsinn*, and *Vollzugsinn*, his account of intentionality can be interpreted through it. *Bezugsinn* is consciousness’s directedness toward an object, *Gehaltsinn* is the sense-content of *what* is intended, and *Vollzugsinn* is the concrete enactment of the intentional act itself (*Aktivollzug*), often translated as “performance of an act,” “act-execution,” or “enacted act.” Heidegger stresses that the

starting point of any phenomenological inquiry remains within the domain of lived experience, structured by intentionality, even when that experience is thematically modified through reflection. This methodology simply makes it possible to principally ask of each experience both *what* is experienced and *how* the phenomenon is experienced (*PIA*, 62–63/43; *SZ*, 51/38). In doing so, one moves from an absorbed, passive involvement with the world to an apprehension of it. In Heidegger’s words, “I do not *live directly* in the perception, say, of the chair, but rather *live thematically* in the apprehension of the perceptual act and of what is perceived in it” (*P*, 136/99). Accordingly, in this reflective comportment, “the significative content of the given is nothing but the thing itself grasped by reflection”; consciousness is no longer directed toward the real object in its immediate reality but toward its own content, namely toward the intelligibility of that object (*FS*, 279; Crowell 2001, 104).

Along with a more precise articulation of the phenomenon, this clarifying comportment co-grasps what is directionally co-present in the phenomenon itself, such that the nexuses of meaning belonging to Being (*Sein*) and beings (*Seiendes*, *Seiendheit*) are brought into relief (*PIA*, 84/64). This reflective way of “perceiving” νόησις (noēsis) therefore does not objectify experience but “possesses the self-accompanying experience of experience” by appropriating the genuine phenomenological sense of Being (*FS*, 279; Crowell 2001, 104; *ZBP*, 138, 218–220/117, 185–188; *PIA*, 33–34, 59–60/27, 45). This is possible in part because reflection discloses what is experienced and brings into view the Being that enacts and lives through the comportment. In *Being and Time*, the same methodological orientation remains at work, though it is recast in existential terms. Heidegger formalizes the manifold of relating-senses under the notion of care (*Sorge*), and the corresponding content-senses under the notion of significance (*Bedeutsamkeit*) (*SZ* §18, §41; *PIA*, 119–22/89–90). The relating-sense (*Bezugsinn*) concerns how one navigates or deals with life (*umgeht*) in its richness and manifold referentiality, while the content-sense (*Gehaltsinn*) concerns what is disclosed in experience as “world” (*PIA*, 86/65). The

enactment-sense (*Vollzugsinn*), in turn, concerns how this relation is carried out in the concrete way life lives through its relation to what it encounters. Importantly, factual life and phenomenological inquiry share the same ground, yet their enactment differs, since phenomenology modifies comportment by turning explicitly toward what ordinarily remains implicit (*PIA*, 62-63/43; *SZ*, 51/38).²⁴ Put differently, actualization (*Vollzug*) is life's way of behaving, which formally indicates how (*wie*) intentional acts are fulfilled (Escudero 2020, 17).

The importance of maintaining methodological contact with Husserlian notions of intentionality and reflection are further instantiated by Heidegger's response to the objections of *Lebensphilosophie* posed by Heinrich Rickert. In his critical work, *Die Philosophie des Lebens* (1920), Rickert argues that to follow the contours of life's immediacy without a categorial, and theoretical reconstruction is a useless "repetition" of that immediacy (Rickert 1920, 28). *Lebensphilosophie*, a philosophy that seeks meaning, value, and purpose by turning away from theoretical knowledge towards the undistorted fullness of lived experience fails to distinguish between living life and thinking (i.e., philosophizing) about it. The same objection applies to the concept of being-in-the-world if the non-reflective, φρονητικός (phronetic) aspects of the hermeneutics of facticity are set against the phenomenological dimensions of Heidegger's thought.²⁵ While Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity shares a central tenant with *Lebensphilosophie*, namely, that the various manifestations of life can only be accessed and understood from within life itself, Heidegger branches off from *Lebensphilosophie* in an essential difference. For Heidegger, the everydayness of experience is given in a distorted way as the *problem of facticity*. This is not tantamount to only "theoretically covering over," as though eliminating theoretical obfuscation provides an accurate representation of experience (*PIA*, 116–118/87). Instead, Heidegger states:

That which factual life cares about in its thrust into its world at any time is encountered as stemming from life as care [...] The interpretation of this movement leads to a fundamental category of caring life in its facticity and makes

possible both the categorial articulation of the relationality of life and the categorial determination of the Being (sense of reality) of its world. These are not invented structures, belonging nowhere, but, according to their very sense, ones in which “life,” i.e., our life today, must be articulated; thus they relate to what concerns us in a special sense, the problematic of the situation (Problem of facticity—κίησις-problem) [...] Inclination is thus *reflexive* and in that way comes back toward caring life itself. Self-dispersed life encounters its world as “dispersion,” manifold, absorbing, engaging, un-fulfilling, boring. This means that inclination shows itself as something which moves itself toward itself (*PIA*, 116–119/87–89).

Heidegger agrees with Rickert that an a-theoretical “preconception toward grasping” life never leads to the proper sense of “caring and its categorial determinations” (*PIA*, 100/135).²⁶ To interpret the world in a way that merely goes along with a predetermined ordering of things is not sufficiently radical, and those who do so are too ready to accept traditional determinations (*PIA*, 30–41/24–33.). At the same time, caring life in its facticity is not an invented structure belonging nowhere. In the language of *Being and Time*, “care does not stand primarily and exclusively for an isolated attitude of the ‘I toward itself’” (*SZ*, 256/193). As something factual, Dasein understands itself in some way and, in each case, is already alongside a world it has encountered (*SZ*, 257–259/194). Heidegger writes, “Ontically, therefore, Dasein is not only close to us, but is even that which is closest: we are it, each of us, we ourselves” (*SZ*, 21/15). Yet he immediately qualifies this point by warning that such closeness does not mean that the most readily available pre-ontological interpretation of Dasein’s being can be adopted as an adequate guideline, as though this understanding had arisen “from a thematically ontological reflection on the most proper constitution of its Being” (*SZ*, 15/36).²⁷ On the contrary, despite its pre-ontological familiarity with itself, Dasein remains “ontologically farthest” (*SZ*, 15/36). The implication is that our ontic self-understanding is insufficient for ontological analysis.

Although Dasein exists with some prior interpretation of Being, it initially inherits its possibilities from the *existentiell*-categorical interpretations handed down by the “they,” and therefore understands itself inauthentically (SZ, 15, 194/36). On an ontological level, philosophy also tends to treat “experiences occurring in a ‘stream’ [as] completely indefinite with regard to the meaning of [their] Being” (SZ, 193). The task of fundamental ontology therefore bears a familiar resemblance to the phenomenological reduction: it must neither remain with immediate and unreflective life nor impose theory from without, but must interpret Dasein categorially in a way that brings its ontological structures into view.

