

The «trembling of divinization»: Being and God in Martin Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)

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Abstract

In this essay, I will attempt to explore the relationship between Being and God in Martin Heidegger's *Contributions to Philosophy*. I will attempt to demonstrate that *Contributions to Philosophy* serves as a laboratory for the development of a new phenomenology of the divine, in which Heidegger explores the experience of divine presence through the lens of the thought of Being. Furthermore, I will attempt to argue that, despite Heidegger's efforts to establish a clear separation between Being and God, Being ultimately emerges as a fundamental and decisive condition for the possible manifestation and arrival of the divine.

Keywords: Heidegger, Being, God, theology, last god, phenomenology of the divine

1. Preliminary remarks

Being and Time is widely recognized as an unfinished work. According to Heidegger's own self-interpretation, its incompleteness stems from inadequacy of traditional metaphysical language to speak about Being (Heidegger 1977, 208). Beginning in the 1930s, Heideggerian reflection undergoes a «turning» (*Kehre*)¹ that does not coincide with a biographical event but with a change of perspective regarding the question of Being, which is now understood no longer as mere presence but as *parousia*, *aletheia*, *dis-velation*. In this change of direction, Heidegger begins a confrontation with

theology and the question of Being becomes inextricably linked with that of the divine.

A key text from Heidegger's 1930s reflections on the relationship between Being and God is his major posthumous work, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*. In this paper I will try to analyze this relationship with particular reference to this work, starting from an observation by Jean-Luc Marion, who pointed out the fact that «no one more than Heidegger has aroused the suspicion that it may be necessary to liberate "God" from the question on/of Being, but that this liberation is also contrary to the conditions of thought» (Marion 1991, 61). The purpose of this paper is to highlight how Being ends up becoming in *Contributions to Philosophy* a prerequisite and a fundamental condition for the *parousia* of the divine, «insofar as Heidegger attempts to determine the event of God from thought and, especially, from the thought of Being, and this despite the precise separation posed between Being and God» (Di Chiro 2010, 19). In this case, I am not interested in whether Heidegger's thought remains confined within the tradition of onto-theo-logy, as Emmanuel Lévinas notes in his 1975-76 Sorbonne lectures, *Dieu et l'onto-theo-logie* (Lévinas 200, 121-224; Schrijvers, 2010, 207-239). If anything, I am interested in taking up the question posed by the Lithuanian philosopher: «But a question arises: did onto-theo-logys mistake consist in taking being for God, or rather in taking God for being?» (Lévinas 200, 124). It can be recognized, as Lévinas does, that although «having taken leave of being as God, Heidegger continues [...] to think God within the horizon of being. For this reason his thinking is not radical enough. Being remains for Heidegger the ultimate source of meaning to which all things must necessarily refer. Heidegger's God is strictly dependent on being and is subject to its passage» (Stagi 2013, 147)². This last observation is very interesting for the purposes of this work. The problem that arises here concerns the fact, as Bernhard Welte points out, that

to discuss the problem of God in Heidegger's sense is not merely to repeat once again what is known, but to make the attempt to penetrate into the movement of the totality of this path of thought, to dare to reckon with this thought that leads

far beyond all that is customary, and then from this, to dare the totality, to observe carefully whether in such thought something like God manifests itself and, if it does, how it manifests itself there (Welte 1997, 447).

Having made these necessary premises, before I begin my analysis, I must finally recall that in the Marburg Lecture on *Phenomenology and Theology* in 1927, Heidegger had made a clear distinction between theology and philosophy (Heidegger 1998, 39-62). Graziano Ripanti notes that.

Theology unlike philosophy, an ontological science, is ontical science, insofar as it interprets a historical fact, the Crucified One, and human existence from this fact; positive science, therefore, radically distinct from philosophy. To want to conceive and think the essence of God in the terms of being for Heidegger is to overwhelm faith in the fate of occidental metaphysics (Ripanti 1993, 118-119).