Heidegger claims that “meaningfulness becomes explicit in the proper interpretation of life with respect to itself, and thence we can first fully understand what it ‘is’ and what it means to live factually ‘in’” (PIA, 92–93/70). Categorical determinations of factual life are therefore meant to formally indicate directions of meaning (*Sinnrichtungen*) that take their departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein as the point from which interpretation arises and to which it returns (SZ, 38, 436). In this sense, categorial interpretation makes a phenomenon intelligible by determining the way it is to be understood as an *interpretandum* (PIA, 85–86/65). Because the problematic of the situation (i.e., existence as such) remains bound to facticity (*Faktizität*) and falling (*Verfallen*), “universal phenomenological ontology” involves the interpretation of an interpretation that has already, in some sense, made itself manifest. Phenomenological inquiry first aims to articulate the self-referential structure already enacted in factual life and to participate *reflexively* in its meaning. In doing so, it takes up life’s “re-collectability” and the “struggle of philosophical interpretation against factual ruinance, a struggle that always accompanies the process of the actualization [*Vollzugsinn*] of philosophizing” (PIA, 67, 153–154/50, 114). In other words, as a reflective practice, ontological research “authentically brings back” life from its “downward fall into decadence” (PIA, 81–82/62). This “bringing back,” repetition, or “re-seeking” constitutes a radical mode of research through which, “in its genuine and ever more rigorous

repeatability, the evidence [grounding such interpretation] comes to genuine fruition [*zeitigt*]” (*PIA*, 88/67).

From the preceding analysis, it follows that Heidegger’s account of the situated subject, factual life, or being-in-the-world requires understanding oneself categorially, thereby defining what it means to “be in a situation” existentially and factually. The importance of phenomenological interpretation lies in the movement of factual-life analysis, which “uncovers the situational categories that make philosophical inquiry itself possible” (*PIA*, 26-28/22; Crowell 2001, 139). While Heidegger develops his analysis primarily through critique, two methodological claims can nevertheless be discerned in his sense of *Seinsverständnis*: first, pre-theoretical experience provides access to the philosophical object, namely existence as such; second, the analysis of existence requires clarification of the kind of being that grants access to that object and of the problems encountered therein. The success of this account, I argue, depends upon remaining at least in proximity to Husserl’s notion of *Reflexion*. A deliberate turning of attention toward the relationality of conscious experience (*noesis*) is precisely the shift from the natural attitude to the phenomenological standpoint that makes possible an analysis of how consciousness constitutes meaning. If Heidegger’s phenomenological ambitions are overlooked, “the ‘subject,’ as a factual point of departure can yield only historically and culturally relative world-views [...] and [the] distinction between *Weltanschauung* and fundamental ontology collapses” (Crowell 2001, 136).²⁸

4. Heidegger’s Concept of Reluzenz as the Reflective Counter-part to Ruinance

From the preceding analysis, Heidegger determines that factual life is “bound to a pre-conception [*Vorgriff*]” that is “not ultimately primordial and decisive” but rather “presupposes philosophical fundamental experiences” (*PAA*, 35/25, 187/144). Through the *reflexivity* inherent to factual life, philosophy ceases upon the “pre-conception” to apprehend, appropriate, and “recollect” the negative motives of understanding [*Verstehensmotive*] as positive motives of

understanding” (*PAA*, 192/148). Under the influence of St. Paul, Augustine, and Luther, Heidegger’s demand for philosophy as a deconstruction of factual life often present itself *Frühe Freiburger Vorlesungen* (1919–1923) as distinctively anthropological and even at times, with religious undertones. The categories of life are taken as formal indicators that demand an affective and personal response to be appreciated. They arise from the individuating and transformative dimension of the existential disruption of our lives today, rooted in a pre-ontological acquaintance with factual ruinance (*Ruinanz*).²⁹

The same methodology is at work in Heidegger’s *Marburger Vorlesungen* (1923–1928) and *Being and Time*. However, the focus becomes less concerned with the personal affection of existential disruption than with the use of these “guiding clues” toward temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*). *Bekümmernung*, or self-concern within factual life, is formally rearticulated as the ontological structure of care (*Sorge*), understood as the unified phenomenon of being-ahead-of-itself, already-being-in-the-world, and being-alongside entities encountered within it (*SZ*, §§39–43, §65). This structure grounds the possibility of any comportment and underlies the disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*) of *Dasein*. With this shift, the evaluation of “pre-conception” becomes ontologically oriented and is stylized more generally as the deconstruction of the history of Western metaphysics (*SZ*, 53, 120, 518/39, 89, 392; *GP II*, §§7–18). In doing so, Heidegger traces the notion of *Sein* back to the analytic of *Dasein* and its ontological concepts (i.e., the categorial of life now existentials), such that *Dasein* itself, rather than the content under interpretation, undergoes a radical transformation (Scagliusi 2025, 77). The “questioning comportment” or “ontological research” still targets what is “closed off” (*verschlossen*), but the relevant phenomena are the philosophical concepts handed down by tradition. We fall prey to a tradition that has more or less explicitly taken up the primordial “sources” of ontological analysis in an improper manner. In this sense, deconstruction “first and foremost guards against any uncritical lapse into a fixed conception

that would foreclose the pursuit of the ‘genuine sense’ of the phenomenon” (Dahlstrom, 1994, 780).³⁰

Given that the notions of facticity (*Faktizität*) and falling (*Verfallen*) in *Being and Time* can be traced back to the *Frühe Freiburger Vorlesungen* with greater clarity, they have become an increasing focus in Heideggerian scholarship.³¹ Commentators have moved beyond the pragmatic, and epistemological readings of Heidegger’s thought by reincorporating the existential structures developed in Division II.³² Death, anxiety, authenticity, and temporality systematically converge in the possibility of retrieving Dasein from its fallen absorption in the world and individuating it through anticipatory resoluteness. I have followed this line of thought, at least in part, by arguing that the problem of facticity, and not merely the hermeneutics of facticity, prefigures the *existentiell-existential* structure of the analytic of Dasein. This analysis enables Heidegger to explicate the phenomenon of life while distancing his project from *Lebensphilosophie*. Moving beyond this reading, however, I also suggest that philosophical evaluation relies on a reflective comportment inherited from Husserl, one that grants reflexivity to the proper interpretation of life in the midst of ruinance.

In this section, I demonstrate that the relational sense characteristic of Dasein’s comportment toward itself and its world is conceptualized triadically in terms of reluctance (*Reluzenz*), pre-structure (*Praestruktion*), and ruinance (*Ruinanz*) (*PIA*: 117–132/87–112). Despite the frequency with which the connection between *Ruinanz* and *Verfallen* is made, the counterpart to ruinance, namely *Reluzenz* (*reluceo*, “reflect a gleam”), remains conspicuously absent in the scholarship. One possible reason the term *Reluzenz* has been neglected is that it appears only once in the German edition of *Being and Time* under the altered spelling “reluzent” and translated in the English edition as “reflected light” (*SZ*, 29/21). In this context, Heidegger uses the term conceptually similar to concealment or *Verfallen*, describing Dasein’s tendency to interpret itself from the reflected significance of the surrounding world. Heidegger states: “Dasein is inclined to

fall back upon its world (the world in which it is) and to interpret itself in terms of that world by its reflected light” (*SZ*, 29/21). *Reluzenz* therefore appears as a negative instantiation of Dasein’s self-understanding through the world. This claim is *prima facie* difficult to square with its characterization in *PIA* as an authentic retrieval of Being. Another possible reason for the neglect of the term is that, in *PIA*, it appears too closely aligned with Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological concept of *Reflexion* and is therefore incompatible with the received reading of the canonical arguments of *Being and Time*.