Along the same line of interpretation is Rüdiger Safranski who, in his biography devoted to Heidegger, states that «Faith, then, was the undisposable event of God penetrating into man's life. Thinking could do no more than determine the point of penetration. The event of God itself was not a matter for thinking» (Safranski 1998, 310). The peculiarity of *Contributions* consists in the fact that Heidegger seeks to experience the real presence of the divine from thought: «*Contributions* continually refer to God, albeit to a God unknown to tradition in this form. He springs from the thinking about Being» (Safranski 1998, 308). In this case, *Contributions* can be said to open the stage for a «spectacular return of God in philosophy» (Grondin 2010: 113-123) and can be regarded as a radical experiment in thinking about the divine, a laboratory for designing a new concept of the divine (Fabris 2002, 647-671). In fact, they propose a «new phenomenology of the sacred and the divine» (Strummiello 1995, 12), a «phenomenology in which the classical question, “how does God enter philosophy?”, is transformed into the question of the reciprocal relationship that gathers being, God and humans» (Di Chiro 2010, 20-21), and which finds its philosophical fulfillment in the mysterious figure of «the last god». Before addressing this work and devoting our attention to this figure, it should first be pointed

out that Heidegger has always been clear, even in the work following the *Phenomenology and Theology* conference, about the attempt not to want to identify God with Being. In fact, in the 1951 Zurich Seminar, when asked whether it is permissible to think of God as Being, he replies that

Being and god are not identical, and I would never attempt to think the essence of god through being. [...] Were I yet to write a theology, as I am sometimes tempted to do, the word “being” should not occur in it. [...] I believe that being can never be thought as the ground and essence of god, but that the experience of god and its manifestness (insofar as it is encountered by the human being) nonetheless takes place in the direction of being, which never means that being could be a possible predicate of god (Heidegger 2005, 436-437).

Heidegger is quite perplexed by any attempt to use Being as a theological determinant of what makes God God, stating: «Thought speaks of the manifestation of Being; but the term being is a non-theological term. Since it is revelation itself that determines its mode of manifestation, theology does not need to prove or interpret a “being”» (Kearney, O’Leary 1980, 334-335). However, it should be noted that, although Being cannot be conceived as «the ground and essence of god», it nevertheless plays a significant role in relation to God, as it functions as a preliminary element for divine revelation. In this sense, «the experience of god and its manifestness (insofar as it is encountered by the human being) nonetheless takes place in the direction of being» (Kearney, O’Leary 1980, 437). This aspect becomes central in *Contributions to Philosophy*, particularly in the section devoted to the figure of «the last god».

2. The question of the divine and the history of being

Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), written between 1936 and 1938 and published posthumously in 1989, are articulated, after a «Prospect» (*Vorblick*) and a concluding part dedicated to «Beyng» (*Das Seyn*), into six parts: «The Resonating» (*Der Anklang*), «The Interplay» (*Das Zuspiel*), «The Leap» (*Der sprung*), «The Grounding» (*Die Gründung*), «The Future Ones» (*Die Zu-künftigen*), «The last god» (*der Letzte*

Gott). A special place in the architecture of this work is occupied by the question of God, and more precisely, by the enigmatic figure of the the last god, which is configured under the strictly philosophical sphere as the real outcome of the work³. According to Leonardo Samonà, the question of God, «probably the secret thread along the Heideggerian path is required at the end of the same turn» (Samonà 1997, 193). In this case, the «transformation to which thought is called in order to think being as an event converges in fact toward preparing for the encounter with the “farthest”, “ultimate” trait of being, its own inaugurating and “adapting” retraction to itself». The only adequate way to grasp being as «turn» is thus preparation for and making oneself available to the call of «*The turning in the event*» (Heidegger 2012, 322), the event makes everything possible, even the opening for the possibility of man’s encounter with the divine and the gods (Samonà 1997, 193). In fact, the problem Heidegger poses in *Contributions* is «the question of whether something like being can be attributed to gods at all without destroying everything divine» (Heidegger 2012, 345). He asserts that

To grasp the thinking of beyng on the basis of the gods will immediately seem arbitrary and “fantastic”, insofar as on the one hand it means in general to proceed without hesitation from the divine, as if that were “given” and everyone agreed about it, and insofar as on the other hand it means still more outlandishly to proceed from “gods,” as if a “polytheism” were postulated as the “point of departure” for philosophy (Heidegger 2012, 345).

It should be pointed out, however, that speaking in the plural of «gods» for Heidegger «does of course not mean that a decision has been made here affirming the existence of many gods instead of one» (Heidegger 2012, 345). For Heidegger, however, this indecision is crucial because

The thinking in advance, as abiding in this decision with regard to such undecidability, does not presuppose the existence of any gods whatever; instead, it ventures into the domain of that question for which the answer can come only from what is question-worthy itself, never from the questioner. This fact, that such anticipatory thinking denies

beyng to “the gods” in advance, means that every assertion about the “being” and “essence” of gods not only says nothing about them, i.e., about that which is to be decided, but also dissimulates something objective, on which all thinking founders because it is immediately driven astray (Heidegger 2012, 345).

This denial of Being to the gods means that Being does not stand above the gods, at a higher level, but also that, at the same time, the gods do not stand above Being. However, in such an only seemingly equal relationship between Being and the gods, priority is given to Being. Infact for Heidegger the gods «need beyng» (Heidegger 2012, 346). This relation of need is an altogether special one. The need the gods have for Being is not like a property or attribute in which the gods come to settle: «“The gods” require beyng so that through beyng, which does not belong to them, they might indeed belong to themselves» (Heidegger 2012, 346). Being becomes, therefore, a necessity for the gods. Here, my interpretation differs from that of Samona, who believes that in *Contributions* the «relationship between being and the divine remains somewhat undecidable: the “gods” need being, but this in turn is essentially being enjoyed by the gods» (Samonà 1997, 195). Furthermore, Samona asserts that in *Contributions* comes into

play a constitutive renunciation for thought: the question of the divine cannot be decided by the thought of being, and the question of the sacred cannot be decided by the “clearing” of the sacred or of “gods.” Thought, understood radically, is expectation, and with that the proximity of the “ultimate god” in its undecided relation to being. The latter in turn “does not unfold its essence as god itself” but “enjoys the sacralization of the god to remain nevertheless completely different from that”. The not between the divine and being reveals in its extreme ambivalence the “turning point” as the nexus between being and god (Samonà 1997, 195).

I agree with Samona when he declares that the last god is not being, but «being is the space for the free “passing away” of the last god» (Samonà 1997, 197). I differ, however, from his interpretation when he asserts that in *Contributions* Heidegger brings into philosophy «the “emptiness” of god, that is, its

irreducibility to a condition posed by thought» (Samonà 1997, 197). What I would like to emphasize instead is that the last god springs precisely from a condition of thought, and especially from the thought of being, insofar as it needs being. This key to interpretation finds confirmation in Heidegger's words:

As obfuscated as the neededness of beyng still remains for thinking, this neededness nevertheless provides a first foothold for thinking "the gods" as the ones that need beyng. We thereby take the first steps into the history of beyng, the thinking of the historicity of beyng thus first gets under way, and every effort to force what is said in this commencement into an ordinary understandability is otiose and, above all, opposed to this kind of thinking (Heidegger 2012, 346).

In this way, as Costantino Esposito states, «the locution "history of being" means in a proper and strict sense "history of salvation": safeguarding what is retracted and giving what is rejected. This is where the *Beiträge zur Philosophie* (1936-38) should be read, as a true book of salvation in the other beginning of thought» (Esposito 20023, 204). Heidegger asks why there is ever a need for such a beginning, and his answer is that

only the greatest occurrence, the most intimate event, can still save us from lostness in the bustle of mere incidents and machinations. What must eventuate is what opens being to us and places us back into being and in that way brings us to ourselves and face to face with work and sacrifice (Heidegger 2012, 46).