Despite these concerns, *Reluzenz* serves two positive functions and clarifies an important feature of the structure of existence as it is characterized in *Being and Time*. Heidegger explains:

Life, caring for itself in this relationality, reflects light back on itself, which produces a clarification of the surroundings of the currently immediate nexus of care. As so characterized, the *movement of life toward itself within every encounter* is what we call *relucence [Reluzenz]* [...] Life begins to build out from this world and for it. Life establishes itself following the sense of its projection and of its appropriated *pre-possession*. It assures itself with a pre-possession and cares for itself in explicit or implicit reference to it. In caring, life is always projecting, beginning to build; in being *relucence*, life is at the same time *prestructive*. The assurance, protection, acquisition, and relinquishment of the prepossession (which in any give case may serve to guide or disperse, but nevertheless fulfills in one way or another) can be attended to explicitly [...] within the shared world [...] This means that the tendency to security, which has been elevated reluctantly to the mode of a positively creative work, can, as such, become lost (whereby a basic peculiarity of the movedness of life expresses itself: ruinance, ossification) (*PIA*, 119–120/89).³³

Reluzenz and *Praestruktion* articulate the relational structure of care: the former names life’s clarifying self-illumination in concrete worldly involvement, while the latter names the anticipatory structuring by which life projects itself, secures itself in a pre-possession, and holds fast to what

has been disclosed. However, *Reluzenz*, in some sense, has methodological priority since it names life's self-illumination and thus belongs to the intentional, self-disclosing *Vorstrukturierung* (pre-structuring) of existence. It designates a movement in which life is illuminated in its worldly involvement while also being reflected back upon itself, thereby clarifying its meaningful situation and making possible a genuine beholding of Being. However, *Dasein* is directly experienced as significant before we reflect on it, thus, is already pre-structured in its worldly movement. For this reason, Heidegger also shows that this relational structure of care can collapse into *ruinance* when life's tendency toward clarification and self-assurance hardens into fixation, leaving it absorbed in the very structures through which it sought to secure itself (*PIA*, 119–120/89).

For Scott Campbell, one of the difficulties that arises in the analysis of *Reluzenz* and *Praestruktion* is that these terms are “exceedingly difficult to translate accurately” (Campbell 2012, 241). However, the indeterminacy of translation has an advantage and plays an indispensable role in the way formally indicative concepts function. As linguistic tokens, formal indications have a magnetizing effect, forming a nexus of meaning around pre-ontological significance: a web of interrelated threads with the phenomenon at issue at its center. Despite not appearing in most, if not all, German dictionaries, in Latin, *Relucence* is a verb that means “to shine back” or “to reflect light.” Etymologically, *Reluzenz* derives much of its metaphorical force from the imagery of light and luminosity, and thus representative of recurring conceptual themes in Heidegger's work.³⁴ Heidegger employs terms such as ἀλήθεια (truth), *Offenheit* (openness), *Unverborgenheit* (unconcealment), *Lichtung* (clearing), *Licht* (light), *Leuchten* (shining), *Scheinen* (appearing or shining), *Aufleuchten* (flashing up), and *Erhellung* (illumination), all of which draw either etymologically or interpretively on the metaphor of light in order to characterize, in different ways, the radiance or “shining forth” that he takes to belong to the phenomenon of truth.

Following Heidegger's marginal notes to his copy of *Being and Time*, the terms "ἀλήθεια – *Offenheit* – *Lichtung*, *Licht*, *Leuchten*" are appended to the following explication of the being of Dasein as both the condition for the possibility of experience and the clarification that occurs on its basis. Heidegger writes:

The ontically figurative talk of a *lumen naturale* in the human being means nothing other than the existential-ontological structure of this being, namely that it is in such a way as to be its "there." It is "illuminated," which means: in itself, as *In-der-Welt-sein* (being-in-the-world), it is cleared, not through another being, but in such a way that it itself is the clearing. Only for a being that is existentially thus cleared does what is present-at-hand become accessible in the light, while remaining concealed in the dark. Dasein brings its "there" along with it from the outset; lacking it, it is not only factually not, but is not at all the being of this essence. Dasein is its disclosedness (*SZ*, 177/133).

The same metaphor occurs in Division II in a similar analysis of the being of Dasein and care when Heidegger states that:

The being that bears the title Dasein is "cleared." The light that constitutes this clearedness of Dasein is not an ontically present force or source of a radiance that occasionally occurs in this being. What essentially clears this being, that is, what makes it for itself both "open" and "bright," was determined, prior to any "temporal" interpretation, as care (*Sorge*). In care is grounded the full disclosedness of the "there." This clearedness first makes possible all illumination and clarification, every perceiving, "seeing," and having of something. We understand the light of this clearedness only if we do not search for some implanted, present force, but instead interrogate the entire constitution of the being of Dasein, namely care, with respect to the unified ground of its existential possibility. Ecstatic temporality originally clears the "there." It is the primary regulative of the possible unity of all essential existential structures of Dasein (*SZ*, 462/351).

Lichtung (clearing) is tied to Dasein's disclosedness insofar as Dasein is *erleuchtet* (illuminated) or *gelichtet*

(cleared). The ordinary sense of *gelichtet*, means “to clear” or “to thin out,” yet Heidegger is careful to distinguish *Lichtung* from *Licht*. A clearing in the woods need not itself be bright. Rather, light can fall into the clearing, and within it, brightness can play against darkness. The clearing therefore precedes light, rather than the reverse (SZ, 133/171). In this way, Heidegger can say that the clearing is the open region for whatever comes to presence or withdraws from it (SZ, 56f/81f). Phenomenologically expressed, Dasein discovers entities and their determinations, (i.e. ontic truths), only because Dasein is itself an openness, or, equivalently, the clearing that makes possible the encounter with particular beings (SZ, 133, 182/171, 226).³⁵

The interplay between light and dark, together with the conceptual affinity between *Reluzenz* and *Leuchten*, suggests that both terms belong to Heidegger’s account of the transcendental conditions for the possibility of experience. Truth is not guaranteed simply because something is disclosed, just as the being of Dasein does not immediately apprehend the genuine sense of its being merely by existing. Rather, because temporality ecstatically and horizontally constitutes the clearedness of the “there,” it is “primordially always already interpretable within the ‘there’” (SZ, 539/408). This may help explain why, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger’s use of the term *reluzent* in §6, “Die Aufgabe einer Destruktion der Geschichte der Ontologie,” points to the way tradition is reflected in what is disclosed through our understanding of Being (SZ, 29/21). In taking up these inherited understandings within our everyday worldly existence, we come to “forget that they have had such an origin, and [it] makes us suppose that the necessity of going back to these sources is something which we need not even understand” (SZ, 29/21). In other words, *reluzent* openness is historically mediated, and the sedimentation of tradition can dominate understanding in such a way that its original sources are forgotten and what it transmits becomes concealed. As a result, Dasein falls back upon “the kind of Being which is closest” to it, interpreting itself in terms of that world (SZ, 29/21). In short, the possibility of distortion in what is

reflected within experience belongs, at a more primordial level, to the clearing itself as the condition for both unconcealment and concealment.

In a similar register, Heidegger presents *Reluzenz* as a determination of factual life's openness, its outward orientation toward the world prior to any identification with it. *Reluzenz* names the illuminating dimension of life's movement by which the world is encountered, even though this movement is at the same time covered over by pre-structuring tendencies that secure life in its concrete determinations. Life thus unfolds through a double process in which what is disclosed is both revealed and articulated, while remaining partially concealed. In this sense, *Reluzenz* bears a *reflexive* dimension, insofar as it enables the retrieval of what remains hidden or covered over within disclosure. The retrieval of Dasein's being is therefore a temporal process that draws relucient meaning out of pre-structured determinations. This movement requires a phenomenological analysis that arises from clarified factual situations and remains sustained within them, such that questioning lives within its answers as an ongoing relation rather than as a completed result (*PIA*, 153-154/114). In short, factual life's movement through *Reluzenz* is susceptible to ruinance because it is factual; yet, as open and historically enacted, it is also kairotic, capable of grasping itself reluctantly in its temporal unfolding.

5. Concluding Remarks

The "historical" and "factual" aspects of experience are typically treated as the operative dimensions through which experience "become[s] familiar with itself and therefore [is] understood" (Kisiel 1995, 379). Lived experience is immersed in the world and Dasein tends to interpret itself in terms of its worldly being. However, the *Seinsverständnis* that arises from this hermeneutic situation is, for the most part, pervaded by the fallenness of inauthenticity or covered over through the sedimentation of tradition. Accordingly, the enactment-sense of life in its immediacy lacks a genuine sense of self-possession (i.e., life does not genuinely "possess" itself). It follows that if factual lived experience covers over what must be brought to

light, then the articulation of the fundamental structures of experience can no longer rely on merely “going along with life’s tendencies” (Kisiel 1995, 379). Although the inevitable fallenness of my worldly being preserves the “possibility and factual necessity [...] from which one must begin,” it nevertheless demands reflective “self-transformation” (*PIA*, 134/100; *GM*, 425–427/294). The phenomenologist must take hold of “the enactment” in order to see how the self-world is encountered within it (*GP I*, 94–95/74–75).

The task of reflective or relucent philosophy, therefore, is to provide a “counter-movement” that “continually struggles against its own factic ruinance,” so that life may come to its “genuinely developable self-givenness” (*PIA*, 153/113). In this respect, *Reluzenz* bears a conceptual affinity to Husserl’s notion of *Reflexion*, insofar as both function as phenomenological principles through which experience is brought back upon itself and made explicit. For Husserl, *Reflexion* discloses the structures of consciousness by turning toward the experiencing of what is experienced, making the mode of givenness thematically accessible. In a similar vein, *Reluzenz* describes a self-illuminating movement within factual life, in which life, through its immersion in the world, reflects itself back to itself and makes its situation intelligible. In both cases, what is at issue is the clarification of what is given pre-theoretically or pre-ontologically and its elevation to the level of phenomenological research. In other words, Heideggerian analysis must move beyond immersion in factual life, just as Husserlian analysis must move beyond the natural attitude.

Importantly, *Reluzenz* belongs to the structure of Dasein’s openness, such that life is always already capable of a certain self-illumination in its worldly involvement. In this reflective stance, I no longer live unthematically but attend to the co-given contents of my experience. For this reason, *Reluzenz* avoids the objectifying tendencies often associated with *Reflexion*. Yet this association rests on Natorp’s somewhat misleading characterization of Husserlian *Reflexion*. For Husserl, every “actual” (*aktuell*) experience that is alive as an originary present (*Gegenwart*) has a kind of

being that can be grasped immediately by a discerning perception (*Hua* III/1, 84/81). What reflection grasps in these moments is something that not only is and persists within the reflective focus, but also already was before the focus turned toward it. Only because reflection and experience have these “essential peculiarities” can we know something of “unreflected experiences and, by extension, of reflections themselves” (*Hua* III/1, 84/81). Reproductive and retentional modifications of experience exhibit a parallel structure of givenness, though in a correspondingly modified form. In any case, Husserl claims that experience already satisfies the conditions for being accessible to reflection simply by virtue of belonging to a particular ego; that ego can direct its attention into it and live through it reflectively (*Hua* III/1, 84/81).³⁶

For both Husserl and Heidegger, reflection as a phenomenological method does not convert experience into a static object but remains bound to the ongoing, temporal unfolding of experience. With that said, for Heidegger, the clarification of subjectivity does not culminate in an ideative grasp of the stream of experience. *Reluzenz* can be understood as preserving Husserl’s insight into the clarificatory function of reflection while re-situating the subject within the dynamic, historically situated movement of existence. This existential learning is where Heidegger finds that the philosophical categories of “care,” “life,” “as,” “world,” “existence,” and even “philosophy” formally indicate “a task to be carried out concretely on one’s own” (Dahlstrom 2001, 437). When successful, genuine and increasingly precise repetition brings to fruition the evidence supporting a counter-ruinous movement against the problem of facticity. This process, to be sure, is not accomplished through a single methodological directive that yields apodictic evidence, but through ongoing refinement and cultivation. The result, Heidegger claims, is that the analytic of Dasein can be enacted through the existentials and can “shine back” or “reflect light” on pre-ontological understanding, thereby illuminating the meaning of Being.

*

Acknowledgements: I am grateful to Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Andrew Mitchell, Ian Alexander Moore, and Hakhamanesh Zangeneh for their insightful comments during the initial development of this article at the West Coast Heidegger Circle at California State University, Stanislaus. Special thanks also go to Thomas Szanto, Dan Zahavi, Soren Øvergaard, for helpful comments on early version of this paper presented at the Center for Subjectivity Research at the University of Copenhagen. My attendance would not have possible without the generous funding provided by Dr. Patrick Eldridge and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.

NOTES

¹ See *Hua* XIX/2: 567–568/207–208; *Hua* III/1, §77; Husserl 1975, 407–408; and Jacobs 2016, 258.

² Natorp's critique targets the methodological foundations of Husserl's earlier phenomenology and, inadvertently, their transformation in *Ideas I*. It therefore anticipates and bears on *Ideas I* with greater force, despite being published a year earlier. See Dahlstrom 2015, 240–60; Luft 2016, 326–70.

³ While deconstructing the notion of theoretical subjectivity, Heidegger acknowledges Natorp directly suggesting that “reflection turns a non-reflectively lived through experience into an observed object, i.e., the moment an experience is reflectively given it is no longer lived through, but only looked at . . . We ex-posit the experiences and so extract them from the immediacy of experience. We as it were dip into the on flowing stream of experience and scoop out one or more, which means that we ‘still the stream,’ as Natorp says” (*ZBP*, 100–101/85). Accordingly, there is “no such thing as immediate description, since all expression, any attempt to put something into words, generalizes and so objectifies” (*ZBP*, 101, 111/85, 93).