But what is this «event» of which Heidegger speaks? (Stovba 2022, 276-297). In paragraph 255 of *Contributions* he states that «The event must require Dasein and, in needing it, must place it in the call and thereby bring it before the passing by of the last god» (Heidegger 2012, 323). The last god obviously does not coincide with the event, but refers back to it, as that to which it belongs. The last god is a figure of the event, that in which the event takes prominence (Vitiello 1995, 70). Heidegger avoids any possible and reductive identification between the event and the figure of the last god: «The last god is not the event itself and yet is in need of the event as that to which the

one who grounds the “there” belongs» (Heidegger 2012, 324). For Heidegger «the god needs beyng» (Heidegger 2012, 328). This necessity means neither reduction nor submission of the divine to Being, but more simply a pre-emption of Being over the divine. This precedence of Being also alludes to a connection between event and the last god. The event «is always the beginning, even if it is the beginning of the last god» (Heidegger 2012, 46). The beginning «is *beyng itself* as event, the concealed sovereignty of the origin of the truth of beings as such. And beyng as the event is the beginning» (Heidegger 2012, 47). Philosophy takes on the task of identifying the rudimentary outlines of a *Seinsgeschichte*, or rather, tracing the history of Being as abandonment and lack as it «grasps the abyss of the neededness of beyng as what is first and never seeks the essence of beyng in what is godly itself as that which supposedly is most eminently» (Heidegger 2012, 346). In this way, the «thinking of the historicity of beyng stands outside every theology and is equally removed from any atheism, whether in the sense of a “worldview” or of a doctrine having some other character» (Heidegger 2012, 346) and connects to the enigmatic figure of the last god.

3. The last god and the «trembling of divinization»

Regarding the expression «the last god»⁴, Heidegger frees it from any reference to Christianity⁵. The last god does not constitute the end of a path characterized by the previous images of pagan gods, he is not the son of God who has come to impart a radical turn to human history and to secure a meaningful fulfillment for it, but rather constitutes a representation of the event that disturbs mortals and sets them on the paths of Being (Tomassi 2011). Therefore, the last god stands beyond any specification and indication through which monotheism, pantheism, or atheism could be considered: «With the death of this God, all theisms wither away» (Heidegger 2012, 326). The last god «is not the Christian God, no longer depending on revelation and assent his advent tied exclusively to being. The more divine God of whom Heidegger speaks is expressly opposed to the gods who have already been and in particular to the Christian God» (Stagi 2013, 113). The last god

«is the *ganz Andere* who definitively breaks with the tradition from which he comes and establishes an “ultimate” and “definitive” divinity» (Stagi 2013, 113). According to Luigi Pareyson, this «God is understood by Heidegger as a new God, completely outside the tradition, and it is here again that his anti-Christianity manifests itself far more radically than the philosophical contestation by which he intends to downgrade the metaphysical God» (Pareyson 2000, 446). The last god thus lies beyond the realm of metaphysics. He emerges after the death of the metaphysical God and is ultimacy not because he follows the twilight of previous gods, nor because he definitively resolves the question of the divine. Rather, his ultimacy emphasizes that such a God, transcending any ontic individuation characteristic of metaphysics, can only appear as an extreme possibility. From this point of view, «Der letzte Gott» should perhaps be more rigorously translated as «the extreme God» (Strummiello 1995, 314), «der äußerste Gott», an expression used by Heidegger himself (Heidegger 2012, 323). The last god, then, is by no means another other God, not a new figure added to the others: «Der letzte Gott means that God is the last one; that he is close to us in the farthest distance» (Cacciari 1994, 163). In his ultimacy is contained the whole dimension of God: the last god is *trembling*, throbbing, hesitation, not stable and secure presence. The palpitation of God is the very trembling of Being, which must be guarded and safeguarded in its tenuousness and exceptional character: «Beyng is the trembling of divinization» (Heidegger 2012, 189). This vibration makes it possible to clarify the finite nature of Being and at the same time to reaffirm the distinction between Being and God:

Beyng must be thought out to this extremity. It thereby illuminates itself as the most finite and richest, the most abyssal of its own intimacy. For beyng is never a determination of the god as god; rather, beyng is that which the divinization of the god needs so as to remain nevertheless completely distinct from it (Heidegger 2012, 189).