⁴ Cf. *GP I*, 194/148.

⁵ For example, Heidegger states by asking the question “is there something?” the intended sense (for Husserl) is not “is there something for me?” but rather “is there something for anyone?” Heidegger answers the question “Is there something?” suggesting the “is there” is a “there is” for an “I,” and yet the question does not attain to *my I*. In seeing the lectern, I am fully present in my “I”; it resonates with the experience. “It is an experience proper to me and so do I see it. However, it is not a process but rather an event of appropriation [*Ereignis*]” (*ZBP*, 75/60).

⁶ The environmental *milieu* (lectern, book, blackboard . . . etc.) does not consist just of things, objects, which are then conceived as meaning. The meaningful is primary and immediately given to me without any mental detours across thing-oriented apprehension (*ZBP*, 73/58).

⁷ Also see, *EpF*, 275–278/213–214.

⁸ Steven Crowell notes that: As late as 1927 in *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (*GP II*, 155–56/110–11). Heidegger can still speak of “reflection” (*Reflexion*) as distinctive of ontological inquiry, using the term precisely to distinguish the “naïveté” of ancient ontology from the modern attempt—including his own—to overcome such naïveté: “Ancient ontology performs in a virtually naive way its interpretation of beings and its elaboration of the concepts mentioned.” Though “naive ontology, too, if it is ontology at all, must already always, because necessarily, be reflective—reflective in the genuine sense that it seeks to conceive beings with respect to their being by having regard to the Dasein (*puche, nous, logos*),” in naive ontology “reflection [*Reflexion*] remains in the rut of pre-philosophical knowledge”—it has not become an explicit issue of method. Heidegger’s attempt to revamp the phenomenological concept of reflection, the beginnings of which I am outlining in this chapter, is an attempt to overcome this naïveté and so to reunite Aristotelian with Kantian transcendental philosophy (2001, 144n23).

⁹ For example, see *Hau III*, §§109–110, 115, §117.

¹⁰ See, Crowell 1995.

¹¹ This interpretation of ‘apophantical discourse’ may suffice to clarify the primary function of the λόγος.

¹² For a recent article that argues precisely this point, see Cazzanelli 2020.

¹³ Scharff’s central claim is that Heidegger’s engagement with Husserl was decisively shaped by his reading of Dilthey, especially Dilthey’s emphasis on historical life and hermeneutics. For Scharff’s contribution to the debate addressed in this article, see Scharff 2019, chap. 5, 111–33.

¹⁴ It is unclear what those significant components might be, other than the psychological experiences themselves. However, one thing is clear: “Natorp does not see the danger of psychologism in subjectivization” (*ZBP*, 215/161). For the dangers of psychologism, see Fahmy-Hooke 2024.

¹⁵ According to Burt Hopkins, Heidegger’s reading of Natorp is mistaken, and objectification of subjectivity is permitted under Natorp’s new reconstructive principles. For a thorough evaluation of this misreading see, Burt Hopkins, 2021. Regardless of whether Heidegger misinterprets Natorp, and despite the critical affinities between the two thinkers, Heidegger does not accept Natorp’s reconstructive method. Moreover, commentators often focus on Heidegger’s concession to Natorp’s “scientifically noteworthy objections against phenomenology” in *ZBP*, while overlooking the fact that, in the following year, *Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks* (1920, hereafter *PAA*), Heidegger devotes over fifty pages to Natorp in a section titled “Die destruierende Betrachtung der Natorpschen Position,” where he addresses what he “did not have time to cover in the previous lecture course” (*PAA*, 92–146/73–113, here 96/76).

¹⁶ Heidegger additionally claims that Natorp’s “dispute with phenomenology does not get at its authentic sphere [...] This applies quite generally to all previous criticisms of phenomenology” (*ZBP*, 108/83). Here, Heidegger is addressing Natorp’s postulation concerning the nature of phenomenological intuition. Natorp assumes that phenomenological intuition stands in an external relation to what is intuited, such that intuition itself is already

structured in an objectifying, theoretical manner and any subsequent description is necessarily disconnected from it (*ZBP*, 111–12/85). By distinguishing intuition from description, Heidegger states that description is indeed a form of theoretization, however, this does not entail that the founding intuition is itself theoretical. The disconnection between intuition and description arises only with the latter’s theoretical articulation or thematization, not from the structure of intuition itself (*ZBP*, 111–12/85). Heidegger states that for Husserl, “Everything that presents itself ... originarily in “intuition” is to be taken simply . . . as it gives itself” (*ZBP*, 110/84). This is tantamount to saying that the basic bearing of lived-experience first becomes absolute when we live in it and the connection between an intentionality and intuition is “not achieved by any constructed system of concepts, regardless of how extensive it may be, but only through phenomenological life in its ever-growing self-intensification” (*ZBP*, 110/84). Phenomenological intuition has “the absolute sympathy with life that is identical with life-experience,” and involves an immediate and unmediated consciousness of the object in its presentational and experiential aspects (*ZBP*, 110/84). Theoretical articulation or thematization simply allows the phenomenologist to investigate the essential features and structures of the object as they appear to consciousness. In this way, reflecting on experience allows for the description and analysis of the givenness and constitution of objects in their subjective manifestation.

¹⁷ Here, I address the strongest version of Natorp’s critique and Heidegger’s response to it. Natorp’s weaker claim is his “undemonstrated prejudice” that “all language is itself already objectifying, i.e., that living in meaning implies a theoretical grasping of what is meant” (*ZBP*, 111/93–94, quoted in Scagliusi 2024, 79). Heidegger, to be sure, does not think that subjectivity and reflection become methodological objectifications simply because they can be articulated and conceptualized theoretically.

¹⁸ Here Heidegger is likely criticizing Natorp, albeit somewhat tongue-in-cheek, without mentioning him by name. Natorp’s claim that subjectivity must be approached “from the other side” is grounded in his view that the same unitary process of cognition can be traced in two directions: from the subjective to the objective and, in reverse, from the objective back to the subjective. Heidegger uses similar language when addressing Natorp in *ZBP*, 116/88. See also *AP*, chap. 4, §§3–5, 11–13, especially the formulations “die Frage zunächst umkehrt,” “Rückgang vom Objektiven zum Subjektiven,” and “vom Subjektiven zum Objektiven und vom Objektiven zum Subjektiven.”

¹⁹ Here, Heidegger anticipates Husserl’s distinction in *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie* (1954, hereafter *Hua* VI) between a broader and a narrower sense of “self-reflection” (*Selbstbesinnung*): pure “ego-reflection” (*Ich-Reflexion*), understood as reflection on the whole life of the ego as ego, and reflection (*Besinnung*) in the pregnant sense of “questioning back” into the sense or teleological essence of the ego (*Hua* VI, 392n; 510–11n1). In the broader sense, self-reflection involves a person reflecting on the ultimate sense of their existence (quoted in Cohen, Moran 2012, 292).

²⁰ To be sure, Kisiel's *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time* remains a landmark achievement in Heidegger scholarship, and in phenomenology more broadly. There has perhaps been no other full-length study to date that offers so thorough a treatment of the origins of Heidegger's thought or such meticulous historical scholarship. The narrowness of my criticism here is itself a testament to that achievement. Yet Kisiel nevertheless helped inaugurate what I call the "hermeneutic, mystical, and anti-philosophical" interpretation of Heidegger. My critique of Kisiel is at times stylized as a more general critique of this line of interpretation, which overlooks the extent to which Heidegger's philosophical insights, even when presented through Aristotle, remain conceptually mediated through Husserl's phenomenology. I have written about this from different angles in Fahmy-Hooke 2025; 2026.

²¹ See Overgaard 2004, 31–67, for a thorough elaboration of the fundamental differences between Descartes and Husserl.

²² When Heidegger refers to the old sense of "act-phenomenology," he may be referring to the neo-Kantian tendency to understand Husserl's conception of intentionality in continuity with Brentano and as a philosophy of consciousness still bound to the subject-object framework. Husserl, however, rejects Brentano's view that the intentional object enters consciousness as a substitute for the object of reference, describing this as a "pure postulate that does not explain anything" (*Hua* XIX/1: 365, 505/87, 164; *Hua* XIX/2: 566-67/207-8). For Husserl, *Vorstellung* is not a mediating mental item that stands between consciousness and the world. Rather, it designates an intentional *presentation* in which the object is given as transcendent to the act itself. By retaining the term while rejecting Brentano's model of representational mediation, Husserl develops what may be described as a presentational anti-representationalism. See Jansen 2014. I treat this issue at length in Fahmy-Hooke 2026.

²³ Heidegger's analysis of Descartes and Husserl's account of reflection suggests that phenomenology can, in fact, be defended against Natorp when understood along these lines. Although this reading may not be entirely faithful to Husserl's position, it nevertheless highlights the closeness of his thought to Heidegger's reformulation of the phenomenological project. Heidegger frequently adopts this interpretive strategy, drawing out implications that a thinker may not have explicitly intended. This can, at times, do violence to the text. His reading of Kant in the *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1929), for example, is often criticized on precisely these grounds. Even so, whether or not Husserl would have endorsed the claims Heidegger attributes to him, significant points of contact remain between them, and these are enough to challenge Kisiel's claim that Heidegger abandons phenomenology after Natorp because of its latent Cartesianism.

²⁴ *Sorge*: ahead-of-itself; already-being-in-a-world; being-alongside entities encountered within-the-world) and *Bedeutsamkeit*: the surrounding-world; the with-world; the self-world) (*PIA*, 119–22/89–90).

²⁵ Crowell points out that *phronesis*, as it relates to Aristotle's virtuous life, may be said to engender a "better life" than Cartesian subjectivity and its

aftermath. However, “it is quite another [thing] to say that philosophy itself is essentially phronesis.” See Crowell 2001, 444.

²⁶ In this context, the term “category” refers to something that, “according to its sense, interprets a phenomenon in a direction of sense, in a determinate way, at the level of principle, and brings the phenomenon to intelligibility as the interpretatum” (*PIA*, 85–86/65). Heidegger is likely anticipating what he later calls the Existentials in *Being and Time*.

²⁷ This quotation is taken from Joan Stambaugh’s translation of *Being and Time*. Page references give the section number first, followed by the corresponding page number in that translation.

²⁸ Heidegger states in *Being and Time* that Dasein’s ways of behaviour, its capacities, powers, possibilities, and vicissitudes, have been studied with varying extent in philosophical psychology, in anthropology, ethics, and ‘political science’, in poetry, biography, and the writing of history, each in a different fashion. But the question remains whether these interpretations of Dasein have been carried through with a primordial existentiality comparable to whatever existentiell primordiality they may have possessed. Neither of these excludes the other but they do not necessarily go together. Existentiell interpretation can demand an existential analytic, if indeed we conceive of philosophical cognition as something possible and necessary. Only when the basic structures of Dasein have been adequately worked out with explicit orientation towards the problem of Being itself, will what we have hitherto gained in interpreting Dasein get its existential justification (*SZ*, 22/16).

To be sure, ruinance (*Ruinanz*) names the tendency of factual life to become absorbed, dispersed, and estranged in its everyday concerns, such that life falls away from an authentic grasp of itself. In terms consistent with the foregoing analysis, the disintegrating and depraving fallenness of factual life endangers experience in its primordiality, thereby mixing it with fallen content, relation, and enactment. Content that is thus divested of the primordiality of its accompanying relation and enactment remains within an average “interest” and becomes accessible in boredom, emptiness, fleetingness, speed, restlessness, and insecurity. Accordingly, primordiality, in which the genuineness of enactment and its renewal are sustained, drops out (*PAA*, 187/144). In *PIA*, the four formally indicative characters of ruinance are the seducing (temptative), the soothing (quietive), the estranging (alienative), and the annihilating (negative in an active and transitive sense) (*PIA*, 140/104). In *Being and Time*, with greater precision, *Ruinanz*, now expressed as fallenness (*das Verfallen*), is understood as a tranquilized immersion in the public world of averageness (*Durchschnittlichkeit*) under the anonymity of the “they” (*das Man*). Closely related phenomena include idle talk (*Gerede*), curiosity (*Neugier*), and ambiguity (*Zweideutigkeit*) (*SZ*, §§27, 35–38).

³⁰ Whether each treatment of Dasein is continuous or conflicting is beyond the scope of this article. However, the two can be reconciled, at least *prima facie*, if the former is simply understood as an *existentiell* analysis and the latter as an *existential* analysis, both of which seek to recover the pre-ontological in a genuine way.

³¹ For example, See Ruin 2012; Maggini 2001; Richardson 1995; Klun 2014; Abergel 2016; Hayes 2007; Abergel 2020; Dahl 2023.

³² Moving beyond, for example, Dreyfus's interpretation in *Being-in-the-World* (1991), which is explicitly limited to Division I and accordingly focuses on Heidegger's analysis of everyday practical engagement, especially readiness-to-hand, skillful coping, and worldhood.

³³ Aspects of this paragraph are rewritten in *SZ*, 15/36–7.

³⁴ See, Capobianco, 2010 for a detailed evaluation.

³⁵ Heidegger is not endorsing traditional conceptions but appropriating them. See for example, Aristotle, *De Anima*, III, 5 “And in fact intellect as we have described it is what it is by virtue of becoming all things, while there is another [intellect] which is what it is by virtue of making all things: this is a sort of state like light; for in a sense light makes potential colors into actual colors” (430a15).

³⁶ As Husserl puts it, “experience always fulfills those conditions merely through its manner of existing and, indeed, does so for the very ego to which it belongs and whose pure focus may live ‘in’ it” (*Hua* III/1, 84/81).

REFERENCES

References to the works of Martin Heidegger are provided parenthetically in the text using abbreviations of their German titles, followed by the German pagination, a slash, and the English pagination of published translations where extant. The only exception is citations of *Being and Time* (*SZ*). No references to the pages of English translations are provided. Instead, the German pagination is followed by the paragraph number referring to *Sein und Zeit*, 11th ed. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1967), which is consistent across all English translations of *Being and Time*. All volumes of the *Gesamtausgabe* are published by Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1975–.