The last god thus does not confront us with the ultimate revelation or incarnation of the Godhead. The last god means that God’s essence is his own passing away; he is the one who

passes away, never having come and never having to go away (Stagi 2013, 114). The last god «has never yet come and has always already passed away; a God who is ultimate precisely because he recuses being from himself, though in need of it, and who in this unrealizable destitution constitutes the ultimate sign of finiteness, that is, of the “ontological” irretrievability of being itself» (Esposito 2003, 206). Heidegger states that «The most intrinsic finitude of beyng reveals itself here: in the intimation of the last god» (Heidegger 2012, 325)⁶. This God says, as Vincenzo Vitiello notes, the «mystery of finiteness»:

says of the past God and the coming God - of their equal ultimacy. It says of the ultimacy of all gods. It says that there is no divine except as ultimate, except as presence-abandonment, donation-denial, that there is no presence except suspended to absence, word that is not in the impossible possibility of Silence, and yet abandoned to itself, to its irredeemable death (Vitiello 1995, 70)

This distinctive feature of God, his ultimate being,

announces that his advent always remains in doubt, and that like being it too cannot pass with his beckoning otherwise than in the manner of the 'possible'. His is a presence that is at the same time abandonment, like an offering that is given in refusal, since the very “divinity” of the divine is all in the initial gesture of this retreating as a presence that is always held in abeyance, like the possible possibility exposed to the impossible of Silence (Forcellino 2003, 95).

The only voice that can approach his passage, able to grasp his transit and possible coming, is one that has to do with silence. This means that «What is last is therefore withdrawn from all calculation and for that reason must be able to bear the burden of the loudest and most repeated misinterpretation» (Heidegger 2012, 321). Hidden in his being “ultimate” is that unrepeatable and unique character and trait that helps illuminate the essential aspect of every possible god:

The last god is not an end. The last god is the oscillation of the beginning in itself and thus is the highest form of refusal, since what is inceptual eludes every attempt to grasp onto it and essentially occurs only in protruding beyond all things that, as futural, are already incorporated into it and are delivered over to its determining power (Heidegger 2012, 329).

The last god is «a God who reveals himself to be divine precisely because of the power with which he eludes all

attempts at idolatrous capture, a power that does not bind, that merely sends “hints”, signs for those who know and are willing to place themselves at the service of the surplus» (Regina 2003, 136). The last god is a *Deus absconditus*, a God who is given in denial and rejection: «Recusal, the most extreme trait of the possibility of the last god radicalizes its being possible to the point of denial of the possibility of itself, to the impossible that denies itself and denies the making possible in the extreme difference of nothingness without any clue of revelation» (Forcellino 2003, 99). In this way, it is also part of the possibility of such a God’s most radical possibility, that of non revelation, and thus of an extreme revelation that also conceals the impossibility of giving himself as such, that is, of a revelation that is, that can also be its exact opposite: non revelation⁷.

Heidegger affirms that the last god has no need for temples, churches and places set aside for worship:

With our provenance out of a “metaphysically” determined position toward beings, we will only with difficulty and delay be able to know what is otherwise, namely that neither in “personal” nor in “massively shared” “lived experience” does the god still appear. The god appears uniquely in the abyssal “space” of being itself. All previous “creeds,” “churches,” and the like cannot in the least become the essential preparation for the encounter of god and the human being in the midst of being (Heidegger 2012, 329-330).

Because of his inability to find suitable temples and dwellings, this God has no place to take root and stay. The last god is a divinity that shatters established patterns and stable and unshakable logics of thought and that challenges the very dimension of faith even going so far as to configure himself, at least on the surface, as a possible blasphemy. In fact, Heidegger wonders whether

To speak of the last god - is that not a degradation of God, indeed pure and simple blasphemy? Yet what if the last god must be so named, because the decision about the gods ultimately leads under and among them and so raises to the highest the essence of the uniqueness of the Godhead? (Heidegger 2012, 322).