The standard German edition of Husserl's collected works is *Husserliana: Edmund Husserl, Gesammelte Werke*, first published by Martinus Nijhoff, later acquired by Kluwer Academic Publishers, and, following the merger of Kluwer and Springer, now published by Springer. This series constitutes the primary critical edition of Husserl's writings. In the secondary literature, it is commonly cited under the abbreviation *Hua*, followed by the relevant volume number. The volumes include both previously published books and articles in critical editions, as well as selections from unpublished manuscripts preserved at the Husserl-Archives Leuven. Throughout this study, Husserl's works are cited using the abbreviations listed below, with German and English pagination separated by a slash. When appropriate, I reference the relevant section number indicated by a section sign (§).

- Abergel, David C. 2020. "The Confluence of Authenticity and Inauthenticity in Heidegger's Being and Time." *Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual* 10: 75–98.
- Abergel, David C. 2016. "The Disunity of Factual Life: An Ethical Development in Heidegger's Early Work." *Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual* 6: 25–52.
- Bernet, Rudolf, Iso Kern, and Eduard Marbach. 1993. *An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology*. Northwestern University Press.
- Campbell, Scott M. 2012. *The Early Heidegger's Philosophy of Life: Facticity, Being, and Language*. Fordham University Press.
- Capobianco, Richard. 2011. *Engaging Heidegger*. University of Toronto Press.
- Cazzanelli, Stefano. 2020. "The Relevance of Natorp's Criticism of Husserl to the Hermeneutical Transformation of Heidegger's Phenomenology." *Problemata* 98: 8–20.
- Dahl, Espen. 2023. "Augustine and Heidegger on Verticality and Everydayness." *Continental Philosophy Review* 56: 1–20. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-023-09599-y>.
- Dahlstrom, Daniel O. 1994. "Heidegger's Method: Philosophical Concepts as Formal Indications." *The Review of Metaphysics*, 775–95.
- Dahlstrom, Daniel O. 2015. "Natorp's Psychology." In *New Approaches to Neo-Kantianism*, edited by Nicolas de Warren and Andrea Staiti. Cambridge University Press.
- Dahlstrom, Daniel O. 2023. *The Heidegger Dictionary*. 2nd ed. Bloomsbury Academic.
- Dreyfus, Hubert L. 1991. *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I*. MIT Press.
- Dreyfus, Hubert L. 2014. *Skillful Coping: Essays on the Phenomenology of Everyday Perception and Action*. Edited by Mark Wrathall. Oxford University Press.
- Escudero, Jesús Adrián. 2020. "Actualization (Vollzug)." In *The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon*, edited by Mark A. Wrathall. Cambridge University Press.
- Fahmy-Hooke, Joshua. 2024. "Heidegger's Critical Confrontation with the Concept of Truth as Validity." *Open Philosophy* 7 (1): 20240054.
- Fahmy-Hooke, Joshua. 2025. "Heidegger's Concept of Truth: The Phenomenological Core of the Ontological Turn." *Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual* 15: 177–200.

Fahmy-Hooke, Joshua. 2026. "Husserl's Logical Investigations and the Problem of Truth: A Response to Tugendhat's Critique of Heidegger." *Forthcoming*.

Frank, Manfred. 1991. *Selbstbewußtseinstheorien von Fichte Bis Sartre*. Suhrkamp.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 2004. *Truth and Method*. Translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall. Continuum.

Gethmann, Carl Friedrich. 1974. "Zu Heideggers Wahrheitsbegriff." *Kant-Studien* 65 (2): 186–200.

Guignon, Charles. 1983. *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge*. Hackett.

Harman, Graham. 2002. *Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects*. Open Court.

Hayes, James M. 2007. "Deconstructing Dasein: Heidegger's Earliest Interpretations of Aristotle's De Anima." *The Review of Metaphysics* 61 (1): 45–84.

Heidegger, Martin. 1991. *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. Herausgegeben von Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Bd. 3. *Gesamtausgabe*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Ursprünglich erschienen 1929. English trans. Heidegger, Martin. *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. Translated by Richard Taft. 5th ed., enlarged. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.

Heidegger, Martin. 1975. [GP II] *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (Sommersemester 1927). Herausgegeben von Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Bd. 24. *Gesamtausgabe*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. English trans. Heidegger, Martin. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Translated by Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.

Heidegger, Martin. 1976. [L] *Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit* (Wintersemester 1925/26). Herausgegeben von Walter Biemel. Bd. 21. *Gesamtausgabe*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. English trans. Heidegger, Martin. *Logic: The Question of Truth*. Translated by Thomas Sheehan. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.

Heidegger, Martin. 1977. [SZ] *Sein und Zeit*. Herausgegeben von Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer. Ursprünglich erschienen 1927. English trans. Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper and Row, 1962; *Being and Time*. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. Revised by Dennis J. Schmidt. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010.

Heidegger, Martin. 1978. [FS] *Frühe Schriften 1912–1916*. Herausgegeben von Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Bd. 1. *Gesamtausgabe*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

Heidegger, Martin. 1979. [P] *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* (Sommersemester 1925). Herausgegeben von Petra Jaeger. Bd. 20. *Gesamtausgabe*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. English trans. Heidegger, Martin. *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*. Translated by Theodore Kisiel. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.

Heidegger, Martin. 1983. [GM] *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt, Endlichkeit, Einsamkeit* (Wintersemester 1929/30). Herausgegeben von Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Bd. 29/30. *Gesamtausgabe*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. English trans. Heidegger, Martin. *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*. Translated by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.

Heidegger, Martin. 1985. [PIA] *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung* (Wintersemester 1921/22). Herausgegeben von Walter Bröcker und Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns. Bd. 61. *Gesamtausgabe*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. English trans. Heidegger, Martin. *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research*. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001.

Heidegger, Martin. 1987. [ZBP] *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie* (Kriegsnotsemester 1919 und Sommersemester 1919). Herausgegeben von Bernd Heimbüchel. Bd. 56/57. *Gesamtausgabe*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. English trans. Heidegger, Martin. *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*. Translated by Ted Sadler. London: Athlone Press, 2008.

Heidegger, Martin. 1988. [O] *Ontologie: Hermeneutik der Faktizität* (Sommersemester 1923). Herausgegeben von Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns. Bd. 63. *Gesamtausgabe*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. English trans. Heidegger, Martin. *Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity*. Translated by John van Buren. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.

Heidegger, Martin. 1992. [PS] *Platon: Sophistes* (Wintersemester 1924/25). Herausgegeben von Ingeborg Schüßler. Bd. 19. *Gesamtausgabe*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. English trans. Heidegger, Martin. *Plato's Sophist*. Translated by Richard

Rojcewicz and André Schuwer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.

Heidegger, Martin. 1993a. [GP I] *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (Wintersemester 1919/20). Herausgegeben von Hans-Helmuth Gander. Bd. 58. *Gesamtausgabe*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. English trans. Heidegger, Martin. *Basic Problems of Phenomenology: Winter Semester 1919/20*. Translated by Scott M. Campbell. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013.

Heidegger, Martin. 1993b. [PAA] *Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks* (Sommersemester 1920). Herausgegeben von Claudius Strube. Bd. 59. *Gesamtausgabe*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. English trans. Heidegger, Martin. *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression*. Translated by Tracy Colony. London: Continuum, 2010.

Heidegger, Martin. 1994. [EpF] *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung* (Wintersemester 1923/24). Herausgegeben von Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Bd. 17. *Gesamtausgabe*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. English trans. Heidegger, Martin. *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*. Translated by Daniel O. Dahlstrom. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005.

Heidegger, Martin. 1995. [PRL] *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens* (Wintersemester 1920/21, Sommersemester 1921 und *Aufzeichnungen über Mystik*). Herausgegeben von Matthias Jung, Thomas Regehly und Claudius Strube. Bd. 60. *Gesamtausgabe*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. English trans. Heidegger, Martin. *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*. Translated by Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.

Herrmann, Friedrich-Wilhelm von. 2013. *Hermeneutics and Reflection: Heidegger and Husserl on the Concept of Phenomenology*. Translated by Kenneth Maly. University of Toronto Press.

Holland, Nancy J. 2018. *Heidegger and the Problem of Consciousness*. Indiana University Press.

Hopkins, Burt C. 2021. "The 'Offence of Any and All Ready-Made Givennesses': Natorp's Critique of Husserl's Ideas I." In *The Idealism-Realism Debate Among Edmund Husserl's Early Followers and Critics*. Springer International Publishing.

Husserl, Edmund. 1954. *Die Krisis Der Europäischen Wissenschaften Und Die Transzendente Phänomenologie*. Edited by Walter Biemel. VI. Husserliana. Martinus Nijhoff.

Husserl, Edmund. 1975. *Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic*. Translated by James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks. Northwestern University Press.

Husserl, Edmund. 1976. [Hua III/1] *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*. Herausgegeben von Karl Schuhmann. Husserliana. Bd. III/1. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. Ursprünglich erschienen 1913. English trans. Husserl, Edmund. *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*. Translated by F. Kersten. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1983.

Husserl, Edmund. 1984. [Hua XIX/1] *Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band, erster Teil: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis*. Edited by Ursula Panzer. Husserliana XIX/1. Dordrecht: Springer. English trans. Husserl, Edmund. 2001. *Logical Investigations. Volume 2*. Translated by J. N. Findlay. Edited by Dermot Moran. London and New York: Routledge.

Husserl, Edmund. 1984. [Hua XIX/2] *Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band: Zweiter Teil. Untersuchungen Zur Phänomenologie Und Theorie Der Erkenntnis*. Edited by Ursula Panzer. XIX/2. Husserliana. Springer. English trans. Husserl, Edmund. 2001. *Logical Investigations. Volume 2*. Translated by J. N. Findlay. Edited by Dermot Moran. London and New York: Routledge.

Husserl, Edmund. 2002. [Hua XXXV] *Einleitung in Die Philosophie: Vorlesungen 1922/23*. Edited by Berndt Goossens. XXXV. Husserliana. Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Husserl, Edmund. 2012. *Einleitung in Die Philosophie: Vorlesungen 1916–1920*. Edited by Hanne Jacobs. IX. Husserliana Materialien. Springer.

Imdahl, Georg. 1994. "Formale Anzeige Bei Heidegger." *Archiv Für Begriffsgeschichte* 37: 306–32.

Jansen, Julia. 2014. "Taking a Transcendental Stance: Anti-Representationalism and Direct Realism in Kant and Husserl." In *Husserl und die klassische deutsche Philosophie*, edited by Faustino Fabbianelli and Sebastian Luft, 79–92. *Phaenomenologica* 212. Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Jacobs, Hanne. 2016. "Husserl on Reason, Reflection, and Attention." *Research in Phenomenology* 46 (2): 257–76.

- Kisiel, Theodore. 1995. *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*. University of California Press.
- Kisiel, Theodore. 2002. "The Transformation of the Categorical." In *Heidegger's Way of Thought*, edited by Alfred Denker and Marion Heinz. Continuum.
- Klun, Branko. 2014. "Early Heidegger's Methodology and Its Challenges for the Future." *Toronto Journal of Theology* 30 (2): 231–47.
- Luft, Sebastian. 2016. "Reconstruction and Reduction: Natorp and Husserl on Method and the Question of Subjectivity." *Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy* 8 (2): 326–70.
- Maggini, Giovanni. 2001. "Historical and Practical Kairos in the Early Heidegger." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 32 (2): 160–75.
- McGrath, S. J. 2010. "Formal Indication, Irony, and the Risk of Saying Nothing." In *A Companion to Heidegger's Phenomenology of Religious Life*. Brill.
- Moran, Dermot, and Joseph Cohen, eds. 2012. *The Husserl Dictionary*. Bloomsbury Academic.
- Natorp, Paul. 2013. *Allgemeine Psychologie Nach Kritischer Methode*. Edited by Sebastian Luft. Wbg Academic.
- Okrent, Mark. 2019. *Heidegger's Pragmatism: Understanding, Being, and the Critique of Metaphysics*. Cornell University Press.
- O'Rourke, Jonathan. 2018. "Heidegger on Expression: Formal Indication and Destruction in the Early Freiburg Lectures." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 49 (2): 109–25. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2018.1431133>.
- Overgaard, Søren. 2004. *Husserl and Heidegger on Being in the World*. Vol. 173. Springer Science and Business Media.
- Richardson, William J. 1995. "Heidegger's Fall." In *From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy, and Desire*, edited by Babette Babich. Springer.
- Rickert, Heinrich. 1922. *Die Philosophie Des Lebens: Darstellung Und Kritik Der Philosophischen Modeströmungen Unserer Zeit*. J. C. B. Mohr.
- Ruin, Hans. 2012. "Thinking in Ruins: Life, Death, and Destruction in Heidegger's Early Writings." *Comparative and Continental Philosophy* 4 (1): 15–30. <https://doi.org/10.1558/ccp.v4i1.15>.

Scagliusi, Francesco. 2024. "Destruction, History of Ontology, and Factual Life: A Reconstruction of the Phenomenological Function of Heidegger's 'Destruction' (1919–1927)." *Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual* 14: 74–104.

Scharff, Robert C. 2018. *Heidegger Becoming Phenomenological: Interpreting Husserl through Dilthey, 1916–1925*. Rowman and Littlefield.

Sheehan, Thomas. 2011. "Facticity and Ereignis." In *Interpreting Heidegger: Critical Essays*, edited by Daniel O. Dahlstrom. Cambridge University Press.

Zahavi, Dan. 2015. "Phenomenology of Reflection." In *Commentary on Husserl's Ideas I*, edited by Andrea Staiti. De Gruyter.

Joshua Fahmy-Hooke is Ph.D. candidate at Memorial University (Canada), specializing in phenomenology and metaphysics. His dissertation explores the roots of *Being and Time* by tracing Heidegger's phenomenological development in his early lecture courses (*Frühe Freiburger Vorlesungen*, 1919–1923; *Marburger Vorlesung*, 1923–1929).

Address:

Joshua Fahmy-Hooke
Department of Philosophy
Memorial University
St. John's, NL, Canada
+1 (416) 877-6482
Email: jdhooke@mun.ca