Heidegger answer is that «If we think calculatively here and take “last” in the sense of sheer stoppage and ending, rather than in the sense of the most extreme and most

compendious decision about what is highest, then any knowledge of the last god is of course impossible» (Heidegger 2012, 322). The peculiarity of the last god is his extreme eccentricity, that is, his radical detachment from calculative thinking and at the same time his equally radical detachment from traditional cults, faiths, rites, churches, and liturgies: «What remains constant in Heidegger's thought is the question of being, the one star toward which we must go, and that this star comes from the East (formerly the East), from a particular experience of life that is of Judeo-Christian origin, although it has often been articulated and clarified with reference to Greek thought» (Stagi 2013, 9).

4. Concluding remarks

In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger's ambivalent stance toward the problem of God becomes evident: on the one hand, he seeks to move beyond the metaphysical conception of the divine; on the other, his thinking is explicitly shaped by an openness to the expectation of an event in which new images of the divine might emerge. The figure of the last god signifies this «turn» toward a new manifestation of Being, about which man can do nothing but prepare and await (Fabris 2002, 671).

As we have sought to demonstrate, the last god has nothing to do with theology or faith⁸. He remains a god who belongs to thought: «He is a requirement of thought, indeed, even more precisely, he is a requirement for thought. Certainly, in the face of such a God one cannot dance – as Heidegger himself advocated in *Identität und Differenz* – especially since it is a God who is by definition absent, whose advent thought can and must only prepare – but only asymptotically» (Strummiello 1995, 324).

Philosophers, have the arduous task of preparing for such an advent: but it is an end in itself, a preparation, a promise that can never be fulfilled definitively and completely, because «if it were, the ultimate God would cease to be such» (Strummiello 1995, 324). Strummiello emphasizes the fact that there is a singular and accidental messianic component at the bottom of

this waiting of waiting, preparation of preparation: something that - for just a moment, and only marginally – seems to bring Heidegger closer again to Jewish thought (and even to Lévinas). But with an essential difference: the waiting of man is never a waiting of God or for God, but always and only the preparation of the event of the truth of being (Strummiello 1995, 325-326)⁹.

The co-participation of Being and God is reaffirmed here: the chink opened by Being accompanies toward the need for God, and conversely, the event of the opening of Being can only be prepared from the nod of the last god.

In such essential occurrence of the intimation, being itself attains its maturity. Maturity is readiness to become fruit and bestowal. Occurring essentially herein is what is last, the essential end required by the beginning but not carried toward it. The most intrinsic finitude of being reveals itself here: in the intimation of the last god (Heidegger 2012, 325).

But the gift of Being is not, in fact, that its retraction: «In maturity, potency for fruit and greatness for bestowal, there lies at the same time the *most concealed* essence of the “not,” as the “not yet” and the “not any longer”» (Heidegger 2012, 325). The last god is, then, a God who is lacking, a God who is such lack himself, who inhabits this lack. A God who can only be awaited. And such waiting excludes any salvation or redemption:

Occurring here is not a deliverance - i.e., basically a suppression - of the human being but, rather, an establishment of the more original essence (the grounding of Da-sein) in being itself: the acknowledgment of the belongingness of the human being to being through the god and the admission by the god of needing being, whereby the god does not at all renounce himself or his greatness (Heidegger 2012, 325).

Heidegger's philosophical theology has, therefore, nothing to do with any soteriology just as it has no eschatological dimension since it does not arise from a need for mankind's salvation, but from a need on the part of the God of Being¹⁰.

In light of what has been said so far, the conclusion of the Heideggerian attempt to liberate God from Being appears clear, and Marion's statement that for Heidegger «this liberation is also contrary to the conditions of thought» (Marion

1991, 61). As we have been able to see Heidegger establishes a sharp chiasm between God and Being. In this sense must be read the pages, quoted earlier, from the Zurich seminar, when Heidegger states that Being and God are not «identical» and that the essence of God is not to be conceived through Being. Heidegger in this seminar states that

being can never be thought as the ground and essence of god, but that the experience of god and its manifestness (insofar as it is encountered by the human being) nonetheless takes place in the direction of being, which never means that being could be a possible predicate of god (Heidegger 2005, 436-437).

Thus for Heidegger the experience and advent of God, rather than depending on God himself, depends on Being, and the thought of Being. In this sense we seem to be able to agree with Fédier's thesis, which points out that Heidegger does not «absolutely claims to submit God to being. It merely points out soberly that whenever it comes to thinking God one must preliminarily think being» (Fedier 1980, 44)¹¹, because he speaks of a precedence of Being over God, which in order to manifest and reveal itself must satisfy preliminaries, preliminaries of the thought of Being. In this way, Being precedes the question of God, in the same sense that Being determines at the outset, on the basis of the gods, the divine and the sacred, God. For Marion, «Being offers in advance the screen on which any “God” that would be constituted would be projected and would appear—since, by definition, to be constituted signifies to be constituted as a being» (Marion 1991, 70) and constitutes a preliminary to the manifestation of God, which can only take place in the dimension of Being itself. Being then constitutes a constraint for last god. This is a God who needs Being, and whose epiphany occurs only in the abyssal heart of Being, and not in the places set aside for worship. He is a God who comes as the ultimate, a God of ultimacy. There remains, then, in *Contributions* the Heideggerian attempt to conceive and experience a new concept of the divine. But here, no matter how hard Heidegger strives to postulate a detachment between Being and God, he is unable to disregard, as far as the manifestation of God is concerned, the dimension of Being, which ends up becoming a screen and a

mortgage, that is, a fundamental and determining constraint for a possible manifestation and coming of God. The «God who thus comes, if he comes, and even if he is the last god, is a God who comes at the thought of Being. A God who comes from the firmament and galaxy of Being, and who remains harnessed and entangled in the meshes and net of Being» (Di Chiro 2010, 56).

NOTES

¹ The complex topic of *Kehre* in Heidegger's thought would deserve a very extensive treatment that is beyond the scope of this paper. For a framing of the topic in question in the overall architecture of Heideggerian thought we merely refer to: Paravati 2011; Bertolini 2011. On the theme of *Kehre* in relation to *Contributions to Philosophy* see: D'Angelo 1992; Samonà 1997.

² In the case of a quotation from the Italian, the translation is mine.

³ On the theme of the divine in *Contributions to Philosophy* see: Magris 1989; Viscomi 2018; Duman 2014.

⁴ On the figure of «the last god» in *Contributions* see: Mancini 1994; Coriando 1995; Regina 1990; Duque 1995; Courtine 1994; Glazier 2022; Kearney 2002; Zuzunaga 2022; Wrathall & Lambeth 2011; Surzyn 2023; Ionescu 2002.

⁵ On the relationship of the last god and the Christian God, see Hübner 1999. On Christianity in Heidegger see: Savarino 2001; Franck 2004.

⁶ On the theme of finitude and the negativity of Being, see: Cover 1993; Esposito 1999.

⁷ Here, at this point, for a brief moment, singular would seem to be the consonance between the last god of Heidegger's *Contributions*, who can reveal himself but also not reveal himself, and the God of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* who does not reveal himself in the world. See Wittgenstein (1961, 149).

⁸ On theology in Heidegger see: Dastur 1994; De Vitiis 1995; Ott - Penzo (eds.), 1996; Capelle 1998; Anelli 2011; Costa 1974.

⁹ On a possible closeness between Heidegger and Lévinas on this point see: Nancy 1999, 23; Sikka 1998.

¹⁰ On the issue of eschatology in *Contributions* see: Osti 2019; Greisch 1996.

¹¹ Against the theoretically reductive attempt to reduce God to Being see Moretti 1999, 14: «In Heidegger the problem of the sacred and the divine is aestheticized, Heidegger reduces God to being, and the latter swallows up the former. We definitely distance ourselves from these simplifications, as well as from the ultimately complementary attempts to make out that Heidegger calls being what theology calls God. For Heidegger, so it seems to us, the Christian God is part of the story of being as presence that closes with the overcoming of metaphysics; hence his critique of theology and its philosophical approach, a critique that remains insurmountable even by resorting to the easy loophole of the mystical Heidegger».

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